| File: | root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c |
| Warning: | line 3342, column 17 Value stored to 'crv' is never read |
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| 1 | /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| 2 | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| 3 | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
| 4 | /* |
| 5 | * This file implements the Symkey wrapper and the PKCS context |
| 6 | * Interfaces. |
| 7 | */ |
| 8 | |
| 9 | #include <stddef.h> |
| 10 | #include <limits.h> |
| 11 | |
| 12 | #include "seccomon.h" |
| 13 | #include "secmod.h" |
| 14 | #include "secmodi.h" |
| 15 | #include "secmodti.h" |
| 16 | #include "pkcs11.h" |
| 17 | #include "pk11func.h" |
| 18 | #include "secitem.h" |
| 19 | #include "secoid.h" |
| 20 | #include "secerr.h" |
| 21 | #include "hasht.h" |
| 22 | |
| 23 | static ECPointEncoding pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); |
| 24 | |
| 25 | static void |
| 26 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 27 | { |
| 28 | if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 29 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); |
| 30 | } |
| 31 | |
| 32 | static void |
| 33 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 34 | { |
| 35 | if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 36 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); |
| 37 | } |
| 38 | |
| 39 | /* |
| 40 | * pk11_getKeyFromList returns a symKey that has a session (if needSession |
| 41 | * was specified), or explicitly does not have a session (if needSession |
| 42 | * was not specified). |
| 43 | */ |
| 44 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 45 | pk11_getKeyFromList(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool needSession) |
| 46 | { |
| 47 | PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 48 | |
| 49 | PR_Lock(slot->freeListLock); |
| 50 | /* own session list are symkeys with sessions that the symkey owns. |
| 51 | * 'most' symkeys will own their own session. */ |
| 52 | if (needSession) { |
| 53 | if (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) { |
| 54 | symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead; |
| 55 | slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next; |
| 56 | slot->keyCount--; |
| 57 | } |
| 58 | } |
| 59 | /* if we don't need a symkey with its own session, or we couldn't find |
| 60 | * one on the owner list, get one from the non-owner free list. */ |
| 61 | if (!symKey) { |
| 62 | if (slot->freeSymKeysHead) { |
| 63 | symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead; |
| 64 | slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next; |
| 65 | slot->keyCount--; |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | } |
| 68 | PR_Unlock(slot->freeListLock); |
| 69 | if (symKey) { |
| 70 | symKey->next = NULL((void*)0); |
| 71 | if (!needSession) { |
| 72 | return symKey; |
| 73 | } |
| 74 | /* if we are getting an owner key, make sure we have a valid session. |
| 75 | * session could be invalid if the token has been removed or because |
| 76 | * we got it from the non-owner free list */ |
| 77 | if ((symKey->series != slot->series) || |
| 78 | (symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0)) { |
| 79 | symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner); |
| 80 | } |
| 81 | PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)((symKey->session != 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",81 )); |
| 82 | if (symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) |
| 83 | return symKey; |
| 84 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 85 | /* if we are here, we need a session, but couldn't get one, it's |
| 86 | * unlikely we pk11_GetNewSession will succeed if we call it a second |
| 87 | * time. */ |
| 88 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | |
| 91 | symKey = PORT_New(PK11SymKey)(PK11SymKey *)PORT_Alloc_Util(sizeof(PK11SymKey)); |
| 92 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 93 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 94 | } |
| 95 | |
| 96 | symKey->next = NULL((void*)0); |
| 97 | if (needSession) { |
| 98 | symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner); |
| 99 | PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)((symKey->session != 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",99 )); |
| 100 | if (symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 101 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 102 | symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 103 | } |
| 104 | } else { |
| 105 | symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | return symKey; |
| 108 | } |
| 109 | |
| 110 | /* Caller MUST hold slot->freeListLock (or ref count == 0?) !! */ |
| 111 | void |
| 112 | PK11_CleanKeyList(PK11SlotInfo *slot) |
| 113 | { |
| 114 | PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 115 | |
| 116 | while (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) { |
| 117 | symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead; |
| 118 | slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next; |
| 119 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner); |
| 120 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(symKey); |
| 121 | } |
| 122 | while (slot->freeSymKeysHead) { |
| 123 | symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead; |
| 124 | slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next; |
| 125 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner); |
| 126 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(symKey); |
| 127 | } |
| 128 | return; |
| 129 | } |
| 130 | |
| 131 | /* |
| 132 | * create a symetric key: |
| 133 | * Slot is the slot to create the key in. |
| 134 | * type is the mechanism type |
| 135 | * owner is does this symKey structure own it's object handle (rare |
| 136 | * that this is false). |
| 137 | * needSession means the returned symKey will return with a valid session |
| 138 | * allocated already. |
| 139 | */ |
| 140 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 141 | pk11_CreateSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 142 | PRBool owner, PRBool needSession, void *wincx) |
| 143 | { |
| 144 | |
| 145 | PK11SymKey *symKey = pk11_getKeyFromList(slot, needSession); |
| 146 | |
| 147 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 148 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | /* if needSession was specified, make sure we have a valid session. |
| 151 | * callers which specify needSession as false should do their own |
| 152 | * check of the session before returning the symKey */ |
| 153 | if (needSession && symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 154 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 155 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 156 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 157 | } |
| 158 | |
| 159 | symKey->type = type; |
| 160 | symKey->data.type = siBuffer; |
| 161 | symKey->data.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 162 | symKey->data.len = 0; |
| 163 | symKey->owner = owner; |
| 164 | symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 165 | symKey->slot = slot; |
| 166 | symKey->series = slot->series; |
| 167 | symKey->cx = wincx; |
| 168 | symKey->size = 0; |
| 169 | symKey->refCount = 1; |
| 170 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginNULL; |
| 171 | symKey->parent = NULL((void*)0); |
| 172 | symKey->freeFunc = NULL((void*)0); |
| 173 | symKey->userData = NULL((void*)0); |
| 174 | PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); |
| 175 | return symKey; |
| 176 | } |
| 177 | |
| 178 | /* |
| 179 | * destroy a symetric key |
| 180 | */ |
| 181 | void |
| 182 | PK11_FreeSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 183 | { |
| 184 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 185 | PRBool freeit = PR_TRUE1; |
| 186 | |
| 187 | if (!symKey) { |
| 188 | return; |
| 189 | } |
| 190 | |
| 191 | if (PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&symKey->refCount)__sync_sub_and_fetch(&symKey->refCount, 1) == 0) { |
| 192 | PK11SymKey *parent = symKey->parent; |
| 193 | |
| 194 | symKey->parent = NULL((void*)0); |
| 195 | if ((symKey->owner) && symKey->objectID != CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 196 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 197 | (void)PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((symKey->slot)->functionList ))->C_DestroyObject(symKey->session, symKey->objectID); |
| 198 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | if (symKey->data.data) { |
| 201 | PORT_Memsetmemset(symKey->data.data, 0, symKey->data.len); |
| 202 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(symKey->data.data); |
| 203 | } |
| 204 | /* free any existing data */ |
| 205 | if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) { |
| 206 | (*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData); |
| 207 | } |
| 208 | slot = symKey->slot; |
| 209 | PR_Lock(slot->freeListLock); |
| 210 | if (slot->keyCount < slot->maxKeyCount) { |
| 211 | /* |
| 212 | * freeSymkeysWithSessionHead contain a list of reusable |
| 213 | * SymKey structures with valid sessions. |
| 214 | * sessionOwner must be true. |
| 215 | * session must be valid. |
| 216 | * freeSymKeysHead contain a list of SymKey structures without |
| 217 | * valid session. |
| 218 | * session must be CK_INVALID_HANDLE. |
| 219 | * though sessionOwner is false, callers should not depend on |
| 220 | * this fact. |
| 221 | */ |
| 222 | if (symKey->sessionOwner) { |
| 223 | PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)((symKey->session != 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",223 )); |
| 224 | symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead; |
| 225 | slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey; |
| 226 | } else { |
| 227 | symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 228 | symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysHead; |
| 229 | slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey; |
| 230 | } |
| 231 | slot->keyCount++; |
| 232 | symKey->slot = NULL((void*)0); |
| 233 | freeit = PR_FALSE0; |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | PR_Unlock(slot->freeListLock); |
| 236 | if (freeit) { |
| 237 | pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session, |
| 238 | symKey->sessionOwner); |
| 239 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(symKey); |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 242 | |
| 243 | if (parent) { |
| 244 | PK11_FreeSymKey(parent); |
| 245 | } |
| 246 | } |
| 247 | } |
| 248 | |
| 249 | PK11SymKey * |
| 250 | PK11_ReferenceSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 251 | { |
| 252 | PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&symKey->refCount)__sync_add_and_fetch(&symKey->refCount, 1); |
| 253 | return symKey; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | |
| 256 | /* |
| 257 | * Accessors |
| 258 | */ |
| 259 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
| 260 | PK11_GetMechanism(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 261 | { |
| 262 | return symKey->type; |
| 263 | } |
| 264 | |
| 265 | /* |
| 266 | * return the slot associated with a symetric key |
| 267 | */ |
| 268 | PK11SlotInfo * |
| 269 | PK11_GetSlotFromKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 270 | { |
| 271 | return PK11_ReferenceSlot(symKey->slot); |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | |
| 274 | CK_KEY_TYPE |
| 275 | PK11_GetSymKeyType(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 276 | { |
| 277 | return PK11_GetKeyType(symKey->type, symKey->size); |
| 278 | } |
| 279 | |
| 280 | PK11SymKey * |
| 281 | PK11_GetNextSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 282 | { |
| 283 | return symKey ? symKey->next : NULL((void*)0); |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | char * |
| 287 | PK11_GetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 288 | { |
| 289 | return PK11_GetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID); |
| 290 | } |
| 291 | |
| 292 | SECStatus |
| 293 | PK11_SetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey, const char *nickname) |
| 294 | { |
| 295 | return PK11_SetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, nickname); |
| 296 | } |
| 297 | |
| 298 | void * |
| 299 | PK11_GetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 300 | { |
| 301 | return symKey->userData; |
| 302 | } |
| 303 | |
| 304 | void |
| 305 | PK11_SetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey, void *userData, |
| 306 | PK11FreeDataFunc freeFunc) |
| 307 | { |
| 308 | /* free any existing data */ |
| 309 | if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) { |
| 310 | (*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData); |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | symKey->userData = userData; |
| 313 | symKey->freeFunc = freeFunc; |
| 314 | return; |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | |
| 317 | /* |
| 318 | * turn key handle into an appropriate key object |
| 319 | */ |
| 320 | PK11SymKey * |
| 321 | PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *parent, PK11Origin origin, |
| 322 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyID, PRBool owner, void *wincx) |
| 323 | { |
| 324 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 325 | PRBool needSession = !(owner && parent); |
| 326 | |
| 327 | if (keyID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 328 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 329 | } |
| 330 | |
| 331 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, owner, needSession, wincx); |
| 332 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 333 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 334 | } |
| 335 | |
| 336 | symKey->objectID = keyID; |
| 337 | symKey->origin = origin; |
| 338 | |
| 339 | /* adopt the parent's session */ |
| 340 | /* This is only used by SSL. What we really want here is a session |
| 341 | * structure with a ref count so the session goes away only after all the |
| 342 | * keys do. */ |
| 343 | if (!needSession) { |
| 344 | symKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE0; |
| 345 | symKey->session = parent->session; |
| 346 | symKey->parent = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(parent); |
| 347 | /* This is the only case where pk11_CreateSymKey does not explicitly |
| 348 | * check symKey->session. We need to assert here to make sure. |
| 349 | * the session isn't invalid. */ |
| 350 | PORT_Assert(parent->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)((parent->session != 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("parent->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",350 )); |
| 351 | if (parent->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 352 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 353 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 354 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | } |
| 357 | |
| 358 | return symKey; |
| 359 | } |
| 360 | |
| 361 | /* |
| 362 | * Restore a symmetric wrapping key that was saved using PK11_SetWrapKey. |
| 363 | * |
| 364 | * This function is provided for ABI compatibility; see PK11_SetWrapKey below. |
| 365 | */ |
| 366 | PK11SymKey * |
| 367 | PK11_GetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 368 | int series, void *wincx) |
| 369 | { |
| 370 | PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 371 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle; |
| 372 | |
| 373 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 374 | /* refKeys is a fixed-size array; bounds-check wrap to match |
| 375 | * PK11_SetWrapKey. */ |
| 376 | if (wrap < 0 || (size_t)wrap >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(slot->refKeys)(sizeof(slot->refKeys)/sizeof((slot->refKeys)[0])) || |
| 377 | slot->series != series || |
| 378 | slot->refKeys[wrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 379 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 380 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 381 | } |
| 382 | |
| 383 | if (type == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM0xffffffffUL) { |
| 384 | type = slot->wrapMechanism; |
| 385 | } |
| 386 | |
| 387 | keyHandle = slot->refKeys[wrap]; |
| 388 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 389 | symKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL((void*)0), PK11_OriginDerive, |
| 390 | slot->wrapMechanism, keyHandle, PR_FALSE0, wincx); |
| 391 | return symKey; |
| 392 | } |
| 393 | |
| 394 | /* |
| 395 | * This function sets an attribute on the current slot with a wrapping key. The |
| 396 | * data saved is ephemeral; it needs to be run every time the program is |
| 397 | * invoked. |
| 398 | * |
| 399 | * Since NSS 3.45, this function is marginally more thread safe. It uses the |
| 400 | * slot lock (if present) and fails silently if a value is already set. Use |
| 401 | * PK11_GetWrapKey() after calling this function to get the current wrapping key |
| 402 | * in case there was an update on another thread. |
| 403 | * |
| 404 | * Either way, using this function is inadvisable. It's provided for ABI |
| 405 | * compatibility only. |
| 406 | */ |
| 407 | void |
| 408 | PK11_SetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, PK11SymKey *wrapKey) |
| 409 | { |
| 410 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 411 | if (wrap >= 0) { |
| 412 | size_t uwrap = (size_t)wrap; |
| 413 | if (uwrap < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(slot->refKeys)(sizeof(slot->refKeys)/sizeof((slot->refKeys)[0])) && |
| 414 | slot->refKeys[uwrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 415 | /* save the handle and mechanism for the wrapping key */ |
| 416 | /* mark the key and session as not owned by us so they don't get |
| 417 | * freed when the key goes way... that lets us reuse the key |
| 418 | * later */ |
| 419 | slot->refKeys[uwrap] = wrapKey->objectID; |
| 420 | wrapKey->owner = PR_FALSE0; |
| 421 | wrapKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE0; |
| 422 | slot->wrapMechanism = wrapKey->type; |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | } |
| 425 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | |
| 428 | /* |
| 429 | * figure out if a key is still valid or if it is stale. |
| 430 | */ |
| 431 | PRBool |
| 432 | PK11_VerifyKeyOK(PK11SymKey *key) |
| 433 | { |
| 434 | if (!PK11_IsPresent(key->slot)) { |
| 435 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 436 | } |
| 437 | return (PRBool)(key->series == key->slot->series); |
| 438 | } |
| 439 | |
| 440 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 441 | pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 442 | PK11Origin origin, PRBool isToken, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, |
| 443 | unsigned int templateCount, SECItem *key, void *wincx) |
| 444 | { |
| 445 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 446 | SECStatus rv; |
| 447 | |
| 448 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 449 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 450 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | |
| 453 | symKey->size = key->len; |
| 454 | |
| 455 | PK11_SETATTRS(&keyTemplate[templateCount], CKA_VALUE, key->data, key->len)(&keyTemplate[templateCount])->type = (0x00000011UL); ( &keyTemplate[templateCount])->pValue = (key->data); (&keyTemplate[templateCount])->ulValueLen = (key-> len);; |
| 456 | templateCount++; |
| 457 | |
| 458 | if (SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &symKey->data, key) != SECSuccess) { |
| 459 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 460 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 461 | } |
| 462 | |
| 463 | symKey->origin = origin; |
| 464 | |
| 465 | /* import the keys */ |
| 466 | rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, symKey->session, keyTemplate, |
| 467 | templateCount, isToken, &symKey->objectID); |
| 468 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 469 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 470 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | |
| 473 | return symKey; |
| 474 | } |
| 475 | |
| 476 | /* |
| 477 | * turn key bits into an appropriate key object |
| 478 | */ |
| 479 | PK11SymKey * |
| 480 | PK11_ImportSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 481 | PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx) |
| 482 | { |
| 483 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 484 | unsigned int templateCount = 0; |
| 485 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 486 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 487 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; /* sigh */ |
| 488 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[5]; |
| 489 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 490 | |
| 491 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 492 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 493 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 494 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 495 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 496 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 497 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | |
| 500 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 501 | attrs++; |
| 502 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 503 | attrs++; |
| 504 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (1);; |
| 505 | attrs++; |
| 506 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 507 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",507 )); |
| 508 | |
| 509 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len); |
| 510 | symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, PR_FALSE0, |
| 511 | keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx); |
| 512 | return symKey; |
| 513 | } |
| 514 | /* Import a PKCS #11 data object and return it as a key. This key is |
| 515 | * only useful in a limited number of mechanisms, such as HKDF. */ |
| 516 | PK11SymKey * |
| 517 | PK11_ImportDataKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, PK11Origin origin, |
| 518 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx) |
| 519 | { |
| 520 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS ckoData = CKO_DATA0x00000000UL; |
| 521 | CK_ATTRIBUTE template[2] = { { CKA_CLASS0x00000000UL, (CK_BYTE_PTR)&ckoData, sizeof(ckoData) }, |
| 522 | { CKA_VALUE0x00000011UL, (CK_BYTE_PTR)key->data, key->len } }; |
| 523 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle; |
| 524 | PK11GenericObject *genObject; |
| 525 | |
| 526 | genObject = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, template, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template)(sizeof(template)/sizeof((template)[0])), PR_FALSE0); |
| 527 | if (genObject == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 528 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 529 | } |
| 530 | handle = PK11_GetObjectHandle(PK11_TypeGeneric, genObject, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 531 | /* A note about ownership of the PKCS #11 handle: |
| 532 | * PK11_CreateGenericObject() will not destroy the object it creates |
| 533 | * on Free, For that you want PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject(). |
| 534 | * Below we import the handle into the symKey structure. We pass |
| 535 | * PR_TRUE as the owner so that the symKey will destroy the object |
| 536 | * once it's freed. This is why it's safe to destroy genObject now. */ |
| 537 | PK11_DestroyGenericObject(genObject); |
| 538 | if (handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 539 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL((void*)0), origin, type, handle, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 542 | } |
| 543 | |
| 544 | /* turn key bits into an appropriate key object */ |
| 545 | PK11SymKey * |
| 546 | PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 547 | PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, |
| 548 | CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm, void *wincx) |
| 549 | { |
| 550 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 551 | unsigned int templateCount = 0; |
| 552 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 553 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 554 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; /* sigh */ |
| 555 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 556 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 557 | |
| 558 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 559 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 560 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 561 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 562 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 563 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 564 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 565 | } |
| 566 | |
| 567 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 568 | attrs++; |
| 569 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 570 | attrs++; |
| 571 | if (isPerm) { |
| 572 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(cktrue));; |
| 573 | attrs++; |
| 574 | /* sigh some tokens think CKA_PRIVATE = false is a reasonable |
| 575 | * default for secret keys */ |
| 576 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue))(attrs)->type = (0x00000002UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(cktrue));; |
| 577 | attrs++; |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 580 | if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY0) && |
| 581 | !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, attrs - keyTemplate, operation)) { |
| 582 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue))(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(cktrue));; |
| 583 | attrs++; |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 586 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",586 )); |
| 587 | |
| 588 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len); |
| 589 | symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, isPerm, |
| 590 | keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx); |
| 591 | if (symKey && isPerm) { |
| 592 | symKey->owner = PR_FALSE0; |
| 593 | } |
| 594 | return symKey; |
| 595 | } |
| 596 | |
| 597 | PK11SymKey * |
| 598 | PK11_FindFixedKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *keyID, |
| 599 | void *wincx) |
| 600 | { |
| 601 | CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[5]; |
| 602 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 603 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 604 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 605 | size_t tsize = 0; |
| 606 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE key_id; |
| 607 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, 0); |
| 608 | |
| 609 | attrs = findTemp; |
| 610 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyclass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyclass));; |
| 611 | attrs++; |
| 612 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& ckTrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(ckTrue));; |
| 613 | attrs++; |
| 614 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 615 | attrs++; |
| 616 | if (keyID) { |
| 617 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len)(attrs)->type = (0x00000102UL); (attrs)->pValue = (keyID ->data); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (keyID->len);; |
| 618 | attrs++; |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | tsize = attrs - findTemp; |
| 621 | PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))?((void )0):PR_Assert("tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",621 )); |
| 622 | |
| 623 | key_id = pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize); |
| 624 | if (key_id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 625 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL((void*)0), PK11_OriginDerive, type, key_id, |
| 628 | PR_FALSE0, wincx); |
| 629 | } |
| 630 | |
| 631 | PK11SymKey * |
| 632 | PK11_ListFixedKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx) |
| 633 | { |
| 634 | CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4]; |
| 635 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 636 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 637 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 638 | int tsize = 0; |
| 639 | int objCount = 0; |
| 640 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids; |
| 641 | PK11SymKey *nextKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 642 | PK11SymKey *topKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 643 | int i, len; |
| 644 | |
| 645 | attrs = findTemp; |
| 646 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyclass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyclass));; |
| 647 | attrs++; |
| 648 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& ckTrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(ckTrue));; |
| 649 | attrs++; |
| 650 | if (nickname) { |
| 651 | len = PORT_Strlen(nickname)strlen(nickname); |
| 652 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len)(attrs)->type = (0x00000003UL); (attrs)->pValue = (nickname ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (len);; |
| 653 | attrs++; |
| 654 | } |
| 655 | tsize = attrs - findTemp; |
| 656 | PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))?((void )0):PR_Assert("tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",656 )); |
| 657 | |
| 658 | key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize, &objCount); |
| 659 | if (key_ids == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 660 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 661 | } |
| 662 | |
| 663 | for (i = 0; i < objCount; i++) { |
| 664 | SECItem typeData; |
| 665 | CK_KEY_TYPE type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 666 | SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, key_ids[i], |
| 667 | CKA_KEY_TYPE0x00000100UL, NULL((void*)0), &typeData); |
| 668 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 669 | if (typeData.len == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) { |
| 670 | type = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)typeData.data; |
| 671 | } |
| 672 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(typeData.data); |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | nextKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL((void*)0), PK11_OriginDerive, |
| 675 | PK11_GetKeyMechanism(type), key_ids[i], PR_FALSE0, wincx); |
| 676 | if (nextKey) { |
| 677 | nextKey->next = topKey; |
| 678 | topKey = nextKey; |
| 679 | } |
| 680 | } |
| 681 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(key_ids); |
| 682 | return topKey; |
| 683 | } |
| 684 | |
| 685 | void * |
| 686 | PK11_GetWindow(PK11SymKey *key) |
| 687 | { |
| 688 | return key->cx; |
| 689 | } |
| 690 | |
| 691 | /* |
| 692 | * extract a symmetric key value. NOTE: if the key is sensitive, we will |
| 693 | * not be able to do this operation. This function is used to move |
| 694 | * keys from one token to another */ |
| 695 | SECStatus |
| 696 | PK11_ExtractKeyValue(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 697 | { |
| 698 | SECStatus rv; |
| 699 | |
| 700 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 701 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 702 | return SECFailure; |
| 703 | } |
| 704 | |
| 705 | if (symKey->data.data != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 706 | if (symKey->size == 0) { |
| 707 | symKey->size = symKey->data.len; |
| 708 | } |
| 709 | return SECSuccess; |
| 710 | } |
| 711 | |
| 712 | if (symKey->slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 713 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); |
| 714 | return SECFailure; |
| 715 | } |
| 716 | |
| 717 | rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, CKA_VALUE0x00000011UL, NULL((void*)0), |
| 718 | &symKey->data); |
| 719 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 720 | symKey->size = symKey->data.len; |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | return rv; |
| 723 | } |
| 724 | |
| 725 | SECStatus |
| 726 | PK11_DeleteTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 727 | { |
| 728 | if (!PK11_IsPermObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID)) { |
| 729 | return SECFailure; |
| 730 | } |
| 731 | PK11_DestroyTokenObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID); |
| 732 | symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 733 | return SECSuccess; |
| 734 | } |
| 735 | |
| 736 | SECItem * |
| 737 | PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 738 | { |
| 739 | return &symKey->data; |
| 740 | } |
| 741 | |
| 742 | /* This symbol is exported for backward compatibility. */ |
| 743 | SECItem * |
| 744 | __PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 745 | { |
| 746 | return PK11_GetKeyData(symKey); |
| 747 | } |
| 748 | |
| 749 | /* |
| 750 | * PKCS #11 key Types with predefined length |
| 751 | */ |
| 752 | unsigned int |
| 753 | pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) |
| 754 | { |
| 755 | int length = 0; |
| 756 | switch (keyType) { |
| 757 | case CKK_DES0x00000013UL: |
| 758 | length = 8; |
| 759 | break; |
| 760 | case CKK_DES20x00000014UL: |
| 761 | length = 16; |
| 762 | break; |
| 763 | case CKK_DES30x00000015UL: |
| 764 | length = 24; |
| 765 | break; |
| 766 | case CKK_SKIPJACK0x0000001BUL: |
| 767 | length = 10; |
| 768 | break; |
| 769 | case CKK_BATON0x0000001CUL: |
| 770 | length = 20; |
| 771 | break; |
| 772 | case CKK_JUNIPER0x0000001DUL: |
| 773 | length = 20; |
| 774 | break; |
| 775 | default: |
| 776 | break; |
| 777 | } |
| 778 | return length; |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | |
| 781 | /* return the keylength if possible. '0' if not */ |
| 782 | unsigned int |
| 783 | PK11_GetKeyLength(PK11SymKey *key) |
| 784 | { |
| 785 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType; |
| 786 | |
| 787 | if (key->size != 0) |
| 788 | return key->size; |
| 789 | |
| 790 | /* First try to figure out the key length from its type */ |
| 791 | keyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_KEY_TYPE0x00000100UL); |
| 792 | key->size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType); |
| 793 | if ((keyType == CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL) && |
| 794 | (key->type == CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN0x00000370UL)) { |
| 795 | key->size = 48; |
| 796 | } |
| 797 | |
| 798 | if (key->size != 0) |
| 799 | return key->size; |
| 800 | |
| 801 | if (key->data.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 802 | PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key); |
| 803 | } |
| 804 | /* key is probably secret. Look up its length */ |
| 805 | /* this is new PKCS #11 version 2.0 functionality. */ |
| 806 | if (key->size == 0) { |
| 807 | CK_ULONG keyLength; |
| 808 | |
| 809 | keyLength = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_VALUE_LEN0x00000161UL); |
| 810 | if (keyLength != CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION(~0UL)) { |
| 811 | key->size = (unsigned int)keyLength; |
| 812 | } |
| 813 | } |
| 814 | |
| 815 | return key->size; |
| 816 | } |
| 817 | |
| 818 | /* return the strength of a key. This is different from length in that |
| 819 | * 1) it returns the size in bits, and 2) it returns only the secret portions |
| 820 | * of the key minus any checksums or parity. |
| 821 | */ |
| 822 | unsigned int |
| 823 | PK11_GetKeyStrength(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid) |
| 824 | { |
| 825 | int size = 0; |
| 826 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM0xffffffffUL; /* RC2 only */ |
| 827 | SECItem *param = NULL((void*)0); /* RC2 only */ |
| 828 | CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_params = NULL((void*)0); /* RC2 ONLY */ |
| 829 | unsigned int effectiveBits = 0; /* RC2 ONLY */ |
| 830 | |
| 831 | switch (PK11_GetKeyType(key->type, 0)) { |
| 832 | case CKK_CDMF0x0000001EUL: |
| 833 | return 40; |
| 834 | case CKK_DES0x00000013UL: |
| 835 | return 56; |
| 836 | case CKK_DES30x00000015UL: |
| 837 | case CKK_DES20x00000014UL: |
| 838 | size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key); |
| 839 | if (size == 16) { |
| 840 | /* double des */ |
| 841 | return 112; /* 16*7 */ |
| 842 | } |
| 843 | return 168; |
| 844 | /* |
| 845 | * RC2 has is different than other ciphers in that it allows the user |
| 846 | * to deprecating keysize while still requiring all the bits for the |
| 847 | * original key. The info |
| 848 | * on what the effective key strength is in the parameter for the key. |
| 849 | * In S/MIME this parameter is stored in the DER encoded algid. In Our |
| 850 | * other uses of RC2, effectiveBits == keyBits, so this code functions |
| 851 | * correctly without an algid. |
| 852 | */ |
| 853 | case CKK_RC20x00000011UL: |
| 854 | /* if no algid was provided, fall through to default */ |
| 855 | if (!algid) { |
| 856 | break; |
| 857 | } |
| 858 | /* verify that the algid is for RC2 */ |
| 859 | mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(algid)); |
| 860 | if ((mechanism != CKM_RC2_CBC0x00000102UL) && (mechanism != CKM_RC2_ECB0x00000101UL)) { |
| 861 | break; |
| 862 | } |
| 863 | |
| 864 | /* now get effective bits from the algorithm ID. */ |
| 865 | param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid); |
| 866 | /* if we couldn't get memory just use key length */ |
| 867 | if (param == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 868 | break; |
| 869 | } |
| 870 | |
| 871 | rc2_params = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)param->data; |
| 872 | /* paranoia... shouldn't happen */ |
| 873 | PORT_Assert(param->data != NULL)((param->data != ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert("param->data != NULL" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",873 )); |
| 874 | if (param->data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 875 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param, PR_TRUE1); |
| 876 | break; |
| 877 | } |
| 878 | effectiveBits = (unsigned int)rc2_params->ulEffectiveBits; |
| 879 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param, PR_TRUE1); |
| 880 | param = NULL((void*)0); |
| 881 | rc2_params = NULL((void*)0); /* paranoia */ |
| 882 | |
| 883 | /* we have effective bits, is and allocated memory is free, now |
| 884 | * we need to return the smaller of effective bits and keysize */ |
| 885 | size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key); |
| 886 | if ((unsigned int)size * 8 > effectiveBits) { |
| 887 | return effectiveBits; |
| 888 | } |
| 889 | |
| 890 | return size * 8; /* the actual key is smaller, the strength can't be |
| 891 | * greater than the actual key size */ |
| 892 | |
| 893 | default: |
| 894 | break; |
| 895 | } |
| 896 | return PK11_GetKeyLength(key) * 8; |
| 897 | } |
| 898 | |
| 899 | /* |
| 900 | * The next three utilities are to deal with the fact that a given operation |
| 901 | * may be a multi-slot affair. This creates a new key object that is copied |
| 902 | * into the new slot. |
| 903 | */ |
| 904 | PK11SymKey * |
| 905 | pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 906 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_FLAGS flags, |
| 907 | PRBool isPerm, PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 908 | { |
| 909 | SECStatus rv; |
| 910 | PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 911 | |
| 912 | /* Extract the raw key data if possible */ |
| 913 | if (symKey->data.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 914 | rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey); |
| 915 | /* KEY is sensitive, we're try key exchanging it. */ |
| 916 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 917 | return pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation, |
| 918 | flags, isPerm, symKey); |
| 919 | } |
| 920 | } |
| 921 | |
| 922 | newKey = PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(slot, type, symKey->origin, |
| 923 | operation, &symKey->data, flags, isPerm, symKey->cx); |
| 924 | if (newKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 925 | newKey = pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation, flags, isPerm, symKey); |
| 926 | } |
| 927 | return newKey; |
| 928 | } |
| 929 | |
| 930 | PK11SymKey * |
| 931 | pk11_CopyToSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 932 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 933 | { |
| 934 | return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, type, operation, 0, PR_FALSE0, symKey); |
| 935 | } |
| 936 | |
| 937 | /* |
| 938 | * Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation |
| 939 | * by verifying that it supports all of the specified mechanism types. |
| 940 | */ |
| 941 | PK11SymKey * |
| 942 | pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *type, |
| 943 | int mechCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) |
| 944 | { |
| 945 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = symKey->slot; |
| 946 | PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 947 | PRBool needToCopy = PR_FALSE0; |
| 948 | int i; |
| 949 | |
| 950 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 951 | needToCopy = PR_TRUE1; |
| 952 | } else { |
| 953 | i = 0; |
| 954 | while ((i < mechCount) && (needToCopy == PR_FALSE0)) { |
| 955 | if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type[i])) { |
| 956 | needToCopy = PR_TRUE1; |
| 957 | } |
| 958 | i++; |
| 959 | } |
| 960 | } |
| 961 | |
| 962 | if (needToCopy == PR_TRUE1) { |
| 963 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(type, mechCount, symKey->cx); |
| 964 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 965 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 966 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 967 | } |
| 968 | newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, type[0], operation, symKey); |
| 969 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 970 | } |
| 971 | return newKey; |
| 972 | } |
| 973 | |
| 974 | /* |
| 975 | * Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation |
| 976 | */ |
| 977 | PK11SymKey * |
| 978 | pk11_ForceSlot(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 979 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) |
| 980 | { |
| 981 | return pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(symKey, &type, 1, operation); |
| 982 | } |
| 983 | |
| 984 | PK11SymKey * |
| 985 | PK11_MoveSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 986 | CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool perm, PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 987 | { |
| 988 | if (symKey->slot == slot) { |
| 989 | if (perm) { |
| 990 | return PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(symKey, symKey->cx); |
| 991 | } else { |
| 992 | return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey); |
| 993 | } |
| 994 | } |
| 995 | |
| 996 | return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, symKey->type, |
| 997 | operation, flags, perm, symKey); |
| 998 | } |
| 999 | |
| 1000 | /* |
| 1001 | * Use the token to generate a key. |
| 1002 | * |
| 1003 | * keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero |
| 1004 | * keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template |
| 1005 | * for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN |
| 1006 | * attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you |
| 1007 | * select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN |
| 1008 | * parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen |
| 1009 | * function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN). |
| 1010 | * |
| 1011 | * keyType must be -1 for most algorithms. Some PBE algorthims cannot |
| 1012 | * determine the correct key type from the mechanism or the parameters, |
| 1013 | * so key type must be specified. Other PKCS #11 mechanisms may do so in |
| 1014 | * the future. Currently there is no need to export this publically. |
| 1015 | * Keep it private until there is a need in case we need to expand the |
| 1016 | * keygen parameters again... |
| 1017 | * |
| 1018 | * CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags |
| 1019 | * PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags |
| 1020 | */ |
| 1021 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1022 | pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 1023 | SECItem *param, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, int keySize, SECItem *keyid, |
| 1024 | CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx) |
| 1025 | { |
| 1026 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 1027 | CK_ATTRIBUTE genTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 1028 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = genTemplate; |
| 1029 | int count = sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(genTemplate[0]); |
| 1030 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType; |
| 1031 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 1032 | CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE0; |
| 1033 | CK_ULONG ck_key_size; /* only used for variable-length keys */ |
| 1034 | |
| 1035 | if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) { |
| 1036 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1037 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1038 | } |
| 1039 | |
| 1040 | if ((keySize != 0) && (type != CKM_DES3_CBC0x00000133UL) && |
| 1041 | (type != CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD0x00000136UL) && (type != CKM_DES3_ECB0x00000132UL)) { |
| 1042 | ck_key_size = keySize; /* Convert to PK11 type */ |
| 1043 | |
| 1044 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &ck_key_size, sizeof(ck_key_size))(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& ck_key_size); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(ck_key_size));; |
| 1045 | attrs++; |
| 1046 | } |
| 1047 | |
| 1048 | if (keyType != -1) { |
| 1049 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));; |
| 1050 | attrs++; |
| 1051 | } |
| 1052 | |
| 1053 | /* Include key id value if provided */ |
| 1054 | if (keyid) { |
| 1055 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyid->data, keyid->len)(attrs)->type = (0x00000102UL); (attrs)->pValue = (keyid ->data); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (keyid->len);; |
| 1056 | attrs++; |
| 1057 | } |
| 1058 | |
| 1059 | attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse); |
| 1060 | attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | count = attrs - genTemplate; |
| 1063 | PR_ASSERT(count <= sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((count <= sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))?((void )0):PR_Assert("count <= sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",1063 )); |
| 1064 | |
| 1065 | keyGenType = PK11_GetKeyGenWithSize(type, keySize); |
| 1066 | if (keyGenType == CKM_FAKE_RANDOM0x80000efeUL) { |
| 1067 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 1068 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1069 | } |
| 1070 | symKey = PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(slot, type, keyGenType, |
| 1071 | param, genTemplate, count, wincx); |
| 1072 | if (symKey != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1073 | symKey->size = keySize; |
| 1074 | } |
| 1075 | return symKey; |
| 1076 | } |
| 1077 | |
| 1078 | /* |
| 1079 | * Use the token to generate a key. - Public |
| 1080 | * |
| 1081 | * keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero |
| 1082 | * keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template |
| 1083 | * for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN |
| 1084 | * attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you |
| 1085 | * select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN |
| 1086 | * parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen |
| 1087 | * function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN). |
| 1088 | * |
| 1089 | * CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags |
| 1090 | * PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags |
| 1091 | */ |
| 1092 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1093 | PK11_TokenKeyGenWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 1094 | SECItem *param, int keySize, SECItem *keyid, CK_FLAGS opFlags, |
| 1095 | PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx) |
| 1096 | { |
| 1097 | return pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param, -1, keySize, |
| 1098 | keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx); |
| 1099 | } |
| 1100 | |
| 1101 | /* |
| 1102 | * Use the token to generate a key. keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key |
| 1103 | * length algorithms. A nonzero keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute |
| 1104 | * to be added to the template for the key. PKCS #11 modules fail if you |
| 1105 | * specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute for keys with fixed length. |
| 1106 | * NOTE: this means to generate a DES2 key from this interface you must |
| 1107 | * specify CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN as the mechanism directly; specifying |
| 1108 | * CKM_DES3_CBC as the mechanism and 16 as keySize currently doesn't work. |
| 1109 | */ |
| 1110 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1111 | PK11_TokenKeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, |
| 1112 | int keySize, SECItem *keyid, PRBool isToken, void *wincx) |
| 1113 | { |
| 1114 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 1115 | PRBool weird = PR_FALSE0; /* hack for fortezza */ |
| 1116 | CK_FLAGS opFlags = CKF_SIGN0x00000800UL; |
| 1117 | PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0; |
| 1118 | |
| 1119 | if ((keySize == -1) && (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC640x00001002UL)) { |
| 1120 | weird = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1121 | keySize = 0; |
| 1122 | } |
| 1123 | |
| 1124 | opFlags |= weird ? CKF_DECRYPT0x00000200UL : CKF_ENCRYPT0x00000100UL; |
| 1125 | |
| 1126 | if (isToken) { |
| 1127 | attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN0x00000001L | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE0x00000004L); |
| 1128 | } |
| 1129 | |
| 1130 | symKey = pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param, |
| 1131 | -1, keySize, keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx); |
| 1132 | if (symKey && weird) { |
| 1133 | PK11_SetFortezzaHack(symKey); |
| 1134 | } |
| 1135 | |
| 1136 | return symKey; |
| 1137 | } |
| 1138 | |
| 1139 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1140 | PK11_KeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, |
| 1141 | int keySize, void *wincx) |
| 1142 | { |
| 1143 | return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, type, param, keySize, 0, PR_FALSE0, wincx); |
| 1144 | } |
| 1145 | |
| 1146 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1147 | PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 1148 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType, |
| 1149 | SECItem *param, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs, |
| 1150 | unsigned int attrsCount, void *wincx) |
| 1151 | { |
| 1152 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 1153 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 1154 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 1155 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1156 | PRBool isToken = CK_FALSE0; |
| 1157 | CK_ULONG keySize = 0; |
| 1158 | unsigned i; |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | /* Extract the template's CKA_VALUE_LEN into keySize and CKA_TOKEN into |
| 1161 | isToken. */ |
| 1162 | for (i = 0; i < attrsCount; ++i) { |
| 1163 | switch (attrs[i].type) { |
| 1164 | case CKA_VALUE_LEN0x00000161UL: |
| 1165 | if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL((void*)0) || |
| 1166 | attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_ULONG)) { |
| 1167 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT0x000000D1UL)); |
| 1168 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1169 | } |
| 1170 | keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)attrs[i].pValue; |
| 1171 | break; |
| 1172 | case CKA_TOKEN0x00000001UL: |
| 1173 | if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL((void*)0) || |
| 1174 | attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) { |
| 1175 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT0x000000D1UL)); |
| 1176 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1177 | } |
| 1178 | isToken = (*(CK_BBOOL *)attrs[i].pValue) ? PR_TRUE1 : PR_FALSE0; |
| 1179 | break; |
| 1180 | } |
| 1181 | } |
| 1182 | |
| 1183 | /* find a slot to generate the key into */ |
| 1184 | /* Only do slot management if this is not a token key */ |
| 1185 | if (!isToken && (slot == NULL((void*)0) || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type))) { |
| 1186 | PK11SlotInfo *bestSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx); |
| 1187 | if (bestSlot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1188 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 1189 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1190 | } |
| 1191 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(bestSlot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 1192 | PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot); |
| 1193 | } else { |
| 1194 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 1195 | } |
| 1196 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1197 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1198 | |
| 1199 | symKey->size = keySize; |
| 1200 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginGenerated; |
| 1201 | |
| 1202 | /* Set the parameters for the key gen if provided */ |
| 1203 | mechanism.mechanism = keyGenType; |
| 1204 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1205 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 1206 | if (param) { |
| 1207 | mechanism.pParameter = param->data; |
| 1208 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 1209 | } |
| 1210 | |
| 1211 | /* Get session and perform locking */ |
| 1212 | if (isToken) { |
| 1213 | PK11_Authenticate(symKey->slot, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 1214 | /* Should always be original slot */ |
| 1215 | session = PK11_GetRWSession(symKey->slot); |
| 1216 | symKey->owner = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1217 | } else { |
| 1218 | session = symKey->session; |
| 1219 | if (session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) |
| 1220 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 1221 | } |
| 1222 | if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 1223 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 1224 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); |
| 1225 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1226 | } |
| 1227 | |
| 1228 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((symKey->slot)->functionList ))->C_GenerateKey(session, &mechanism, attrs, attrsCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 1229 | |
| 1230 | /* Release lock and session */ |
| 1231 | if (isToken) { |
| 1232 | PK11_RestoreROSession(symKey->slot, session); |
| 1233 | } else { |
| 1234 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 1235 | } |
| 1236 | |
| 1237 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1238 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 1239 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1240 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1241 | } |
| 1242 | |
| 1243 | return symKey; |
| 1244 | } |
| 1245 | |
| 1246 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1247 | PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symk, void *wincx) |
| 1248 | { |
| 1249 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = symk->slot; |
| 1250 | CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1]; |
| 1251 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template; |
| 1252 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 1253 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1254 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID; |
| 1255 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession; |
| 1256 | |
| 1257 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(cktrue));; |
| 1258 | attrs++; |
| 1259 | |
| 1260 | PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 1261 | rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); |
| 1262 | if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 1263 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); |
| 1264 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1265 | } |
| 1266 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_CopyObject(rwsession, symk->objectID, |
| 1267 | template, 1, &newKeyID); |
| 1268 | PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession); |
| 1269 | |
| 1270 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1271 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1272 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1273 | } |
| 1274 | |
| 1275 | return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL((void*)0) /*parent*/, symk->origin, |
| 1276 | symk->type, newKeyID, PR_FALSE0 /*owner*/, NULL((void*)0) /*wincx*/); |
| 1277 | } |
| 1278 | |
| 1279 | /* This function does a straight public key wrap with the CKM_RSA_PKCS |
| 1280 | * mechanism. */ |
| 1281 | SECStatus |
| 1282 | PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 1283 | PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey) |
| 1284 | { |
| 1285 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE inferred = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(pubKey->keyType); |
| 1286 | return PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(pubKey, inferred, NULL((void*)0), symKey, |
| 1287 | wrappedKey); |
| 1288 | } |
| 1289 | |
| 1290 | /* This function wraps a symmetric key with a public key, such as with the |
| 1291 | * CKM_RSA_PKCS and CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanisms. */ |
| 1292 | SECStatus |
| 1293 | PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 1294 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param, |
| 1295 | PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey) |
| 1296 | { |
| 1297 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 1298 | CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len; |
| 1299 | PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1300 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id; |
| 1301 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 1302 | PRBool owner = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1303 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 1304 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1305 | |
| 1306 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1307 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1308 | return SECFailure; |
| 1309 | } |
| 1310 | |
| 1311 | /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ |
| 1312 | newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, mechType, CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL); |
| 1313 | if (newKey != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1314 | symKey = newKey; |
| 1315 | } |
| 1316 | |
| 1317 | if (symKey->slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1318 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 1319 | return SECFailure; |
| 1320 | } |
| 1321 | |
| 1322 | slot = symKey->slot; |
| 1323 | |
| 1324 | mechanism.mechanism = mechType; |
| 1325 | if (param == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1326 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1327 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 1328 | } else { |
| 1329 | mechanism.pParameter = param->data; |
| 1330 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 1331 | } |
| 1332 | |
| 1333 | id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE0); |
| 1334 | if (id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 1335 | if (newKey) { |
| 1336 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); |
| 1337 | } |
| 1338 | return SECFailure; /* Error code has been set. */ |
| 1339 | } |
| 1340 | |
| 1341 | session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner); |
| 1342 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1343 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1344 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism, |
| 1345 | id, symKey->objectID, wrappedKey->data, &len); |
| 1346 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1347 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1348 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 1349 | if (newKey) { |
| 1350 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); |
| 1351 | } |
| 1352 | |
| 1353 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1354 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1355 | return SECFailure; |
| 1356 | } |
| 1357 | wrappedKey->len = len; |
| 1358 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1359 | } |
| 1360 | |
| 1361 | /* |
| 1362 | * this little function uses the Encrypt function to wrap a key, just in |
| 1363 | * case we have problems with the wrap implementation for a token. |
| 1364 | */ |
| 1365 | static SECStatus |
| 1366 | pk11_HandWrap(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 1367 | SECItem *inKey, SECItem *outKey) |
| 1368 | { |
| 1369 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 1370 | CK_ULONG len; |
| 1371 | SECItem *data; |
| 1372 | CK_MECHANISM mech; |
| 1373 | PRBool owner = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1374 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 1375 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1376 | |
| 1377 | slot = wrappingKey->slot; |
| 1378 | /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ |
| 1379 | mech.mechanism = type; |
| 1380 | if (param) { |
| 1381 | mech.pParameter = param->data; |
| 1382 | mech.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 1383 | } else { |
| 1384 | mech.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1385 | mech.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 1386 | } |
| 1387 | session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner); |
| 1388 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1389 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1390 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_EncryptInit(session, &mech, |
| 1391 | wrappingKey->objectID); |
| 1392 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1393 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1394 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1395 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 1396 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1397 | return SECFailure; |
| 1398 | } |
| 1399 | |
| 1400 | /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far, |
| 1401 | * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */ |
| 1402 | data = PK11_BlockData(inKey, PK11_GetBlockSize(type, param)); |
| 1403 | if (data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1404 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1405 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1406 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 1407 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 1408 | return SECFailure; |
| 1409 | } |
| 1410 | len = outKey->len; |
| 1411 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_Encrypt(session, data->data, data->len, |
| 1412 | outKey->data, &len); |
| 1413 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1414 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1415 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 1416 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(data, PR_TRUE1); |
| 1417 | outKey->len = len; |
| 1418 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1419 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1420 | return SECFailure; |
| 1421 | } |
| 1422 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1423 | } |
| 1424 | |
| 1425 | /* |
| 1426 | * helper function which moves two keys into a new slot based on the |
| 1427 | * desired mechanism. |
| 1428 | */ |
| 1429 | static SECStatus |
| 1430 | pk11_moveTwoKeys(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, |
| 1431 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation, |
| 1432 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation, |
| 1433 | PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey, |
| 1434 | PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey) |
| 1435 | { |
| 1436 | PK11SlotInfo *newSlot; |
| 1437 | *newMovingKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1438 | *newPreferedKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1439 | |
| 1440 | newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech, preferedKey->cx); |
| 1441 | if (newSlot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1442 | return SECFailure; |
| 1443 | } |
| 1444 | *newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, movingKey->type, |
| 1445 | movingOperation, movingKey); |
| 1446 | if (*newMovingKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1447 | goto loser; |
| 1448 | } |
| 1449 | *newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, preferedKey->type, |
| 1450 | preferedOperation, preferedKey); |
| 1451 | if (*newPreferedKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1452 | goto loser; |
| 1453 | } |
| 1454 | |
| 1455 | PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot); |
| 1456 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1457 | loser: |
| 1458 | PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot); |
| 1459 | PK11_FreeSymKey(*newMovingKey); |
| 1460 | PK11_FreeSymKey(*newPreferedKey); |
| 1461 | *newMovingKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1462 | *newPreferedKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1463 | return SECFailure; |
| 1464 | } |
| 1465 | |
| 1466 | /* |
| 1467 | * To do joint operations, we often need two keys in the same slot. |
| 1468 | * Usually the PKCS #11 wrappers handle this correctly (like for PK11_WrapKey), |
| 1469 | * but sometimes the wrappers don't know about mechanism specific keys in |
| 1470 | * the Mechanism params. This function makes sure the two keys are in the |
| 1471 | * same slot by copying one or both of the keys into a common slot. This |
| 1472 | * functions makes sure the slot can handle the target mechanism. If the copy |
| 1473 | * is warranted, this function will prefer to move the movingKey first, then |
| 1474 | * the preferedKey. If the keys are moved, the new keys are returned in |
| 1475 | * newMovingKey and/or newPreferedKey. The application is responsible |
| 1476 | * for freeing those keys once the operation is complete. |
| 1477 | */ |
| 1478 | SECStatus |
| 1479 | PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, |
| 1480 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation, |
| 1481 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation, |
| 1482 | PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey, |
| 1483 | PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey) |
| 1484 | { |
| 1485 | /* usually don't return new keys */ |
| 1486 | *newMovingKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1487 | *newPreferedKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1488 | if (movingKey->slot == preferedKey->slot) { |
| 1489 | |
| 1490 | /* this should be the most common case */ |
| 1491 | if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL((void*)0)) && |
| 1492 | PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) { |
| 1493 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1494 | } |
| 1495 | |
| 1496 | /* we are in the same slot, but it doesn't do the operation, |
| 1497 | * move both keys to an appropriate target slot */ |
| 1498 | return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation, |
| 1499 | preferedKey, movingKey, |
| 1500 | newPreferedKey, newMovingKey); |
| 1501 | } |
| 1502 | |
| 1503 | /* keys are in different slot, try moving the moving key to the prefered |
| 1504 | * key's slot */ |
| 1505 | if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL((void*)0)) && |
| 1506 | PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) { |
| 1507 | *newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(preferedKey->slot, movingKey->type, |
| 1508 | movingOperation, movingKey); |
| 1509 | if (*newMovingKey != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1510 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1511 | } |
| 1512 | } |
| 1513 | /* couldn't moving the moving key to the prefered slot, try moving |
| 1514 | * the prefered key */ |
| 1515 | if ((movingKey->slot != NULL((void*)0)) && |
| 1516 | PK11_DoesMechanism(movingKey->slot, mech)) { |
| 1517 | *newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(movingKey->slot, preferedKey->type, |
| 1518 | preferedOperation, preferedKey); |
| 1519 | if (*newPreferedKey != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1520 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1521 | } |
| 1522 | } |
| 1523 | /* Neither succeeded, but that could be that they were not in slots that |
| 1524 | * supported the operation, try moving both keys into a common slot that |
| 1525 | * can do the operation. */ |
| 1526 | return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation, |
| 1527 | preferedKey, movingKey, |
| 1528 | newPreferedKey, newMovingKey); |
| 1529 | } |
| 1530 | |
| 1531 | /* |
| 1532 | * This function does a symetric based wrap. |
| 1533 | */ |
| 1534 | SECStatus |
| 1535 | PK11_WrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param, |
| 1536 | PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, PK11SymKey *symKey, |
| 1537 | SECItem *wrappedKey) |
| 1538 | { |
| 1539 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 1540 | CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len; |
| 1541 | PK11SymKey *newSymKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1542 | PK11SymKey *newWrappingKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1543 | SECItem *param_save = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1544 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 1545 | PRBool owner = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1546 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 1547 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1548 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1549 | |
| 1550 | /* force the keys into same slot */ |
| 1551 | rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(type, CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL, CKA_WRAP0x00000106UL, |
| 1552 | symKey, wrappingKey, |
| 1553 | &newSymKey, &newWrappingKey); |
| 1554 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1555 | /* Couldn't move the keys as desired, try to hand unwrap if possible */ |
| 1556 | if (symKey->data.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1557 | rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey); |
| 1558 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1559 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 1560 | return SECFailure; |
| 1561 | } |
| 1562 | } |
| 1563 | if (param == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1564 | param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 1565 | } |
| 1566 | rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data, wrappedKey); |
| 1567 | if (param_save) |
| 1568 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_save, PR_TRUE1); |
| 1569 | return rv; |
| 1570 | } |
| 1571 | if (newSymKey) { |
| 1572 | symKey = newSymKey; |
| 1573 | } |
| 1574 | if (newWrappingKey) { |
| 1575 | wrappingKey = newWrappingKey; |
| 1576 | } |
| 1577 | |
| 1578 | /* at this point both keys are in the same token */ |
| 1579 | slot = wrappingKey->slot; |
| 1580 | mechanism.mechanism = type; |
| 1581 | /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ |
| 1582 | if (param == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1583 | param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 1584 | } |
| 1585 | if (param) { |
| 1586 | mechanism.pParameter = param->data; |
| 1587 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 1588 | } else { |
| 1589 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1590 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 1591 | } |
| 1592 | |
| 1593 | len = wrappedKey->len; |
| 1594 | |
| 1595 | session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner); |
| 1596 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1597 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1598 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism, |
| 1599 | wrappingKey->objectID, symKey->objectID, |
| 1600 | wrappedKey->data, &len); |
| 1601 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 1602 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 1603 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 1604 | rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1605 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1606 | /* can't wrap it? try hand wrapping it... */ |
| 1607 | do { |
| 1608 | if (symKey->data.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1609 | rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey); |
| 1610 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 1611 | break; |
| 1612 | } |
| 1613 | rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data, |
| 1614 | wrappedKey); |
| 1615 | } while (PR_FALSE0); |
| 1616 | } else { |
| 1617 | wrappedKey->len = len; |
| 1618 | } |
| 1619 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newSymKey); |
| 1620 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrappingKey); |
| 1621 | if (param_save) |
| 1622 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_save, PR_TRUE1); |
| 1623 | return rv; |
| 1624 | } |
| 1625 | |
| 1626 | /* |
| 1627 | * This Generates a new key based on a symetricKey |
| 1628 | */ |
| 1629 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1630 | PK11_Derive(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, SECItem *param, |
| 1631 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 1632 | int keySize) |
| 1633 | { |
| 1634 | return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation, |
| 1635 | keySize, NULL((void*)0), 0, PR_FALSE0); |
| 1636 | } |
| 1637 | |
| 1638 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1639 | PK11_DeriveWithFlags(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, |
| 1640 | SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 1641 | int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags) |
| 1642 | { |
| 1643 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 1644 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 1645 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 1646 | |
| 1647 | templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue); |
| 1648 | return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation, |
| 1649 | keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE0); |
| 1650 | } |
| 1651 | |
| 1652 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1653 | PK11_DeriveWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, |
| 1654 | SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 1655 | int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm) |
| 1656 | { |
| 1657 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 1658 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 1659 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 1660 | unsigned int templateCount = 0; |
| 1661 | |
| 1662 | attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 1663 | if (isPerm) { |
| 1664 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(CK_BBOOL));; |
| 1665 | attrs++; |
| 1666 | } |
| 1667 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 1668 | templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 1669 | return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation, |
| 1670 | keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm); |
| 1671 | } |
| 1672 | |
| 1673 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1674 | PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, |
| 1675 | SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 1676 | int keySize, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs, |
| 1677 | PRBool isPerm) |
| 1678 | { |
| 1679 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = baseKey->slot; |
| 1680 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 1681 | PK11SymKey *newBaseKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1682 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 1683 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 1684 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 1685 | CK_ULONG valueLen = 0; |
| 1686 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 1687 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1688 | #define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4 |
| 1689 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16 + MAX_ADD_ATTRS]; |
| 1690 | #undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS |
| 1691 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 1692 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 1693 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 1694 | |
| 1695 | if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16) { |
| 1696 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1697 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1698 | } |
| 1699 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 1700 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 1701 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 1702 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 1703 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 1704 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 1705 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 1706 | } |
| 1707 | |
| 1708 | /* first copy caller attributes in. */ |
| 1709 | for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) { |
| 1710 | *attrs++ = *userAttr++; |
| 1711 | } |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller |
| 1714 | ** didn't already supply them. |
| 1715 | */ |
| 1716 | if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS0x00000000UL)) { |
| 1717 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass)(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof keyClass);; |
| 1718 | attrs++; |
| 1719 | } |
| 1720 | if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE0x00000100UL)) { |
| 1721 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 1722 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType)(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof keyType);; |
| 1723 | attrs++; |
| 1724 | } |
| 1725 | if (keySize > 0 && |
| 1726 | !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN0x00000161UL)) { |
| 1727 | valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize; |
| 1728 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen)(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& valueLen); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof valueLen);; |
| 1729 | attrs++; |
| 1730 | } |
| 1731 | if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY0) && |
| 1732 | !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) { |
| 1733 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof cktrue)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof cktrue);; |
| 1734 | attrs++; |
| 1735 | } |
| 1736 | |
| 1737 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 1738 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",1738 )); |
| 1739 | |
| 1740 | /* move the key to a slot that can do the function */ |
| 1741 | if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, derive)) { |
| 1742 | /* get a new base key & slot */ |
| 1743 | PK11SlotInfo *newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(derive, baseKey->cx); |
| 1744 | |
| 1745 | if (newSlot == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1746 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1747 | |
| 1748 | newBaseKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, derive, CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL, |
| 1749 | baseKey); |
| 1750 | PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot); |
| 1751 | if (newBaseKey == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1752 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1753 | baseKey = newBaseKey; |
| 1754 | slot = baseKey->slot; |
| 1755 | } |
| 1756 | |
| 1757 | /* get our key Structure */ |
| 1758 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE1, baseKey->cx); |
| 1759 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1760 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1761 | } |
| 1762 | |
| 1763 | symKey->size = keySize; |
| 1764 | |
| 1765 | mechanism.mechanism = derive; |
| 1766 | if (param) { |
| 1767 | mechanism.pParameter = param->data; |
| 1768 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 1769 | } else { |
| 1770 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1771 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 1772 | } |
| 1773 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive; |
| 1774 | |
| 1775 | if (isPerm) { |
| 1776 | session = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); |
| 1777 | } else { |
| 1778 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 1779 | session = symKey->session; |
| 1780 | } |
| 1781 | if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 1782 | if (!isPerm) |
| 1783 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 1784 | crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID0x000000B3UL; |
| 1785 | } else { |
| 1786 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism, |
| 1787 | baseKey->objectID, keyTemplate, templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 1788 | if (isPerm) { |
| 1789 | PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session); |
| 1790 | } else { |
| 1791 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 1792 | } |
| 1793 | } |
| 1794 | if (newBaseKey) |
| 1795 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newBaseKey); |
| 1796 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1797 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 1798 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1799 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1800 | } |
| 1801 | return symKey; |
| 1802 | } |
| 1803 | |
| 1804 | /* Create a new key by concatenating base and data |
| 1805 | */ |
| 1806 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 1807 | pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(PK11SymKey *base, |
| 1808 | CK_BYTE *data, CK_ULONG dataLen, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 1809 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) |
| 1810 | { |
| 1811 | CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA mechParams; |
| 1812 | SECItem param; |
| 1813 | |
| 1814 | if (base == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1815 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1816 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1817 | } |
| 1818 | |
| 1819 | mechParams.pData = data; |
| 1820 | mechParams.ulLen = dataLen; |
| 1821 | param.data = (unsigned char *)&mechParams; |
| 1822 | param.len = sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA); |
| 1823 | |
| 1824 | return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA0x00000362UL, |
| 1825 | ¶m, target, operation, 0); |
| 1826 | } |
| 1827 | |
| 1828 | /* Create a new key by concatenating base and key |
| 1829 | */ |
| 1830 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 1831 | pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(PK11SymKey *base, |
| 1832 | PK11SymKey *key, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 1833 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize) |
| 1834 | { |
| 1835 | SECItem param; |
| 1836 | |
| 1837 | if ((base == NULL((void*)0)) || (key == NULL((void*)0))) { |
| 1838 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1839 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1840 | } |
| 1841 | |
| 1842 | param.data = (unsigned char *)&(key->objectID); |
| 1843 | param.len = sizeof(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE); |
| 1844 | |
| 1845 | return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY0x00000360UL, |
| 1846 | ¶m, target, operation, keySize); |
| 1847 | } |
| 1848 | |
| 1849 | PK11SymKey * |
| 1850 | PK11_ConcatSymKeys(PK11SymKey *left, PK11SymKey *right, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) |
| 1851 | { |
| 1852 | PK11SymKey *out = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1853 | PK11SymKey *copyOfLeft = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1854 | PK11SymKey *copyOfRight = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1855 | |
| 1856 | if ((left == NULL((void*)0)) || (right == NULL((void*)0))) { |
| 1857 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1858 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1859 | } |
| 1860 | |
| 1861 | SECStatus rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY0x00000360UL, |
| 1862 | CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL, CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL, left, right, |
| 1863 | ©OfLeft, ©OfRight); |
| 1864 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1865 | /* error code already set */ |
| 1866 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1867 | } |
| 1868 | |
| 1869 | out = pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(copyOfLeft ? copyOfLeft : left, copyOfRight ? copyOfRight : right, target, operation, 0); |
| 1870 | PK11_FreeSymKey(copyOfLeft); |
| 1871 | PK11_FreeSymKey(copyOfRight); |
| 1872 | return out; |
| 1873 | } |
| 1874 | |
| 1875 | /* Create a new key whose value is the hash of tobehashed. |
| 1876 | * type is the mechanism for the derived key. |
| 1877 | */ |
| 1878 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 1879 | pk11_HashKeyDerivation(PK11SymKey *toBeHashed, |
| 1880 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 1881 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize) |
| 1882 | { |
| 1883 | return PK11_Derive(toBeHashed, hashMechanism, NULL((void*)0), target, operation, keySize); |
| 1884 | } |
| 1885 | |
| 1886 | /* This function implements the ANSI X9.63 key derivation function |
| 1887 | */ |
| 1888 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 1889 | pk11_ANSIX963Derive(PK11SymKey *sharedSecret, |
| 1890 | CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf, SECItem *sharedData, |
| 1891 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 1892 | CK_ULONG keySize) |
| 1893 | { |
| 1894 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType; |
| 1895 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, mechanismArray[4]; |
| 1896 | CK_ULONG derivedKeySize, HashLen, counter, maxCounter, bufferLen; |
| 1897 | CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen; |
| 1898 | CK_BYTE *buffer = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1899 | PK11SymKey *toBeHashed, *hashOutput; |
| 1900 | PK11SymKey *newSharedSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1901 | PK11SymKey *oldIntermediateResult, *intermediateResult = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1902 | |
| 1903 | if (sharedSecret == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1904 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1905 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1906 | } |
| 1907 | |
| 1908 | switch (kdf) { |
| 1909 | case CKD_SHA1_KDF0x00000002UL: |
| 1910 | HashLen = SHA1_LENGTH20; |
| 1911 | hashMechanism = CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION0x00000392UL; |
| 1912 | break; |
| 1913 | case CKD_SHA224_KDF0x00000005UL: |
| 1914 | HashLen = SHA224_LENGTH28; |
| 1915 | hashMechanism = CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION0x00000396UL; |
| 1916 | break; |
| 1917 | case CKD_SHA256_KDF0x00000006UL: |
| 1918 | HashLen = SHA256_LENGTH32; |
| 1919 | hashMechanism = CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION0x00000393UL; |
| 1920 | break; |
| 1921 | case CKD_SHA384_KDF0x00000007UL: |
| 1922 | HashLen = SHA384_LENGTH48; |
| 1923 | hashMechanism = CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION0x00000394UL; |
| 1924 | break; |
| 1925 | case CKD_SHA512_KDF0x00000008UL: |
| 1926 | HashLen = SHA512_LENGTH64; |
| 1927 | hashMechanism = CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION0x00000395UL; |
| 1928 | break; |
| 1929 | default: |
| 1930 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1931 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1932 | } |
| 1933 | |
| 1934 | derivedKeySize = keySize; |
| 1935 | if (derivedKeySize == 0) { |
| 1936 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 1937 | derivedKeySize = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType); |
| 1938 | if (derivedKeySize == 0) { |
| 1939 | derivedKeySize = HashLen; |
| 1940 | } |
| 1941 | } |
| 1942 | |
| 1943 | /* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be |
| 1944 | * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter |
| 1945 | * to a maximum value of 255. */ |
| 1946 | if (derivedKeySize > 254 * HashLen) { |
| 1947 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1948 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1949 | } |
| 1950 | |
| 1951 | maxCounter = derivedKeySize / HashLen; |
| 1952 | if (derivedKeySize > maxCounter * HashLen) |
| 1953 | maxCounter++; |
| 1954 | |
| 1955 | if ((sharedData == NULL((void*)0)) || (sharedData->data == NULL((void*)0))) |
| 1956 | SharedInfoLen = 0; |
| 1957 | else |
| 1958 | SharedInfoLen = sharedData->len; |
| 1959 | |
| 1960 | if (SharedInfoLen > PR_UINT32_MAX4294967295U - 4) { |
| 1961 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1962 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1963 | } |
| 1964 | |
| 1965 | bufferLen = SharedInfoLen + 4; |
| 1966 | |
| 1967 | /* Populate buffer with Counter || sharedData |
| 1968 | * where Counter is 0x00000001. */ |
| 1969 | buffer = (unsigned char *)PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(bufferLen); |
| 1970 | if (buffer == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1971 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 1972 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1973 | } |
| 1974 | |
| 1975 | buffer[0] = 0; |
| 1976 | buffer[1] = 0; |
| 1977 | buffer[2] = 0; |
| 1978 | buffer[3] = 1; |
| 1979 | if (SharedInfoLen > 0) { |
| 1980 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(&buffer[4], sharedData->data, SharedInfoLen); |
| 1981 | } |
| 1982 | |
| 1983 | /* Look for a slot that supports the mechanisms needed |
| 1984 | * to implement the ANSI X9.63 KDF as well as the |
| 1985 | * target mechanism. |
| 1986 | */ |
| 1987 | mechanismArray[0] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA0x00000362UL; |
| 1988 | mechanismArray[1] = hashMechanism; |
| 1989 | mechanismArray[2] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY0x00000360UL; |
| 1990 | mechanismArray[3] = target; |
| 1991 | |
| 1992 | newSharedSecret = pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(sharedSecret, |
| 1993 | mechanismArray, 4, operation); |
| 1994 | if (newSharedSecret != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1995 | sharedSecret = newSharedSecret; |
| 1996 | } |
| 1997 | |
| 1998 | for (counter = 1; counter <= maxCounter; counter++) { |
| 1999 | /* Concatenate shared_secret and buffer */ |
| 2000 | toBeHashed = pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(sharedSecret, buffer, |
| 2001 | bufferLen, hashMechanism, operation); |
| 2002 | if (toBeHashed == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2003 | goto loser; |
| 2004 | } |
| 2005 | |
| 2006 | /* Hash value */ |
| 2007 | if (maxCounter == 1) { |
| 2008 | /* In this case the length of the key to be derived is |
| 2009 | * less than or equal to the length of the hash output. |
| 2010 | * So, the output of the hash operation will be the |
| 2011 | * dervied key. */ |
| 2012 | hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism, |
| 2013 | target, operation, keySize); |
| 2014 | } else { |
| 2015 | /* In this case, the output of the hash operation will be |
| 2016 | * concatenated with other data to create the derived key. */ |
| 2017 | hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism, |
| 2018 | CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY0x00000360UL, operation, 0); |
| 2019 | } |
| 2020 | PK11_FreeSymKey(toBeHashed); |
| 2021 | if (hashOutput == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2022 | goto loser; |
| 2023 | } |
| 2024 | |
| 2025 | /* Append result to intermediate result, if necessary */ |
| 2026 | oldIntermediateResult = intermediateResult; |
| 2027 | |
| 2028 | if (oldIntermediateResult == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2029 | intermediateResult = hashOutput; |
| 2030 | } else { |
| 2031 | if (counter == maxCounter) { |
| 2032 | /* This is the final concatenation, and so the output |
| 2033 | * will be the derived key. */ |
| 2034 | intermediateResult = |
| 2035 | pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult, |
| 2036 | hashOutput, target, operation, keySize); |
| 2037 | } else { |
| 2038 | /* The output of this concatenation will be concatenated |
| 2039 | * with other data to create the derived key. */ |
| 2040 | intermediateResult = |
| 2041 | pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult, |
| 2042 | hashOutput, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY0x00000360UL, |
| 2043 | operation, 0); |
| 2044 | } |
| 2045 | |
| 2046 | PK11_FreeSymKey(hashOutput); |
| 2047 | PK11_FreeSymKey(oldIntermediateResult); |
| 2048 | if (intermediateResult == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2049 | goto loser; |
| 2050 | } |
| 2051 | } |
| 2052 | |
| 2053 | /* Increment counter (assumes maxCounter < 255) */ |
| 2054 | buffer[3]++; |
| 2055 | } |
| 2056 | |
| 2057 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(buffer, bufferLen); |
| 2058 | if (newSharedSecret != NULL((void*)0)) |
| 2059 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret); |
| 2060 | return intermediateResult; |
| 2061 | |
| 2062 | loser: |
| 2063 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(buffer, bufferLen); |
| 2064 | if (newSharedSecret != NULL((void*)0)) |
| 2065 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret); |
| 2066 | if (intermediateResult != NULL((void*)0)) |
| 2067 | PK11_FreeSymKey(intermediateResult); |
| 2068 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2069 | } |
| 2070 | |
| 2071 | /* |
| 2072 | * This regenerate a public key from a private key. This function is currently |
| 2073 | * NSS private. If we want to make it public, we need to add and optional |
| 2074 | * template or at least flags (a.la. PK11_DeriveWithFlags). |
| 2075 | */ |
| 2076 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE |
| 2077 | PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) |
| 2078 | { |
| 2079 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 2080 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 2081 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 2082 | CK_RV crv; |
| 2083 | |
| 2084 | mechanism.mechanism = CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 40); |
| 2085 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2086 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 2087 | |
| 2088 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2089 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(slot->session, &mechanism, |
| 2090 | privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL((void*)0), 0, |
| 2091 | &objectID); |
| 2092 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2093 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2094 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2095 | return CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 2096 | } |
| 2097 | return objectID; |
| 2098 | } |
| 2099 | |
| 2100 | /* |
| 2101 | * This Generates a wrapping key based on a privateKey, publicKey, and two |
| 2102 | * random numbers. For Mail usage RandomB should be NULL. In the Sender's |
| 2103 | * case RandomA is generate, otherwise it is passed. |
| 2104 | */ |
| 2105 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2106 | PK11_PubDerive(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 2107 | PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB, |
| 2108 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2109 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, void *wincx) |
| 2110 | { |
| 2111 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 2112 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 2113 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 2114 | CK_RV crv; |
| 2115 | |
| 2116 | /* get our key Structure */ |
| 2117 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE1, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 2118 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2119 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2120 | } |
| 2121 | |
| 2122 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 2123 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 2124 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 2125 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 2126 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 2127 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 2128 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 2129 | } |
| 2130 | |
| 2131 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive; |
| 2132 | |
| 2133 | switch (privKey->keyType) { |
| 2134 | case keaKey: |
| 2135 | case fortezzaKey: { |
| 2136 | static unsigned char rb_email[128] = { 0 }; |
| 2137 | CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS param; |
| 2138 | param.isSender = (CK_BBOOL)isSender; |
| 2139 | param.ulRandomLen = randomA->len; |
| 2140 | param.pRandomA = randomA->data; |
| 2141 | param.pRandomB = rb_email; |
| 2142 | param.pRandomB[127] = 1; |
| 2143 | if (randomB) |
| 2144 | param.pRandomB = randomB->data; |
| 2145 | if (pubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) { |
| 2146 | param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len; |
| 2147 | param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data; |
| 2148 | } else { |
| 2149 | /* assert type == keaKey */ |
| 2150 | /* XXX change to match key key types */ |
| 2151 | param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len; |
| 2152 | param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data; |
| 2153 | } |
| 2154 | |
| 2155 | mechanism.mechanism = derive; |
| 2156 | mechanism.pParameter = ¶m; |
| 2157 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param); |
| 2158 | |
| 2159 | /* get a new symKey structure */ |
| 2160 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2161 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, |
| 2162 | privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL((void*)0), 0, |
| 2163 | &symKey->objectID); |
| 2164 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2165 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) |
| 2166 | return symKey; |
| 2167 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2168 | } break; |
| 2169 | case dhKey: { |
| 2170 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2171 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 2172 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 2173 | CK_ULONG key_size = 0; |
| 2174 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4]; |
| 2175 | int templateCount; |
| 2176 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 2177 | |
| 2178 | if (pubKey->keyType != dhKey) { |
| 2179 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
| 2180 | break; |
| 2181 | } |
| 2182 | |
| 2183 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 2184 | attrs++; |
| 2185 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 2186 | attrs++; |
| 2187 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (1);; |
| 2188 | attrs++; |
| 2189 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size))(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& key_size); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(key_size));; |
| 2190 | attrs++; |
| 2191 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 2192 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",2192 )); |
| 2193 | |
| 2194 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 2195 | key_size = keySize; |
| 2196 | symKey->size = keySize; |
| 2197 | if (key_size == 0) |
| 2198 | templateCount--; |
| 2199 | |
| 2200 | mechanism.mechanism = derive; |
| 2201 | |
| 2202 | /* we can undefine these when we define diffie-helman keys */ |
| 2203 | |
| 2204 | mechanism.pParameter = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data; |
| 2205 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; |
| 2206 | |
| 2207 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2208 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, |
| 2209 | privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2210 | templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 2211 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2212 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) |
| 2213 | return symKey; |
| 2214 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2215 | } break; |
| 2216 | case ecKey: { |
| 2217 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2218 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 2219 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 2220 | CK_ULONG key_size = 0; |
| 2221 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4]; |
| 2222 | int templateCount; |
| 2223 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 2224 | CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2225 | |
| 2226 | if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) { |
| 2227 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
| 2228 | break; |
| 2229 | } |
| 2230 | |
| 2231 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 2232 | attrs++; |
| 2233 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 2234 | attrs++; |
| 2235 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (1);; |
| 2236 | attrs++; |
| 2237 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size))(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& key_size); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(key_size));; |
| 2238 | attrs++; |
| 2239 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 2240 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",2240 )); |
| 2241 | |
| 2242 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 2243 | key_size = keySize; |
| 2244 | if (key_size == 0) { |
| 2245 | if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) { |
| 2246 | templateCount--; |
| 2247 | } else { |
| 2248 | /* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require |
| 2249 | * CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */ |
| 2250 | key_size = SHA1_LENGTH20; |
| 2251 | } |
| 2252 | } |
| 2253 | symKey->size = key_size; |
| 2254 | |
| 2255 | mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *)PORT_ZAlloc_Util(sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS )); |
| 2256 | mechParams->kdf = CKD_SHA1_KDF0x00000002UL; |
| 2257 | mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0; |
| 2258 | mechParams->pSharedData = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2259 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; |
| 2260 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data; |
| 2261 | |
| 2262 | mechanism.mechanism = derive; |
| 2263 | mechanism.pParameter = mechParams; |
| 2264 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS); |
| 2265 | |
| 2266 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2267 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, |
| 2268 | &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2269 | templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 2270 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2271 | |
| 2272 | /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed, |
| 2273 | * try this again with and encoded public key */ |
| 2274 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL && pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) != ECPoint_XOnly) { |
| 2275 | SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItemSEC_ASN1EncodeItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), |
| 2276 | &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue, |
| 2277 | SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate)SEC_OctetStringTemplate_Util); |
| 2278 | if (pubValue == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2279 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)); |
| 2280 | break; |
| 2281 | } |
| 2282 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len; |
| 2283 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data; |
| 2284 | |
| 2285 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2286 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, |
| 2287 | &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2288 | templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 2289 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2290 | |
| 2291 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(pubValue, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2292 | } |
| 2293 | |
| 2294 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)); |
| 2295 | |
| 2296 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) |
| 2297 | return symKey; |
| 2298 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2299 | } |
| 2300 | /* most keys are not KEA keys, so assume they are bad if they |
| 2301 | * are not handled explicitly */ |
| 2302 | default: |
| 2303 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
| 2304 | break; |
| 2305 | } |
| 2306 | |
| 2307 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2308 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2309 | } |
| 2310 | |
| 2311 | /* Test for curves that are known to use a special encoding. |
| 2312 | * Extend this function when additional curves are added. */ |
| 2313 | static ECPointEncoding |
| 2314 | pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
| 2315 | { |
| 2316 | SECItem oid; |
| 2317 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2318 | PORTCheapArenaPool tmpArena; |
| 2319 | ECPointEncoding encoding = ECPoint_Undefined; |
| 2320 | |
| 2321 | PORT_InitCheapArena(&tmpArena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE(2048)); |
| 2322 | |
| 2323 | /* decode the OID tag */ |
| 2324 | rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItemSEC_QuickDERDecodeItem_Util(&tmpArena.arena, &oid, |
| 2325 | SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate)SEC_ObjectIDTemplate_Util, |
| 2326 | &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); |
| 2327 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 2328 | SECOidTag tag = SECOID_FindOIDTagSECOID_FindOIDTag_Util(&oid); |
| 2329 | switch (tag) { |
| 2330 | case SEC_OID_X25519: |
| 2331 | case SEC_OID_CURVE25519: |
| 2332 | encoding = ECPoint_XOnly; |
| 2333 | break; |
| 2334 | case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1: |
| 2335 | case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1: |
| 2336 | case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1: |
| 2337 | default: |
| 2338 | /* unknown curve, default to uncompressed */ |
| 2339 | encoding = ECPoint_Uncompressed; |
| 2340 | } |
| 2341 | } |
| 2342 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&tmpArena); |
| 2343 | return encoding; |
| 2344 | } |
| 2345 | |
| 2346 | /* Returns the size of the public key, or 0 if there |
| 2347 | * is an error. */ |
| 2348 | static CK_ULONG |
| 2349 | pk11_ECPubKeySize(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
| 2350 | { |
| 2351 | SECItem *publicValue = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue; |
| 2352 | |
| 2353 | ECPointEncoding encoding = pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey); |
| 2354 | if (encoding == ECPoint_XOnly) { |
| 2355 | return publicValue->len; |
| 2356 | } |
| 2357 | if (encoding == ECPoint_Uncompressed) { |
| 2358 | /* key encoded in uncompressed form */ |
| 2359 | return ((publicValue->len - 1) / 2); |
| 2360 | } |
| 2361 | /* key encoding not recognized */ |
| 2362 | return 0; |
| 2363 | } |
| 2364 | |
| 2365 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 2366 | pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF( |
| 2367 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 2368 | PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB, |
| 2369 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2370 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, |
| 2371 | CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx) |
| 2372 | { |
| 2373 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 2374 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 2375 | PK11SymKey *SharedSecret; |
| 2376 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 2377 | CK_RV crv; |
| 2378 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2379 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 2380 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 2381 | CK_ULONG key_size = 0; |
| 2382 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4]; |
| 2383 | int templateCount; |
| 2384 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 2385 | CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2386 | |
| 2387 | if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey && pubKey->keyType != ecMontKey) { |
| 2388 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
| 2389 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2390 | } |
| 2391 | if ((kdf != CKD_NULL0x00000001UL) && (kdf != CKD_SHA1_KDF0x00000002UL) && |
| 2392 | (kdf != CKD_SHA224_KDF0x00000005UL) && (kdf != CKD_SHA256_KDF0x00000006UL) && |
| 2393 | (kdf != CKD_SHA384_KDF0x00000007UL) && (kdf != CKD_SHA512_KDF0x00000008UL)) { |
| 2394 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 2395 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2396 | } |
| 2397 | |
| 2398 | /* get our key Structure */ |
| 2399 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE1, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 2400 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2401 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2402 | } |
| 2403 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 2404 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 2405 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 2406 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 2407 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 2408 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 2409 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 2410 | } |
| 2411 | |
| 2412 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive; |
| 2413 | |
| 2414 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 2415 | attrs++; |
| 2416 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 2417 | attrs++; |
| 2418 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (1);; |
| 2419 | attrs++; |
| 2420 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size))(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& key_size); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(key_size));; |
| 2421 | attrs++; |
| 2422 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 2423 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",2423 )); |
| 2424 | |
| 2425 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 2426 | key_size = keySize; |
| 2427 | if (key_size == 0) { |
| 2428 | if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) { |
| 2429 | templateCount--; |
| 2430 | } else { |
| 2431 | /* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require |
| 2432 | * CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */ |
| 2433 | switch (kdf) { |
| 2434 | case CKD_NULL0x00000001UL: |
| 2435 | key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey); |
| 2436 | if (key_size == 0) { |
| 2437 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2438 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2439 | } |
| 2440 | break; |
| 2441 | case CKD_SHA1_KDF0x00000002UL: |
| 2442 | key_size = SHA1_LENGTH20; |
| 2443 | break; |
| 2444 | case CKD_SHA224_KDF0x00000005UL: |
| 2445 | key_size = SHA224_LENGTH28; |
| 2446 | break; |
| 2447 | case CKD_SHA256_KDF0x00000006UL: |
| 2448 | key_size = SHA256_LENGTH32; |
| 2449 | break; |
| 2450 | case CKD_SHA384_KDF0x00000007UL: |
| 2451 | key_size = SHA384_LENGTH48; |
| 2452 | break; |
| 2453 | case CKD_SHA512_KDF0x00000008UL: |
| 2454 | key_size = SHA512_LENGTH64; |
| 2455 | break; |
| 2456 | default: |
| 2457 | PORT_AssertNotReached("Invalid CKD")PR_Assert("Invalid CKD","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,2457); |
| 2458 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 2459 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2460 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2461 | } |
| 2462 | } |
| 2463 | } |
| 2464 | symKey->size = key_size; |
| 2465 | |
| 2466 | mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *)PORT_ZAlloc_Util(sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS )); |
| 2467 | if (!mechParams) { |
| 2468 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2469 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2470 | } |
| 2471 | mechParams->kdf = kdf; |
| 2472 | if (sharedData == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2473 | mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0; |
| 2474 | mechParams->pSharedData = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2475 | } else { |
| 2476 | mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = sharedData->len; |
| 2477 | mechParams->pSharedData = sharedData->data; |
| 2478 | } |
| 2479 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; |
| 2480 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data; |
| 2481 | |
| 2482 | mechanism.mechanism = derive; |
| 2483 | mechanism.pParameter = mechParams; |
| 2484 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS); |
| 2485 | |
| 2486 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2487 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism, |
| 2488 | privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2489 | templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 2490 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2491 | |
| 2492 | /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed, |
| 2493 | * try this again with an encoded public key */ |
| 2494 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2495 | /* For curves that only use X as public value and no encoding we don't |
| 2496 | * have to try again. (Currently only Curve25519) */ |
| 2497 | if (pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) == ECPoint_XOnly) { |
| 2498 | goto loser; |
| 2499 | } |
| 2500 | SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItemSEC_ASN1EncodeItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), |
| 2501 | &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue, |
| 2502 | SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate)SEC_OctetStringTemplate_Util); |
| 2503 | if (pubValue == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2504 | goto loser; |
| 2505 | } |
| 2506 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len; |
| 2507 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data; |
| 2508 | |
| 2509 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2510 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, |
| 2511 | &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2512 | templateCount, &symKey->objectID); |
| 2513 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2514 | |
| 2515 | if ((crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) && (kdf != CKD_NULL0x00000001UL)) { |
| 2516 | /* Some PKCS #11 libraries cannot perform the key derivation |
| 2517 | * function. So, try calling C_DeriveKey with CKD_NULL and then |
| 2518 | * performing the KDF separately. |
| 2519 | */ |
| 2520 | CK_ULONG derivedKeySize = key_size; |
| 2521 | |
| 2522 | keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 2523 | key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey); |
| 2524 | if (key_size == 0) { |
| 2525 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(pubValue, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2526 | goto loser; |
| 2527 | } |
| 2528 | SharedSecret = symKey; |
| 2529 | SharedSecret->size = key_size; |
| 2530 | |
| 2531 | mechParams->kdf = CKD_NULL0x00000001UL; |
| 2532 | mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0; |
| 2533 | mechParams->pSharedData = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2534 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; |
| 2535 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data; |
| 2536 | |
| 2537 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret); |
| 2538 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session, |
| 2539 | &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2540 | templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID); |
| 2541 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret); |
| 2542 | |
| 2543 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2544 | /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed, |
| 2545 | * try this one final time with an encoded public key */ |
| 2546 | mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len; |
| 2547 | mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data; |
| 2548 | |
| 2549 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret); |
| 2550 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session, |
| 2551 | &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate, |
| 2552 | templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID); |
| 2553 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret); |
| 2554 | } |
| 2555 | |
| 2556 | /* Perform KDF. */ |
| 2557 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2558 | symKey = pk11_ANSIX963Derive(SharedSecret, kdf, |
| 2559 | sharedData, target, operation, |
| 2560 | derivedKeySize); |
| 2561 | PK11_FreeSymKey(SharedSecret); |
| 2562 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2563 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(pubValue, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2564 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)); |
| 2565 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2566 | } |
| 2567 | } |
| 2568 | } |
| 2569 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(pubValue, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2570 | } |
| 2571 | |
| 2572 | loser: |
| 2573 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)); |
| 2574 | |
| 2575 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2576 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2577 | symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2578 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2579 | } |
| 2580 | return symKey; |
| 2581 | } |
| 2582 | |
| 2583 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2584 | PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 2585 | PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB, |
| 2586 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2587 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, |
| 2588 | CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx) |
| 2589 | { |
| 2590 | |
| 2591 | switch (privKey->keyType) { |
| 2592 | case keaKey: |
| 2593 | case fortezzaKey: |
| 2594 | case dhKey: |
| 2595 | return PK11_PubDerive(privKey, pubKey, isSender, randomA, randomB, |
| 2596 | derive, target, operation, keySize, wincx); |
| 2597 | case ecKey: |
| 2598 | case ecMontKey: |
| 2599 | return pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF(privKey, pubKey, isSender, |
| 2600 | randomA, randomB, derive, target, |
| 2601 | operation, keySize, |
| 2602 | kdf, sharedData, wincx); |
| 2603 | default: |
| 2604 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
| 2605 | break; |
| 2606 | } |
| 2607 | |
| 2608 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2609 | } |
| 2610 | |
| 2611 | /* |
| 2612 | * this little function uses the Decrypt function to unwrap a key, just in |
| 2613 | * case we are having problem with unwrap. NOTE: The key size may |
| 2614 | * not be preserved properly for some algorithms! |
| 2615 | */ |
| 2616 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 2617 | pk11_HandUnwrap(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey, |
| 2618 | CK_MECHANISM *mech, SECItem *inKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2619 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, unsigned int templateCount, |
| 2620 | int key_size, void *wincx, CK_RV *crvp, PRBool isPerm) |
| 2621 | { |
| 2622 | CK_ULONG len; |
| 2623 | SECItem outKey; |
| 2624 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 2625 | CK_RV crv; |
| 2626 | PRBool owner = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2627 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; |
| 2628 | |
| 2629 | /* remove any VALUE_LEN parameters */ |
| 2630 | if (keyTemplate[templateCount - 1].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN0x00000161UL) { |
| 2631 | templateCount--; |
| 2632 | } |
| 2633 | |
| 2634 | if (key_size != 0 && (CK_ULONG)key_size > inKey->len) { |
| 2635 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE0x000000F1UL)); |
| 2636 | if (crvp) |
| 2637 | *crvp = CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE0x000000F1UL; |
| 2638 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2639 | } |
| 2640 | |
| 2641 | /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far, |
| 2642 | * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */ |
| 2643 | outKey.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAllocPORT_ZAlloc_Util(inKey->len); |
| 2644 | if (outKey.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2645 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 2646 | if (crvp) |
| 2647 | *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY0x00000002UL; |
| 2648 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2649 | } |
| 2650 | len = inKey->len; |
| 2651 | |
| 2652 | /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ |
| 2653 | session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner); |
| 2654 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 2655 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2656 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DecryptInit(session, mech, wrappingKey); |
| 2657 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2658 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 2659 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2660 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 2661 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(outKey.data); |
| 2662 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2663 | if (crvp) |
| 2664 | *crvp = crv; |
| 2665 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2666 | } |
| 2667 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_Decrypt(session, inKey->data, inKey->len, |
| 2668 | outKey.data, &len); |
| 2669 | if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) |
| 2670 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2671 | pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner); |
| 2672 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2673 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(outKey.data); |
| 2674 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 2675 | if (crvp) |
| 2676 | *crvp = crv; |
| 2677 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2678 | } |
| 2679 | |
| 2680 | outKey.len = (key_size == 0) ? len : key_size; |
| 2681 | outKey.type = siBuffer; |
| 2682 | |
| 2683 | if (PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) { |
| 2684 | symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap, |
| 2685 | isPerm, keyTemplate, |
| 2686 | templateCount, &outKey, wincx); |
| 2687 | } else { |
| 2688 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, wincx); |
| 2689 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2690 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 2691 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(outKey.data); |
| 2692 | if (crvp) |
| 2693 | *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR0x00000030UL; |
| 2694 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2695 | } |
| 2696 | symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap, |
| 2697 | isPerm, keyTemplate, |
| 2698 | templateCount, &outKey, wincx); |
| 2699 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 2700 | } |
| 2701 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(outKey.data); |
| 2702 | |
| 2703 | if (crvp) |
| 2704 | *crvp = symKey ? CKR_OK0x00000000UL : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR0x00000030UL; |
| 2705 | return symKey; |
| 2706 | } |
| 2707 | |
| 2708 | /* |
| 2709 | * The wrap/unwrap function is pretty much the same for private and |
| 2710 | * public keys. It's just getting the Object ID and slot right. This is |
| 2711 | * the combined unwrap function. |
| 2712 | */ |
| 2713 | static PK11SymKey * |
| 2714 | pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey, |
| 2715 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, |
| 2716 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, |
| 2717 | void *wincx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs, PRBool isPerm) |
| 2718 | { |
| 2719 | PK11SymKey *symKey; |
| 2720 | SECItem *param_free = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2721 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2722 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 2723 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 2724 | CK_ULONG valueLen = 0; |
| 2725 | CK_MECHANISM mechanism; |
| 2726 | CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession; |
| 2727 | CK_RV crv; |
| 2728 | CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info; |
| 2729 | #define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4 |
| 2730 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16 + MAX_ADD_ATTRS]; |
| 2731 | #undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS |
| 2732 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 2733 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 2734 | |
| 2735 | if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16) { |
| 2736 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 2737 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2738 | } |
| 2739 | /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between |
| 2740 | * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set |
| 2741 | * it as a real attribute */ |
| 2742 | if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 2743 | /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT), |
| 2744 | * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */ |
| 2745 | operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L; |
| 2746 | } |
| 2747 | |
| 2748 | /* first copy caller attributes in. */ |
| 2749 | for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) { |
| 2750 | *attrs++ = *userAttr++; |
| 2751 | } |
| 2752 | |
| 2753 | /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller |
| 2754 | ** didn't already supply them. |
| 2755 | */ |
| 2756 | if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS0x00000000UL)) { |
| 2757 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass)(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof keyClass);; |
| 2758 | attrs++; |
| 2759 | } |
| 2760 | if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE0x00000100UL)) { |
| 2761 | keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize); |
| 2762 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType)(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof keyType);; |
| 2763 | attrs++; |
| 2764 | } |
| 2765 | if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY0) && |
| 2766 | !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) { |
| 2767 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1)(attrs)->type = (operation); (attrs)->pValue = (&cktrue ); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (1);; |
| 2768 | attrs++; |
| 2769 | } |
| 2770 | |
| 2771 | /* |
| 2772 | * must be last in case we need to use this template to import the key |
| 2773 | */ |
| 2774 | if (keySize > 0 && |
| 2775 | !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN0x00000161UL)) { |
| 2776 | valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize; |
| 2777 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen)(attrs)->type = (0x00000161UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& valueLen); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof valueLen);; |
| 2778 | attrs++; |
| 2779 | } |
| 2780 | |
| 2781 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 2782 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",2782 )); |
| 2783 | |
| 2784 | /* find out if we can do wrap directly. Because the RSA case if *very* |
| 2785 | * common, cache the results for it. */ |
| 2786 | if ((wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS0x00000001UL) && (slot->hasRSAInfo)) { |
| 2787 | mechanism_info.flags = slot->RSAInfoFlags; |
| 2788 | } else { |
| 2789 | if (!slot->isThreadSafe) |
| 2790 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2791 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID, wrapType, |
| 2792 | &mechanism_info); |
| 2793 | if (!slot->isThreadSafe) |
| 2794 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); |
| 2795 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2796 | mechanism_info.flags = 0; |
| 2797 | } |
| 2798 | if (wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS0x00000001UL) { |
| 2799 | slot->RSAInfoFlags = mechanism_info.flags; |
| 2800 | slot->hasRSAInfo = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2801 | } |
| 2802 | } |
| 2803 | |
| 2804 | /* initialize the mechanism structure */ |
| 2805 | mechanism.mechanism = wrapType; |
| 2806 | /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */ |
| 2807 | if (param == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 2808 | param = param_free = PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 2809 | if (param) { |
| 2810 | mechanism.pParameter = param->data; |
| 2811 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 2812 | } else { |
| 2813 | mechanism.pParameter = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2814 | mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0; |
| 2815 | } |
| 2816 | |
| 2817 | if ((mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT0x00000200UL) && !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) { |
| 2818 | symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey, |
| 2819 | target, keyTemplate, templateCount, keySize, |
| 2820 | wincx, &crv, isPerm); |
| 2821 | if (symKey) { |
| 2822 | if (param_free) |
| 2823 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_free, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2824 | return symKey; |
| 2825 | } |
| 2826 | /* |
| 2827 | * if the RSA OP simply failed, don't try to unwrap again |
| 2828 | * with this module. |
| 2829 | */ |
| 2830 | if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR0x00000030UL) { |
| 2831 | if (param_free) |
| 2832 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_free, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2833 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2834 | } |
| 2835 | /* fall through, maybe they incorrectly set CKF_DECRYPT */ |
| 2836 | } |
| 2837 | |
| 2838 | /* get our key Structure */ |
| 2839 | symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE1, wincx); |
| 2840 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2841 | if (param_free) |
| 2842 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_free, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2843 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 2844 | } |
| 2845 | |
| 2846 | symKey->size = keySize; |
| 2847 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap; |
| 2848 | |
| 2849 | if (isPerm) { |
| 2850 | rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot); |
| 2851 | } else { |
| 2852 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2853 | rwsession = symKey->session; |
| 2854 | } |
| 2855 | PORT_Assert(rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)((rwsession != 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",2855 )); |
| 2856 | if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) |
| 2857 | crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID0x000000B3UL; |
| 2858 | else |
| 2859 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_UnwrapKey(rwsession, &mechanism, wrappingKey, |
| 2860 | wrappedKey->data, wrappedKey->len, |
| 2861 | keyTemplate, templateCount, |
| 2862 | &symKey->objectID); |
| 2863 | if (isPerm) { |
| 2864 | if (rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) |
| 2865 | PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession); |
| 2866 | } else { |
| 2867 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey); |
| 2868 | } |
| 2869 | if (param_free) |
| 2870 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(param_free, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2871 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 2872 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 2873 | symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2874 | if (crv != CKR_DEVICE_ERROR0x00000030UL) { |
| 2875 | /* try hand Unwrapping */ |
| 2876 | symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey, |
| 2877 | target, keyTemplate, templateCount, |
| 2878 | keySize, wincx, NULL((void*)0), isPerm); |
| 2879 | } |
| 2880 | } |
| 2881 | |
| 2882 | return symKey; |
| 2883 | } |
| 2884 | |
| 2885 | /* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */ |
| 2886 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2887 | PK11_UnwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, |
| 2888 | SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, |
| 2889 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 2890 | int keySize) |
| 2891 | { |
| 2892 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID, |
| 2893 | wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 2894 | wrappingKey->cx, NULL((void*)0), 0, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2895 | } |
| 2896 | |
| 2897 | /* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */ |
| 2898 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2899 | PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, |
| 2900 | SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, |
| 2901 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 2902 | int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags) |
| 2903 | { |
| 2904 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2905 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 2906 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 2907 | |
| 2908 | templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue); |
| 2909 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID, |
| 2910 | wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 2911 | wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2912 | } |
| 2913 | |
| 2914 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2915 | PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, |
| 2916 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, |
| 2917 | SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey, |
| 2918 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 2919 | int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm) |
| 2920 | { |
| 2921 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2922 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 2923 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 2924 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 2925 | |
| 2926 | attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 2927 | if (isPerm) { |
| 2928 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(CK_BBOOL));; |
| 2929 | attrs++; |
| 2930 | } |
| 2931 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 2932 | templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 2933 | |
| 2934 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID, |
| 2935 | wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 2936 | wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm); |
| 2937 | } |
| 2938 | |
| 2939 | /* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key. Only supports CKM_RSA_PKCS. */ |
| 2940 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2941 | PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *wrappedKey, |
| 2942 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize) |
| 2943 | { |
| 2944 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType); |
| 2945 | |
| 2946 | return PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(wrappingKey, wrapType, NULL((void*)0), |
| 2947 | wrappedKey, target, operation, |
| 2948 | keySize); |
| 2949 | } |
| 2950 | |
| 2951 | /* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key with the given parameters. */ |
| 2952 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2953 | PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, |
| 2954 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param, |
| 2955 | SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2956 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize) |
| 2957 | { |
| 2958 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 2959 | |
| 2960 | if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)(0 != (wrappingKey->staticflags & 0x1)) ? (0 != (wrappingKey ->staticflags & (1U << 1))) : PK11_HasAttributeSet (wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, 0x00000002UL , 0)) { |
| 2961 | PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx); |
| 2962 | } |
| 2963 | |
| 2964 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, mechType, param, |
| 2965 | wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 2966 | wrappingKey->wincx, NULL((void*)0), 0, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2967 | } |
| 2968 | |
| 2969 | /* unwrap a symetric key with a private key. */ |
| 2970 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2971 | PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, |
| 2972 | SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2973 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags) |
| 2974 | { |
| 2975 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType); |
| 2976 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 2977 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 2978 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 2979 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 2980 | |
| 2981 | templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue); |
| 2982 | |
| 2983 | if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)(0 != (wrappingKey->staticflags & 0x1)) ? (0 != (wrappingKey ->staticflags & (1U << 1))) : PK11_HasAttributeSet (wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, 0x00000002UL , 0)) { |
| 2984 | PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx); |
| 2985 | } |
| 2986 | |
| 2987 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 2988 | wrapType, NULL((void*)0), wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 2989 | wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2990 | } |
| 2991 | |
| 2992 | PK11SymKey * |
| 2993 | PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, |
| 2994 | SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 2995 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, |
| 2996 | CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm) |
| 2997 | { |
| 2998 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType); |
| 2999 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 3000 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 3001 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 3002 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 3003 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 3004 | |
| 3005 | attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 3006 | if (isPerm) { |
| 3007 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL))(attrs)->type = (0x00000001UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& cktrue); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(CK_BBOOL));; |
| 3008 | attrs++; |
| 3009 | } |
| 3010 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 3011 | |
| 3012 | templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 3013 | |
| 3014 | if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)(0 != (wrappingKey->staticflags & 0x1)) ? (0 != (wrappingKey ->staticflags & (1U << 1))) : PK11_HasAttributeSet (wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, 0x00000002UL , 0)) { |
| 3015 | PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx); |
| 3016 | } |
| 3017 | |
| 3018 | return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3019 | wrapType, NULL((void*)0), wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
| 3020 | wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm); |
| 3021 | } |
| 3022 | |
| 3023 | PK11SymKey * |
| 3024 | PK11_CopySymKeyForSigning(PK11SymKey *originalKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) |
| 3025 | { |
| 3026 | CK_RV crv; |
| 3027 | CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate; |
| 3028 | CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 3029 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = originalKey->slot; |
| 3030 | |
| 3031 | /* first just try to set this key up for signing */ |
| 3032 | PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_SIGN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue))(&setTemplate)->type = (0x00000108UL); (&setTemplate )->pValue = (&ckTrue); (&setTemplate)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(ckTrue));; |
| 3033 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(originalKey); |
| 3034 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_SetAttributeValue(originalKey->session, |
| 3035 | originalKey->objectID, &setTemplate, 1); |
| 3036 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(originalKey); |
| 3037 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3038 | return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(originalKey); |
| 3039 | } |
| 3040 | |
| 3041 | /* nope, doesn't like it, use the pk11 copy object command */ |
| 3042 | return pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, mech, CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL, originalKey); |
| 3043 | } |
| 3044 | |
| 3045 | void |
| 3046 | PK11_SetFortezzaHack(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 3047 | { |
| 3048 | symKey->origin = PK11_OriginFortezzaHack; |
| 3049 | } |
| 3050 | |
| 3051 | /* |
| 3052 | * This is required to allow FORTEZZA_NULL and FORTEZZA_RC4 |
| 3053 | * working. This function simply gets a valid IV for the keys. |
| 3054 | */ |
| 3055 | SECStatus |
| 3056 | PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(PK11SymKey *symKey, unsigned char *iv, int len) |
| 3057 | { |
| 3058 | CK_MECHANISM mech_info; |
| 3059 | CK_ULONG count = 0; |
| 3060 | CK_RV crv; |
| 3061 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 3062 | |
| 3063 | mech_info.mechanism = CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC640x00001002UL; |
| 3064 | mech_info.pParameter = iv; |
| 3065 | mech_info.ulParameterLen = len; |
| 3066 | |
| 3067 | /* generate the IV for fortezza */ |
| 3068 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); |
| 3069 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((symKey->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptInit(symKey->slot->session, &mech_info, symKey->objectID); |
| 3070 | if (crv == CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3071 | PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((symKey->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptFinal(symKey->slot->session, NULL((void*)0), &count); |
| 3072 | rv = SECSuccess; |
| 3073 | } |
| 3074 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot); |
| 3075 | return rv; |
| 3076 | } |
| 3077 | |
| 3078 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE |
| 3079 | PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(PK11SymKey *symKey) |
| 3080 | { |
| 3081 | return symKey->objectID; |
| 3082 | } |
| 3083 | |
| 3084 | SECStatus |
| 3085 | PK11_Encapsulate(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, |
| 3086 | PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlags, |
| 3087 | PK11SymKey **outKey, SECItem **outCiphertext) |
| 3088 | { |
| 3089 | PORT_Assert(pubKey)((pubKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("pubKey","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3089)); |
| 3090 | PORT_Assert(outKey)((outKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("outKey","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3090)); |
| 3091 | PORT_Assert(outCiphertext)((outCiphertext)?((void)0):PR_Assert("outCiphertext","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3091)); |
| 3092 | |
| 3093 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 3094 | |
| 3095 | PK11SymKey *sharedSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3096 | SECItem *ciphertext = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3097 | |
| 3098 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 3099 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 3100 | |
| 3101 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 3102 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 3103 | CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE0; |
| 3104 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 3105 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 3106 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kemType = pk11_mapKemKeyType(pubKey->keyType); |
| 3107 | CK_MECHANISM mech = { kemType, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3108 | CK_ULONG ciphertextLen = 0; |
| 3109 | CK_RV crv; |
| 3110 | |
| 3111 | /* set up the target key template */ |
| 3112 | attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 3113 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 3114 | attrs++; |
| 3115 | |
| 3116 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 3117 | attrs++; |
| 3118 | |
| 3119 | attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse); |
| 3120 | attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 3121 | |
| 3122 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 3123 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",3123 )); |
| 3124 | |
| 3125 | *outKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3126 | *outCiphertext = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3127 | |
| 3128 | /* create a struxture for the target key */ |
| 3129 | sharedSecret = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE1, PR_TRUE1, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 3130 | if (sharedSecret == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3131 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 3132 | return SECFailure; |
| 3133 | } |
| 3134 | sharedSecret->origin = PK11_OriginDerive; |
| 3135 | |
| 3136 | /* this path is KEM mechanism agnostic */ |
| 3137 | if (PK11_CheckPKCS11Version(slot, 3, 2, PR_TRUE1) >= 0) { |
| 3138 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3139 | /* get the length the normal PKCS #11 way. This works no matter |
| 3140 | * what the KEM is and we don't have to try to guess the KEM length |
| 3141 | * from the key */ |
| 3142 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_EncapsulateKey(sharedSecret->session, |
| 3143 | &mech, |
| 3144 | pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3145 | keyTemplate, |
| 3146 | templateCount, |
| 3147 | NULL((void*)0), |
| 3148 | &ciphertextLen, |
| 3149 | &sharedSecret->objectID); |
| 3150 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3151 | if ((crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) && (crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL0x00000150UL) && |
| 3152 | (crv != CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE0x00000062UL)) { |
| 3153 | goto loser; |
| 3154 | } |
| 3155 | ciphertext = SECITEM_AllocItemSECITEM_AllocItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), ciphertextLen); |
| 3156 | if (ciphertext == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3157 | crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY0x00000002UL; |
| 3158 | goto loser; |
| 3159 | } |
| 3160 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3161 | /* Now do the encapsulate */ |
| 3162 | /* NOTE: the PKCS #11 order of the parameters is different from |
| 3163 | * the vendor interface */ |
| 3164 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_EncapsulateKey(sharedSecret->session, |
| 3165 | &mech, |
| 3166 | pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3167 | keyTemplate, |
| 3168 | templateCount, |
| 3169 | ciphertext->data, |
| 3170 | &ciphertextLen, |
| 3171 | &sharedSecret->objectID); |
| 3172 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3173 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3174 | goto loser; |
| 3175 | } |
| 3176 | ciphertext->len = ciphertextLen; |
| 3177 | } else { |
| 3178 | /* use the old NSS private interface */ |
| 3179 | CK_INTERFACE_PTR KEMInterface = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3180 | CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR KEMInterfaceName = |
| 3181 | (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR) "Vendor NSS KEM Interface"; |
| 3182 | CK_VERSION KEMInterfaceVersion = { 1, 0 }; |
| 3183 | CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *KEMInterfaceFunctions = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3184 | CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE kemParameterSet; |
| 3185 | |
| 3186 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_GetInterface(KEMInterfaceName, |
| 3187 | &KEMInterfaceVersion, |
| 3188 | &KEMInterface, 0); |
| 3189 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3190 | goto loser; |
| 3191 | } |
| 3192 | KEMInterfaceFunctions = (CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *)(KEMInterface->pFunctionList); |
| 3193 | |
| 3194 | /* the old API expected the parameter set as a parameter, the |
| 3195 | * pkcs11 v3.2 gets it from the key */ |
| 3196 | kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, |
| 3197 | pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3198 | CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 40)); |
| 3199 | if (kemParameterSet == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION(~0UL)) { |
| 3200 | kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, |
| 3201 | pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3202 | CKA_PARAMETER_SET0x0000061dUL); |
| 3203 | if (kemParameterSet == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION(~0UL)) { |
| 3204 | crv = CKR_PUBLIC_KEY_INVALID0x000001B9UL; |
| 3205 | goto loser; |
| 3206 | } |
| 3207 | } |
| 3208 | /* The old interface only ever supported KYBER768 and MLKEM768 |
| 3209 | * SOME versions of RHEL has MLKEM1024 support, if we want to |
| 3210 | * make sure this works with those versions of softoken (without their |
| 3211 | * NSS) we should check the kemParamSet and set the mech to |
| 3212 | * CKM_NSS_ML_KEM if the key isn't KYBER and the cipher test to |
| 3213 | * MLKEM104_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES if the kemParmset is MLKEM1024 */ |
| 3214 | mech.mechanism = CKM_NSS_KYBER((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 46); |
| 3215 | mech.pParameter = (CK_VOID_PTR)&kemParameterSet; |
| 3216 | mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(kemParameterSet); |
| 3217 | ciphertextLen = KYBER768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES1088U; |
| 3218 | |
| 3219 | ciphertext = SECITEM_AllocItemSECITEM_AllocItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), ciphertextLen); |
| 3220 | if (ciphertext == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3221 | crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY0x00000002UL; |
| 3222 | goto loser; |
| 3223 | } |
| 3224 | |
| 3225 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3226 | crv = KEMInterfaceFunctions->C_Encapsulate(sharedSecret->session, |
| 3227 | &mech, |
| 3228 | pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3229 | keyTemplate, |
| 3230 | templateCount, |
| 3231 | &sharedSecret->objectID, |
| 3232 | ciphertext->data, |
| 3233 | &ciphertextLen); |
| 3234 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3235 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3236 | goto loser; |
| 3237 | } |
| 3238 | |
| 3239 | PORT_Assert(ciphertextLen == ciphertext->len)((ciphertextLen == ciphertext->len)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ciphertextLen == ciphertext->len" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",3239 )); |
| 3240 | } |
| 3241 | |
| 3242 | *outKey = sharedSecret; |
| 3243 | *outCiphertext = ciphertext; |
| 3244 | |
| 3245 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3246 | |
| 3247 | loser: |
| 3248 | PK11_FreeSymKey(sharedSecret); |
| 3249 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(ciphertext, PR_TRUE1); |
| 3250 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 3251 | return SECFailure; |
| 3252 | } |
| 3253 | |
| 3254 | SECStatus |
| 3255 | PK11_Decapsulate(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const SECItem *ciphertext, |
| 3256 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, |
| 3257 | CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11SymKey **outKey) |
| 3258 | { |
| 3259 | PORT_Assert(privKey)((privKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("privKey","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3259)); |
| 3260 | PORT_Assert(ciphertext)((ciphertext)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ciphertext","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3260)); |
| 3261 | PORT_Assert(outKey)((outKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("outKey","/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c" ,3261)); |
| 3262 | |
| 3263 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 3264 | |
| 3265 | PK11SymKey *sharedSecret; |
| 3266 | |
| 3267 | CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS16]; |
| 3268 | unsigned int templateCount; |
| 3269 | |
| 3270 | CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; |
| 3271 | CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE1; |
| 3272 | CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE0; |
| 3273 | CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY0x00000004UL; |
| 3274 | CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET0x00000010UL; |
| 3275 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kemType = pk11_mapKemKeyType(privKey->keyType); |
| 3276 | CK_MECHANISM mech = { kemType, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3277 | |
| 3278 | CK_RV crv; |
| 3279 | |
| 3280 | *outKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3281 | sharedSecret = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE1, PR_TRUE1, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 3282 | if (sharedSecret == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3283 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 3284 | return SECFailure; |
| 3285 | } |
| 3286 | sharedSecret->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap; |
| 3287 | |
| 3288 | attrs = keyTemplate; |
| 3289 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass))(attrs)->type = (0x00000000UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyClass); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyClass));; |
| 3290 | attrs++; |
| 3291 | |
| 3292 | PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType))(attrs)->type = (0x00000100UL); (attrs)->pValue = (& keyType); (attrs)->ulValueLen = (sizeof(keyType));; |
| 3293 | attrs++; |
| 3294 | |
| 3295 | attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse); |
| 3296 | attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue); |
| 3297 | |
| 3298 | templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate; |
| 3299 | PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))((templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)" ,"/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c",3299 )); |
| 3300 | |
| 3301 | if (PK11_CheckPKCS11Version(slot, 3, 2, PR_TRUE1) >= 0) { |
| 3302 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3303 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_DecapsulateKey(sharedSecret->session, |
| 3304 | &mech, |
| 3305 | privKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3306 | keyTemplate, |
| 3307 | templateCount, |
| 3308 | ciphertext->data, |
| 3309 | ciphertext->len, |
| 3310 | &sharedSecret->objectID); |
| 3311 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3312 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3313 | goto loser; |
| 3314 | } |
| 3315 | } else { |
| 3316 | CK_INTERFACE_PTR KEMInterface = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3317 | CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR KEMInterfaceName = |
| 3318 | (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR) "Vendor NSS KEM Interface"; |
| 3319 | CK_VERSION KEMInterfaceVersion = { 1, 0 }; |
| 3320 | CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *KEMInterfaceFunctions = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3321 | |
| 3322 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((slot)->functionList))->C_GetInterface(KEMInterfaceName, |
| 3323 | &KEMInterfaceVersion, |
| 3324 | &KEMInterface, 0); |
| 3325 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3326 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 3327 | goto loser; |
| 3328 | } |
| 3329 | KEMInterfaceFunctions = |
| 3330 | (CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *)(KEMInterface->pFunctionList); |
| 3331 | |
| 3332 | /* the old API expected the parameter set as a parameter, the |
| 3333 | * pkcs11 v3.2 gets it from the key */ |
| 3334 | CK_ULONG kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, |
| 3335 | privKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3336 | CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 40)); |
| 3337 | if (kemParameterSet == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION(~0UL)) { |
| 3338 | kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, |
| 3339 | privKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3340 | CKA_PARAMETER_SET0x0000061dUL); |
| 3341 | if (kemParameterSet == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION(~0UL)) { |
| 3342 | crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID0x00000060UL; |
Value stored to 'crv' is never read | |
| 3343 | goto loser; |
| 3344 | } |
| 3345 | } |
| 3346 | /* The old interface only ever supported KYBER768 and MLKEM768 |
| 3347 | * SOME versions of RHEL has MLKEM1024 support, if we want to |
| 3348 | * make sure this works with those versions of softoken (without their |
| 3349 | * NSS) we should check the kemParamSet and set the mech to |
| 3350 | * CKM_NSS_ML_KEM if the key isn't KYBER and the cipher test to |
| 3351 | * MLKEM104_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES if the kemParmset is MLKEM1024 */ |
| 3352 | mech.mechanism = CKM_NSS_KYBER((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 46); |
| 3353 | mech.pParameter = (CK_VOID_PTR)&kemParameterSet; |
| 3354 | mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(kemParameterSet); |
| 3355 | |
| 3356 | pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3357 | crv = KEMInterfaceFunctions->C_Decapsulate(sharedSecret->session, |
| 3358 | &mech, |
| 3359 | privKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 3360 | ciphertext->data, |
| 3361 | ciphertext->len, |
| 3362 | keyTemplate, |
| 3363 | templateCount, |
| 3364 | &sharedSecret->objectID); |
| 3365 | pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret); |
| 3366 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 3367 | goto loser; |
| 3368 | } |
| 3369 | } |
| 3370 | |
| 3371 | *outKey = sharedSecret; |
| 3372 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3373 | |
| 3374 | loser: |
| 3375 | PK11_FreeSymKey(sharedSecret); |
| 3376 | return SECFailure; |
| 3377 | } |