| File: | root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c |
| Warning: | line 912, column 13 Value stored to 'crv' is never read |
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| 1 | /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| 2 | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| 3 | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
| 4 | /* |
| 5 | * This file PK11Contexts which are used in multipart hashing, |
| 6 | * encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations. |
| 7 | */ |
| 8 | |
| 9 | #include "seccomon.h" |
| 10 | #include "secmod.h" |
| 11 | #include "secmodi.h" |
| 12 | #include "secmodti.h" |
| 13 | #include "pkcs11.h" |
| 14 | #include "pk11func.h" |
| 15 | #include "secitem.h" |
| 16 | #include "secoid.h" |
| 17 | #include "sechash.h" |
| 18 | #include "secerr.h" |
| 19 | #include "blapit.h" |
| 20 | #include "secport.h" |
| 21 | |
| 22 | static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 }; |
| 23 | |
| 24 | /********************************************************************** |
| 25 | * |
| 26 | * Now Deal with Crypto Contexts |
| 27 | * |
| 28 | **********************************************************************/ |
| 29 | |
| 30 | /* |
| 31 | * the monitors... |
| 32 | */ |
| 33 | void |
| 34 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) |
| 35 | { |
| 36 | /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor |
| 37 | * the Context */ |
| 38 | if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { |
| 39 | /* Should this use monitors instead? */ |
| 40 | PR_Lock(cx->sessionLock); |
| 41 | } else { |
| 42 | PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot); |
| 43 | } |
| 44 | } |
| 45 | |
| 46 | void |
| 47 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) |
| 48 | { |
| 49 | /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor |
| 50 | * the Context */ |
| 51 | if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) { |
| 52 | /* Should this use monitors instead? */ |
| 53 | PR_Unlock(cx->sessionLock); |
| 54 | } else { |
| 55 | PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot); |
| 56 | } |
| 57 | } |
| 58 | |
| 59 | /* |
| 60 | * Free up a Cipher Context |
| 61 | */ |
| 62 | void |
| 63 | PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit) |
| 64 | { |
| 65 | pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession); |
| 66 | if (context->savedData != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 67 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(context->savedData); |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key); |
| 70 | if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params) { |
| 71 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(context->param, PR_TRUE1); |
| 72 | } |
| 73 | if (context->sessionLock) { |
| 74 | PR_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock); |
| 75 | } |
| 76 | PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot); |
| 77 | /* With freeit == PR_FALSE the caller keeps the struct, so zero it out. |
| 78 | * This clears the dangling pointers and marks the context uninitialized |
| 79 | * (note that CK_INVALID_HANDLE is 0). */ |
| 80 | PORT_Memsetmemset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); |
| 81 | if (freeit) |
| 82 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(context); |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | /* |
| 86 | * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary. |
| 87 | */ |
| 88 | static unsigned char * |
| 89 | pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer, |
| 90 | unsigned long *savedLength) |
| 91 | { |
| 92 | CK_RV crv; |
| 93 | |
| 94 | /* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */ |
| 95 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength); |
| 96 | if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL0x00000150UL)) { |
| 97 | /* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we |
| 98 | * have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the |
| 99 | * correct length |
| 100 | */ |
| 101 | unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength; |
| 102 | buffer = PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(bufLen); |
| 103 | if (buffer == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 104 | return (unsigned char *)NULL((void*)0); |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength); |
| 107 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 108 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(buffer, bufLen); |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | } |
| 111 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 112 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 113 | return (unsigned char *)NULL((void*)0); |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | return buffer; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | void * |
| 119 | pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength) |
| 120 | { |
| 121 | return pk11_saveContextHelper(context, |
| 122 | (unsigned char *)space, savedLength); |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | |
| 125 | /* |
| 126 | * restore the current context |
| 127 | */ |
| 128 | SECStatus |
| 129 | pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long savedLength) |
| 130 | { |
| 131 | CK_RV crv; |
| 132 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = context->objectID; |
| 133 | |
| 134 | PORT_Assert(space != NULL)((space != ((void*)0)) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("space != NULL" , "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c", 134 )); |
| 135 | if (space == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 136 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 137 | return SECFailure; |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0); |
| 140 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 141 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 142 | return SECFailure; |
| 143 | } |
| 144 | return SECSuccess; |
| 145 | } |
| 146 | |
| 147 | SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context); |
| 148 | |
| 149 | /* |
| 150 | * Initialize a Message function. Particular function is passed in as a |
| 151 | * function pointer. Since all C_Message*Init funcitons have the same |
| 152 | * prototype, we just pick one of the the prototypes to declare our init |
| 153 | * function. |
| 154 | */ |
| 155 | static CK_RV |
| 156 | pk11_contextInitMessage(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, |
| 157 | CK_C_MessageEncryptInit initFunc, |
| 158 | CK_FLAGS flags, CK_RV scrv) |
| 159 | { |
| 160 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = context->slot; |
| 161 | CK_RV crv = CKR_OK0x00000000UL; |
| 162 | |
| 163 | context->ivCounter = 0; |
| 164 | context->ivMaxCount = 0; |
| 165 | context->ivFixedBits = 0; |
| 166 | context->ivLen = 0; |
| 167 | context->ivGen = CKG_NO_GENERATE0x00000000UL; |
| 168 | context->simulate_mechanism = (mech)->mechanism; |
| 169 | context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE0; |
| 170 | /* check that we can do the Message interface. We need to check |
| 171 | * for either 1) are we using a PKCS #11 v3 interface and 2) is the |
| 172 | * Message flag set on the mechanism. If either is false we simulate |
| 173 | * the message interface for the Encrypt and Decrypt cases using the |
| 174 | * PKCS #11 V2 interface. |
| 175 | * Sign and verify do not have V2 interfaces, so we go ahead and fail |
| 176 | * if those cases */ |
| 177 | if ((PK11_CheckPKCS11Version(slot, 3, 0, PR_TRUE1) >= 0) && |
| 178 | PK11_DoesMechanismFlag(slot, (mech)->mechanism, flags)) { |
| 179 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 180 | crv = (*initFunc)((context)->session, (mech), (context)->objectID); |
| 181 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 182 | if ((crv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED0x00000054UL) || |
| 183 | (crv == CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID0x00000070UL)) { |
| 184 | /* we have a 3.0 interface, and the flag was set (or ignored) |
| 185 | * but the implementation was not there, use the V2 interface */ |
| 186 | crv = (scrv); |
| 187 | context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE1; |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | } else { |
| 190 | crv = (scrv); |
| 191 | context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE1; |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | return crv; |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | |
| 196 | /* |
| 197 | * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext |
| 198 | */ |
| 199 | static SECStatus |
| 200 | pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info, |
| 201 | const SECItem *sig) |
| 202 | { |
| 203 | CK_RV crv; |
| 204 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE0; |
| 207 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 208 | case CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 209 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 210 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID); |
| 211 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 212 | break; |
| 213 | case CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 214 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 215 | if (context->fortezzaHack) { |
| 216 | CK_ULONG count = 0; |
| 217 | /* generate the IV for fortezza */ |
| 218 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID); |
| 219 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 220 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 221 | break; |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList )) |
| 224 | ->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, |
| 225 | NULL((void*)0), &count); |
| 226 | } |
| 227 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID); |
| 228 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 229 | break; |
| 230 | case CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 231 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 232 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID); |
| 233 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 234 | break; |
| 235 | case CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 236 | /* NOTE: we previously has this set to C_SignInit for Macing. |
| 237 | * It turns out now one could possibly use it that way, though, |
| 238 | * because PK11_HashOp() always called C_VerifyUpdate on CKA_VERIFY, |
| 239 | * which would have failed. So everyone just calls us with CKA_SIGN |
| 240 | * when Macing even when they are verifying, no need to 'do it |
| 241 | * for them'. It needs to be VerifyInit now so that we can do |
| 242 | * PKCS #11 hash/Verify combo operations. */ |
| 243 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 244 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifyInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID); |
| 245 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 246 | break; |
| 247 | /* fake attibute to distingush CKA_VERIFY from CKA_VERIFY_SIGNAGURE */ |
| 248 | case CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE(0x83000000L | 0x0000010AUL): |
| 249 | if (!sig || !sig->data) { |
| 250 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 251 | return SECFailure; |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 254 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifySignatureInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID, sig->data, sig->len); |
| 255 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 256 | break; |
| 257 | case CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L: |
| 258 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 259 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestInit(context->session, mech_info); |
| 260 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 261 | break; |
| 262 | |
| 263 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 264 | crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info, |
| 265 | PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageEncryptInit, |
| 266 | CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT0x00000002UL, CKR_OK0x00000000UL); |
| 267 | break; |
| 268 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 269 | crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info, |
| 270 | PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageDecryptInit, |
| 271 | CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT0x00000004UL, CKR_OK0x00000000UL); |
| 272 | break; |
| 273 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 274 | crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info, |
| 275 | PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageSignInit, |
| 276 | CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN0x00000008UL, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED0x00000054UL); |
| 277 | break; |
| 278 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 279 | crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info, |
| 280 | PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageVerifyInit, |
| 281 | CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY0x00000010UL, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED0x00000054UL); |
| 282 | break; |
| 283 | default: |
| 284 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 285 | break; |
| 286 | } |
| 287 | |
| 288 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 289 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 290 | return SECFailure; |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | |
| 293 | /* handle the case where the token is using the old NSS mechanism */ |
| 294 | if (context->simulate_message && |
| 295 | !PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, context->simulate_mechanism)) { |
| 296 | if ((context->simulate_mechanism == CKM_CHACHA20_POLY13050x00004021UL) && |
| 297 | PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 28))) { |
| 298 | context->simulate_mechanism = CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 28); |
| 299 | } else { |
| 300 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID0x00000070UL)); |
| 301 | return SECFailure; |
| 302 | } |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | |
| 305 | /* |
| 306 | * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex |
| 307 | */ |
| 308 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 309 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 310 | context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 311 | &context->savedLength); |
| 312 | if (context->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 313 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 314 | /* clear out out session for others to use */ |
| 315 | pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 316 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | return rv; |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | |
| 321 | /* |
| 322 | * Testing interfaces, not for general use. This function forces |
| 323 | * an AEAD context into simulation mode even though the target token |
| 324 | * can already do PKCS #11 v3.0 Message (i.e. softoken). |
| 325 | */ |
| 326 | SECStatus |
| 327 | _PK11_ContextSetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context) |
| 328 | { |
| 329 | CK_RV crv; |
| 330 | /* only message encrypt and message decrypt contexts can be simulated */ |
| 331 | if ((context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL)) && |
| 332 | (context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL))) { |
| 333 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 334 | return SECFailure; |
| 335 | } |
| 336 | /* if we are already simulating, return */ |
| 337 | if (context->simulate_message) { |
| 338 | return SECSuccess; |
| 339 | } |
| 340 | /* we need to shutdown the existing AEAD operation */ |
| 341 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 342 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 343 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session); |
| 344 | break; |
| 345 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 346 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session); |
| 347 | break; |
| 348 | default: |
| 349 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); |
| 350 | return SECFailure; |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 353 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 354 | return SECFailure; |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE1; |
| 357 | return SECSuccess; |
| 358 | } |
| 359 | |
| 360 | PRBool |
| 361 | _PK11_ContextGetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context) |
| 362 | { |
| 363 | return context->simulate_message; |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | |
| 366 | /* |
| 367 | * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context. |
| 368 | */ |
| 369 | static PK11Context * |
| 370 | pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 371 | PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 372 | PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, |
| 373 | const SECItem *param, const SECItem *sig, |
| 374 | void *pwArg) |
| 375 | { |
| 376 | CK_MECHANISM mech_info; |
| 377 | PK11Context *context; |
| 378 | SECStatus rv; |
| 379 | |
| 380 | PORT_Assert(slot != NULL)((slot != ((void*)0)) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("slot != NULL", "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c", 380 )); |
| 381 | if (!slot || ((objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) && ((operation != CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L) || |
| 382 | (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC640x00001002UL)))) { |
| 383 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 384 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 385 | } |
| 386 | context = (PK11Context *)PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(sizeof(PK11Context)); |
| 387 | if (context == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 388 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 389 | } |
| 390 | |
| 391 | /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt |
| 392 | * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA |
| 393 | * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be |
| 394 | * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to |
| 395 | * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it), |
| 396 | * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side |
| 397 | * of the connection.*/ |
| 398 | context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE0; |
| 399 | if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC640x00001002UL) { |
| 400 | if (symKey && (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack)) { |
| 401 | context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE1; |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | |
| 405 | /* initialize the critical fields of the context */ |
| 406 | context->operation = operation; |
| 407 | /* If we were given a symKey, keep our own reference to it so |
| 408 | * that the key doesn't disappear in the middle of the operation |
| 409 | * if the caller frees it. Public and Private keys are not reference |
| 410 | * counted, so the caller just has to keep his copies around until |
| 411 | * the operation completes */ |
| 412 | context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL((void*)0); |
| 413 | context->objectID = objectID; |
| 414 | context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); |
| 415 | context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &context->ownSession); |
| 416 | context->pwArg = pwArg; |
| 417 | /* get our session */ |
| 418 | context->savedData = NULL((void*)0); |
| 419 | |
| 420 | /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple |
| 421 | * begins on a single context */ |
| 422 | context->type = type; |
| 423 | if (param) { |
| 424 | if (param->len > 0) { |
| 425 | context->param = SECITEM_DupItemSECITEM_DupItem_Util(param); |
| 426 | } else { |
| 427 | context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params; |
| 428 | } |
| 429 | } else { |
| 430 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 431 | context->param = NULL((void*)0); |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | context->init = PR_FALSE0; |
| 434 | context->sessionLock = PR_NewLock(); |
| 435 | if ((context->param == NULL((void*)0)) || (context->sessionLock == NULL((void*)0))) { |
| 436 | PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE1); |
| 437 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 438 | } |
| 439 | |
| 440 | mech_info.mechanism = type; |
| 441 | mech_info.pParameter = param->data; |
| 442 | mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len; |
| 443 | rv = pk11_context_init(context, &mech_info, sig); |
| 444 | |
| 445 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 446 | PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE1); |
| 447 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 448 | } |
| 449 | context->init = PR_TRUE1; |
| 450 | return context; |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | |
| 453 | /* |
| 454 | * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different |
| 455 | * parts of libsec. |
| 456 | */ |
| 457 | PK11Context * |
| 458 | __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 459 | PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, |
| 460 | SECItem *param, void *wincx) |
| 461 | { |
| 462 | PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 463 | PK11Context *context = NULL((void*)0); |
| 464 | |
| 465 | /* first get a slot */ |
| 466 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 467 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx); |
| 468 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 469 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 470 | goto loser; |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | } else { |
| 473 | PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot); |
| 474 | } |
| 475 | |
| 476 | /* now import the key */ |
| 477 | symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx); |
| 478 | if (symKey == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 479 | goto loser; |
| 480 | |
| 481 | context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param); |
| 482 | |
| 483 | loser: |
| 484 | if (symKey) { |
| 485 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | if (slot) { |
| 488 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 489 | } |
| 490 | |
| 491 | return context; |
| 492 | } |
| 493 | |
| 494 | PK11Context * |
| 495 | PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 496 | PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, |
| 497 | SECItem *param, void *wincx) |
| 498 | { |
| 499 | return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation, |
| 500 | key, param, wincx); |
| 501 | } |
| 502 | |
| 503 | /* |
| 504 | * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using |
| 505 | * the same key in multiple sessions! |
| 506 | */ |
| 507 | PK11Context * |
| 508 | PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 509 | PK11SymKey *symKey, const SECItem *param) |
| 510 | { |
| 511 | PK11SymKey *newKey; |
| 512 | PK11Context *context; |
| 513 | |
| 514 | /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ |
| 515 | newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, type, operation); |
| 516 | if (newKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 517 | PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey); |
| 518 | } else { |
| 519 | symKey = newKey; |
| 520 | } |
| 521 | |
| 522 | /* Context keeps its reference to the symKey, so it's safe to |
| 523 | * free our reference we we are through, even though we may have |
| 524 | * created the key using pk11_ForceSlot. */ |
| 525 | context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey, |
| 526 | symKey->objectID, param, NULL((void*)0), |
| 527 | symKey->cx); |
| 528 | PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); |
| 529 | return context; |
| 530 | } |
| 531 | |
| 532 | /* To support multipart public key operations (like hash/verify operations), |
| 533 | * we need to create contexts with public keys. */ |
| 534 | PK11Context * |
| 535 | PK11_CreateSignatureContextByPubKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, |
| 536 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 537 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECItem *param, |
| 538 | const SECItem *sig, void *pwArg) |
| 539 | { |
| 540 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot; |
| 541 | SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 542 | |
| 543 | /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ |
| 544 | /* public keys have all their data in the public key data structure, |
| 545 | * so there's no need to export the old key, just import this one. The |
| 546 | * import manages consistancy of the public key data structure */ |
| 547 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0) || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type)) { |
| 548 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID; |
| 549 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 550 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 551 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 552 | } |
| 553 | objectID = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE0); |
| 554 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 555 | if (objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 556 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | |
| 560 | /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter |
| 561 | * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of |
| 562 | * PK11_VerifyWithMechanism */ |
| 563 | return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, pubKey->pkcs11Slot, operation, |
| 564 | NULL((void*)0), pubKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 565 | param ? param : &nullparam, sig, pwArg); |
| 566 | } |
| 567 | |
| 568 | /* traditional PK11_CreateContextByPubKey just doesn't have the signature. |
| 569 | * This will work unless operation is CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE */ |
| 570 | PK11Context * |
| 571 | PK11_CreateContextByPubKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 572 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECItem *param, |
| 573 | void *pwArg) |
| 574 | { |
| 575 | return PK11_CreateSignatureContextByPubKey(type, operation, pubKey, param, |
| 576 | NULL((void*)0), pwArg); |
| 577 | } |
| 578 | |
| 579 | /* To support multipart private key operations (like hash/sign operations), |
| 580 | * we need to create contexts with private keys. */ |
| 581 | PK11Context * |
| 582 | PK11_CreateContextByPrivKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
| 583 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const SECItem *param) |
| 584 | { |
| 585 | SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 586 | /* Private keys are generally not movable. If the token the |
| 587 | * private key lives on can't do the operation, generally we are |
| 588 | * stuck anyway. So no need to try to manipulate the key into |
| 589 | * another token */ |
| 590 | |
| 591 | /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */ |
| 592 | /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter |
| 593 | * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of |
| 594 | * PK11_SignWithMechanism */ |
| 595 | return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, privKey->pkcs11Slot, operation, |
| 596 | NULL((void*)0), privKey->pkcs11ID, |
| 597 | param ? param : &nullparam, NULL((void*)0), |
| 598 | privKey->wincx); |
| 599 | } |
| 600 | |
| 601 | /* |
| 602 | * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot. |
| 603 | * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey. |
| 604 | */ |
| 605 | PK11Context * |
| 606 | PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg) |
| 607 | { |
| 608 | /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */ |
| 609 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type; |
| 610 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 611 | PK11Context *context; |
| 612 | SECItem param; |
| 613 | |
| 614 | type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg); |
| 615 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 616 | if (slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 617 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE); |
| 618 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | |
| 621 | /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */ |
| 622 | param.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 623 | param.len = 0; |
| 624 | param.type = 0; |
| 625 | |
| 626 | context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L, NULL((void*)0), |
| 627 | CK_INVALID_HANDLE0, ¶m, NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0)); |
| 628 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 629 | return context; |
| 630 | } |
| 631 | |
| 632 | /* |
| 633 | * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context. |
| 634 | */ |
| 635 | PK11Context * |
| 636 | PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old) |
| 637 | { |
| 638 | PK11Context *newcx; |
| 639 | PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE0; |
| 640 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 641 | void *data; |
| 642 | unsigned long len; |
| 643 | |
| 644 | newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation, |
| 645 | old->key, old->objectID, old->param, |
| 646 | NULL((void*)0), old->pwArg); |
| 647 | if (newcx == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 648 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 649 | |
| 650 | /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state |
| 651 | * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session, |
| 652 | * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */ |
| 653 | if (old->ownSession) { |
| 654 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old); |
| 655 | data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL((void*)0), &len); |
| 656 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old); |
| 657 | needFree = PR_TRUE1; |
| 658 | } else { |
| 659 | data = old->savedData; |
| 660 | len = old->savedLength; |
| 661 | } |
| 662 | |
| 663 | if (data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 664 | PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 665 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 666 | } |
| 667 | |
| 668 | /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different |
| 669 | * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we |
| 670 | * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the |
| 671 | * saveData pointer... */ |
| 672 | if (newcx->ownSession) { |
| 673 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx); |
| 674 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len); |
| 675 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx); |
| 676 | } else { |
| 677 | PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL)((newcx->savedData != ((void*)0)) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert( "newcx->savedData != NULL", "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c" , 677)); |
| 678 | if ((newcx->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) { |
| 679 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 680 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 681 | } else { |
| 682 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len); |
| 683 | newcx->savedLength = len; |
| 684 | } |
| 685 | } |
| 686 | |
| 687 | if (needFree) |
| 688 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(data); |
| 689 | |
| 690 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 691 | PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 692 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 693 | } |
| 694 | return newcx; |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | |
| 697 | /* |
| 698 | * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA |
| 699 | * work. |
| 700 | */ |
| 701 | SECStatus |
| 702 | PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int *len, int saveLength) |
| 703 | { |
| 704 | unsigned char *data; |
| 705 | unsigned int length = 0; |
| 706 | |
| 707 | if (save == NULL((void*)0) || len == NULL((void*)0) || saveLength < 0) { |
| 708 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 709 | return SECFailure; |
| 710 | } |
| 711 | |
| 712 | data = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(cx, save, (unsigned int)saveLength, &length); |
| 713 | if (data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 714 | return SECFailure; |
| 715 | } |
| 716 | if (data != save) { |
| 717 | /* PK11_SaveContextAlloc allocated a temporary because the state did |
| 718 | * not fit in `save`. We can't hand that buffer back through this API, |
| 719 | * so free it and report failure. */ |
| 720 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(data, length); |
| 721 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
| 722 | return SECFailure; |
| 723 | } |
| 724 | *len = (int)length; |
| 725 | return SECSuccess; |
| 726 | } |
| 727 | |
| 728 | /* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */ |
| 729 | unsigned char * |
| 730 | PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx, |
| 731 | unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen, |
| 732 | unsigned int *stateLen) |
| 733 | { |
| 734 | unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL((void*)0); |
| 735 | unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen; |
| 736 | |
| 737 | if (cx->ownSession) { |
| 738 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); |
| 739 | stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length); |
| 740 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); |
| 741 | *stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL((void*)0)) ? length : 0; |
| 742 | } else { |
| 743 | if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) { |
| 744 | stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(cx->savedLength); |
| 745 | if (!stateBuf) { |
| 746 | return (unsigned char *)NULL((void*)0); |
| 747 | } |
| 748 | } else { |
| 749 | stateBuf = preAllocBuf; |
| 750 | } |
| 751 | if (cx->savedData) { |
| 752 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength); |
| 753 | } |
| 754 | *stateLen = cx->savedLength; |
| 755 | } |
| 756 | return stateBuf; |
| 757 | } |
| 758 | |
| 759 | /* |
| 760 | * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for |
| 761 | * FORTEZZA . |
| 762 | */ |
| 763 | SECStatus |
| 764 | PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int len) |
| 765 | { |
| 766 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 767 | if (cx->ownSession) { |
| 768 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); |
| 769 | pk11_Finalize(cx); |
| 770 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx, save, len); |
| 771 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); |
| 772 | } else { |
| 773 | PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL)((cx->savedData != ((void*)0)) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("cx->savedData != NULL" , "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c", 773 )); |
| 774 | if ((cx->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned)len)) { |
| 775 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 776 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 777 | } else { |
| 778 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(cx->savedData, save, len); |
| 779 | cx->savedLength = len; |
| 780 | } |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | return rv; |
| 783 | } |
| 784 | |
| 785 | /* |
| 786 | * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context |
| 787 | */ |
| 788 | SECStatus |
| 789 | PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx) |
| 790 | { |
| 791 | CK_MECHANISM mech_info; |
| 792 | SECStatus rv; |
| 793 | |
| 794 | if (cx->init == PR_TRUE1) { |
| 795 | return SECSuccess; |
| 796 | } |
| 797 | |
| 798 | /* |
| 799 | * make sure the old context is clear first |
| 800 | */ |
| 801 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx); |
| 802 | pk11_Finalize(cx); |
| 803 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx); |
| 804 | |
| 805 | mech_info.mechanism = cx->type; |
| 806 | mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data; |
| 807 | mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len; |
| 808 | rv = pk11_context_init(cx, &mech_info, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 809 | |
| 810 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 811 | return SECFailure; |
| 812 | } |
| 813 | cx->init = PR_TRUE1; |
| 814 | return SECSuccess; |
| 815 | } |
| 816 | |
| 817 | SECStatus |
| 818 | PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, |
| 819 | PRInt32 len) |
| 820 | { |
| 821 | PK11Context *context; |
| 822 | unsigned int max_length; |
| 823 | unsigned int out_length; |
| 824 | SECStatus rv; |
| 825 | |
| 826 | /* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */ |
| 827 | if (len < 0) { |
| 828 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 829 | return SECFailure; |
| 830 | } |
| 831 | |
| 832 | context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg); |
| 833 | if (context == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 834 | return SECFailure; |
| 835 | |
| 836 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); |
| 837 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 838 | PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE1); |
| 839 | return rv; |
| 840 | } |
| 841 | |
| 842 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len); |
| 843 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 844 | PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE1); |
| 845 | return rv; |
| 846 | } |
| 847 | |
| 848 | /* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */ |
| 849 | max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg); |
| 850 | PORT_Assert(max_length)((max_length) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("max_length", "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c" , 850)); |
| 851 | if (!max_length) |
| 852 | max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX64; |
| 853 | |
| 854 | rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, out, &out_length, max_length); |
| 855 | PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE1); |
| 856 | return rv; |
| 857 | } |
| 858 | |
| 859 | /* |
| 860 | * execute a bulk encryption operation |
| 861 | */ |
| 862 | SECStatus |
| 863 | PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *out, int *outlen, |
| 864 | int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) |
| 865 | { |
| 866 | CK_RV crv = CKR_OK0x00000000UL; |
| 867 | CK_ULONG length = maxout; |
| 868 | CK_ULONG offset = 0; |
| 869 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 870 | unsigned char *saveOut = out; |
| 871 | unsigned char *allocOut = NULL((void*)0); |
| 872 | |
| 873 | /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored |
| 874 | * state. |
| 875 | */ |
| 876 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 877 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 878 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 879 | context->savedLength); |
| 880 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 881 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 882 | return rv; |
| 883 | } |
| 884 | } |
| 885 | |
| 886 | /* |
| 887 | * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and |
| 888 | * lose them on the first decrypt. |
| 889 | */ |
| 890 | if (context->fortezzaHack) { |
| 891 | unsigned char random[8]; |
| 892 | if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL) { |
| 893 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 894 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random)); |
| 895 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 896 | |
| 897 | /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into |
| 898 | * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this |
| 899 | * call. */ |
| 900 | allocOut = out = (unsigned char *)PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(maxout); |
| 901 | if (out == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 902 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 903 | return SECFailure; |
| 904 | } |
| 905 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, random, sizeof(random), out, &length); |
| 906 | |
| 907 | out += length; |
| 908 | maxout -= length; |
| 909 | offset = length; |
| 910 | } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL) { |
| 911 | length = sizeof(random); |
| 912 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, sizeof(random), random, &length); |
Value stored to 'crv' is never read | |
| 913 | inlen -= length; |
| 914 | in += length; |
| 915 | context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE0; |
| 916 | } |
| 917 | } |
| 918 | |
| 919 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 920 | case CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 921 | length = maxout; |
| 922 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); |
| 923 | length += offset; |
| 924 | break; |
| 925 | case CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 926 | length = maxout; |
| 927 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); |
| 928 | break; |
| 929 | default: |
| 930 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 931 | break; |
| 932 | } |
| 933 | |
| 934 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 935 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 936 | *outlen = 0; |
| 937 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 938 | } else { |
| 939 | *outlen = length; |
| 940 | } |
| 941 | |
| 942 | if (context->fortezzaHack) { |
| 943 | if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL) { |
| 944 | PORT_Assert(allocOut)((allocOut) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("allocOut", "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c" , 944)); |
| 945 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length); |
| 946 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(allocOut); |
| 947 | } |
| 948 | context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE0; |
| 949 | } |
| 950 | |
| 951 | /* |
| 952 | * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex |
| 953 | */ |
| 954 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 955 | context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 956 | &context->savedLength); |
| 957 | if (context->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 958 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 959 | |
| 960 | /* clear out out session for others to use */ |
| 961 | pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 964 | return rv; |
| 965 | } |
| 966 | |
| 967 | /* |
| 968 | * Simulate the IV generation that normally would happen in the token. |
| 969 | * |
| 970 | * This is a modifed copy of what is in freebl/gcm.c. We can't use the |
| 971 | * version in freebl because of layering, since freebl is inside the token |
| 972 | * boundary. These issues are traditionally handled by moving them to util, |
| 973 | * but we also have two different Random functions we have two switch between. |
| 974 | * Since this is primarily here for tokens that don't support the PKCS #11 |
| 975 | * Message Interface, it's OK if they diverge a bit. Slight semantic |
| 976 | * differences from the freebl/gcm.c version shouldn't be much more than the |
| 977 | * sematic differences between freebl and other tokens which do implement the |
| 978 | * Message Interface. */ |
| 979 | static SECStatus |
| 980 | pk11_GenerateIV(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen, |
| 981 | int fixedBits, unsigned char *iv, int ivLen) |
| 982 | { |
| 983 | unsigned int i; |
| 984 | unsigned int flexBits; |
| 985 | unsigned int ivOffset; |
| 986 | unsigned int ivNewCount; |
| 987 | unsigned char ivMask; |
| 988 | unsigned char ivSave; |
| 989 | SECStatus rv; |
| 990 | |
| 991 | if (context->ivCounter != 0) { |
| 992 | /* If we've already generated a message, make sure all subsequent |
| 993 | * messages are using the same generator */ |
| 994 | if ((context->ivGen != ivgen) || |
| 995 | (context->ivFixedBits != fixedBits) || |
| 996 | (context->ivLen != ivLen)) { |
| 997 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 998 | return SECFailure; |
| 999 | } |
| 1000 | } else { |
| 1001 | /* remember these values */ |
| 1002 | context->ivGen = ivgen; |
| 1003 | context->ivFixedBits = fixedBits; |
| 1004 | context->ivLen = ivLen; |
| 1005 | /* now calculate how may bits of IV we have to supply */ |
| 1006 | flexBits = ivLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8; |
| 1007 | /* first make sure we aren't going to overflow */ |
| 1008 | if (flexBits < fixedBits) { |
| 1009 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1010 | return SECFailure; |
| 1011 | } |
| 1012 | flexBits -= fixedBits; |
| 1013 | /* if we are generating a random number reduce the acceptable bits to |
| 1014 | * avoid birthday attacks */ |
| 1015 | if (ivgen == CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM0x00000003UL) { |
| 1016 | if (flexBits <= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS64) { |
| 1017 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1018 | return SECFailure; |
| 1019 | } |
| 1020 | /* see freebl/blapit.h for how GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS is |
| 1021 | * calculated. */ |
| 1022 | flexBits -= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS64; |
| 1023 | flexBits = flexBits >> 1; |
| 1024 | } |
| 1025 | if (flexBits == 0) { |
| 1026 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1027 | return SECFailure; |
| 1028 | } |
| 1029 | /* Turn those bits into the number of IV's we can safely return */ |
| 1030 | if (flexBits >= sizeof(context->ivMaxCount) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8) { |
| 1031 | context->ivMaxCount = PR_UINT64(0xffffffffffffffff)0xffffffffffffffffUL; |
| 1032 | } else { |
| 1033 | context->ivMaxCount = (PR_UINT64(1)1UL << flexBits); |
| 1034 | } |
| 1035 | } |
| 1036 | |
| 1037 | /* no generate, accept the IV from the source */ |
| 1038 | if (ivgen == CKG_NO_GENERATE0x00000000UL) { |
| 1039 | context->ivCounter = 1; |
| 1040 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1041 | } |
| 1042 | |
| 1043 | /* make sure we haven't exceeded the number of IVs we can return |
| 1044 | * for this key, generator, and IV size */ |
| 1045 | if (context->ivCounter >= context->ivMaxCount) { |
| 1046 | /* use a unique error from just bad user input */ |
| 1047 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_EXTRA_INPUT); |
| 1048 | return SECFailure; |
| 1049 | } |
| 1050 | |
| 1051 | /* build to mask to handle the first byte of the IV */ |
| 1052 | ivOffset = fixedBits / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8; |
| 1053 | ivMask = 0xff >> ((PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8 - (fixedBits & 7)) & 7); |
| 1054 | ivNewCount = ivLen - ivOffset; |
| 1055 | |
| 1056 | /* finally generate the IV */ |
| 1057 | switch (ivgen) { |
| 1058 | case CKG_GENERATE0x00000001UL: /* default to counter */ |
| 1059 | case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER0x00000002UL: |
| 1060 | iv[ivOffset] = (iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask) | |
| 1061 | (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount)((unsigned char)(((ivNewCount) - (0) - 1) >= sizeof(context ->ivCounter) ? 0 : (((context->ivCounter) >> (((ivNewCount ) - (0) - 1) * 8)) & 0xff))) & ivMask); |
| 1062 | for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) { |
| 1063 | iv[ivOffset + i] = |
| 1064 | PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount)((unsigned char)(((ivNewCount) - (i) - 1) >= sizeof(context ->ivCounter) ? 0 : (((context->ivCounter) >> (((ivNewCount ) - (i) - 1) * 8)) & 0xff))); |
| 1065 | } |
| 1066 | break; |
| 1067 | case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR0x00000004UL: |
| 1068 | iv[ivOffset] ^= |
| 1069 | (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount)((unsigned char)(((ivNewCount) - (0) - 1) >= sizeof(context ->ivCounter) ? 0 : (((context->ivCounter) >> (((ivNewCount ) - (0) - 1) * 8)) & 0xff))) & ivMask); |
| 1070 | for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) { |
| 1071 | iv[ivOffset + i] ^= |
| 1072 | PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount)((unsigned char)(((ivNewCount) - (i) - 1) >= sizeof(context ->ivCounter) ? 0 : (((context->ivCounter) >> (((ivNewCount ) - (i) - 1) * 8)) & 0xff))); |
| 1073 | } |
| 1074 | break; |
| 1075 | case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM0x00000003UL: |
| 1076 | ivSave = iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask; |
| 1077 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv + ivOffset, ivNewCount); |
| 1078 | iv[ivOffset] = ivSave | (iv[ivOffset] & ivMask); |
| 1079 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1080 | return rv; |
| 1081 | } |
| 1082 | break; |
| 1083 | } |
| 1084 | context->ivCounter++; |
| 1085 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1086 | } |
| 1087 | |
| 1088 | /* |
| 1089 | * PKCS #11 v2.40 did not have a message interface. If our module can't |
| 1090 | * do the message interface use the old method of doing AEAD */ |
| 1091 | static SECStatus |
| 1092 | pk11_AEADSimulateOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen, |
| 1093 | const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen, |
| 1094 | unsigned char *out, int *outlen, |
| 1095 | int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) |
| 1096 | { |
| 1097 | unsigned int length = maxout; |
| 1098 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1099 | unsigned char *saveOut = out; |
| 1100 | unsigned char *allocOut = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1101 | |
| 1102 | /* |
| 1103 | * first we need to convert the single shot (v2.40) parameters into |
| 1104 | * the message version of the parameters. This usually involves |
| 1105 | * copying the Nonce or IV, setting the AAD from our parameter list |
| 1106 | * and handling the tag differences */ |
| 1107 | CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 gcm; |
| 1108 | CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *gcm_message; |
| 1109 | CK_CCM_PARAMS ccm; |
| 1110 | CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *ccm_message; |
| 1111 | CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS chacha_poly; |
| 1112 | CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *chacha_poly_message; |
| 1113 | CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS nss_chacha_poly; |
| 1114 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = context->simulate_mechanism; |
| 1115 | SECItem sim_params = { 0, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 1116 | unsigned char *tag = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1117 | unsigned int taglen; |
| 1118 | PRBool encrypt; |
| 1119 | |
| 1120 | *outlen = 0; |
| 1121 | /* figure out if we are encrypting or decrypting, as tags are |
| 1122 | * handled differently in both */ |
| 1123 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 1124 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 1125 | encrypt = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1126 | break; |
| 1127 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 1128 | encrypt = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1129 | break; |
| 1130 | default: |
| 1131 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1132 | return SECFailure; |
| 1133 | } |
| 1134 | |
| 1135 | switch (mechanism) { |
| 1136 | case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY13050x00004021UL: |
| 1137 | case CKM_SALSA20_POLY13050x00004022UL: |
| 1138 | if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) { |
| 1139 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1140 | return SECFailure; |
| 1141 | } |
| 1142 | chacha_poly_message = |
| 1143 | (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params; |
| 1144 | chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce; |
| 1145 | chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen; |
| 1146 | chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad; |
| 1147 | chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen; |
| 1148 | tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag; |
| 1149 | taglen = 16; |
| 1150 | sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&chacha_poly; |
| 1151 | sim_params.len = sizeof(chacha_poly); |
| 1152 | /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv |
| 1153 | * internally, don't simulate it either */ |
| 1154 | break; |
| 1155 | case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 28): |
| 1156 | if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) { |
| 1157 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1158 | return SECFailure; |
| 1159 | } |
| 1160 | chacha_poly_message = |
| 1161 | (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params; |
| 1162 | tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag; |
| 1163 | taglen = 16; |
| 1164 | nss_chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce; |
| 1165 | nss_chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen; |
| 1166 | nss_chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad; |
| 1167 | nss_chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen; |
| 1168 | nss_chacha_poly.ulTagLen = taglen; |
| 1169 | sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&nss_chacha_poly; |
| 1170 | sim_params.len = sizeof(nss_chacha_poly); |
| 1171 | /* CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 does not generate the iv |
| 1172 | * internally, don't simulate it either */ |
| 1173 | break; |
| 1174 | case CKM_AES_CCM0x00001088UL: |
| 1175 | if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) { |
| 1176 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1177 | return SECFailure; |
| 1178 | } |
| 1179 | ccm_message = (CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params; |
| 1180 | if (ccm_message->ulMACLen > 16) { |
| 1181 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1182 | return SECFailure; |
| 1183 | } |
| 1184 | ccm.ulDataLen = ccm_message->ulDataLen; |
| 1185 | ccm.pNonce = ccm_message->pNonce; |
| 1186 | ccm.ulNonceLen = ccm_message->ulNonceLen; |
| 1187 | ccm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad; |
| 1188 | ccm.ulAADLen = aadlen; |
| 1189 | ccm.ulMACLen = ccm_message->ulMACLen; |
| 1190 | tag = ccm_message->pMAC; |
| 1191 | taglen = ccm_message->ulMACLen; |
| 1192 | sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&ccm; |
| 1193 | sim_params.len = sizeof(ccm); |
| 1194 | if (encrypt) { |
| 1195 | /* simulate generating the IV */ |
| 1196 | rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ccm_message->nonceGenerator, |
| 1197 | ccm_message->ulNonceFixedBits, |
| 1198 | ccm_message->pNonce, |
| 1199 | ccm_message->ulNonceLen); |
| 1200 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1201 | return rv; |
| 1202 | } |
| 1203 | } |
| 1204 | break; |
| 1205 | case CKM_AES_GCM0x00001087UL: |
| 1206 | if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) { |
| 1207 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1208 | return SECFailure; |
| 1209 | } |
| 1210 | gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params; |
| 1211 | if (gcm_message->ulTagBits > 128) { |
| 1212 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1213 | return SECFailure; |
| 1214 | } |
| 1215 | gcm.pIv = gcm_message->pIv; |
| 1216 | gcm.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen; |
| 1217 | gcm.ulIvBits = gcm.ulIvLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8; |
| 1218 | gcm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad; |
| 1219 | gcm.ulAADLen = aadlen; |
| 1220 | gcm.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits; |
| 1221 | tag = gcm_message->pTag; |
| 1222 | taglen = (gcm_message->ulTagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8 - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE8; |
| 1223 | sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm; |
| 1224 | sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm); |
| 1225 | if (encrypt) { |
| 1226 | /* simulate generating the IV */ |
| 1227 | rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, gcm_message->ivGenerator, |
| 1228 | gcm_message->ulIvFixedBits, |
| 1229 | gcm_message->pIv, gcm_message->ulIvLen); |
| 1230 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1231 | return rv; |
| 1232 | } |
| 1233 | } |
| 1234 | break; |
| 1235 | default: |
| 1236 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 1237 | return SECFailure; |
| 1238 | } |
| 1239 | /* now handle the tag. The message interface separates the tag from |
| 1240 | * the data, while the single shot gets and puts the tag at the end of |
| 1241 | * the encrypted data. */ |
| 1242 | if (!encrypt) { |
| 1243 | /* In the decrypt case, if the tag is already at the end of the |
| 1244 | * input buffer we are golden, otherwise we'll need a new input |
| 1245 | * buffer and copy the tag at the end of it */ |
| 1246 | if (tag != in + inlen) { |
| 1247 | allocOut = PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(inlen + taglen); |
| 1248 | if (allocOut == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1249 | return SECFailure; |
| 1250 | } |
| 1251 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(allocOut, in, inlen); |
| 1252 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(allocOut + inlen, tag, taglen); |
| 1253 | in = allocOut; |
| 1254 | } |
| 1255 | inlen = inlen + taglen; |
| 1256 | } else { |
| 1257 | /* if we end up allocating, we don't want to overrun this buffer, |
| 1258 | * so we fail early here */ |
| 1259 | if (maxout < inlen) { |
| 1260 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1261 | return SECFailure; |
| 1262 | } |
| 1263 | /* in the encrypt case, we are fine if maxout is big enough to hold |
| 1264 | * the tag. We'll copy the tag after the operation */ |
| 1265 | if (maxout < inlen + taglen) { |
| 1266 | allocOut = PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(inlen + taglen); |
| 1267 | if (allocOut == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1268 | return SECFailure; |
| 1269 | } |
| 1270 | out = allocOut; |
| 1271 | length = maxout = inlen + taglen; |
| 1272 | } |
| 1273 | } |
| 1274 | /* now do the operation */ |
| 1275 | if (encrypt) { |
| 1276 | rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length, |
| 1277 | maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1278 | } else { |
| 1279 | rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length, |
| 1280 | maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1281 | } |
| 1282 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1283 | /* If the mechanism was CKM_AES_GCM, the module may have been |
| 1284 | * following the same error as old versions of NSS. Retry with |
| 1285 | * the CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS */ |
| 1286 | if ((mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM0x00001087UL) && |
| 1287 | (PORT_GetErrorPORT_GetError_Util() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA)) { |
| 1288 | CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS gcm_nss; |
| 1289 | gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params; |
| 1290 | gcm_nss.pIv = gcm_message->pIv; |
| 1291 | gcm_nss.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen; |
| 1292 | gcm_nss.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad; |
| 1293 | gcm_nss.ulAADLen = aadlen; |
| 1294 | gcm_nss.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits; |
| 1295 | sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm_nss; |
| 1296 | sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm_nss); |
| 1297 | if (encrypt) { |
| 1298 | rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, |
| 1299 | &length, maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1300 | } else { |
| 1301 | rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, |
| 1302 | &length, maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1303 | } |
| 1304 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1305 | goto fail; |
| 1306 | } |
| 1307 | } else { |
| 1308 | goto fail; |
| 1309 | } |
| 1310 | } |
| 1311 | |
| 1312 | /* on encrypt, separate the output buffer from the tag */ |
| 1313 | if (encrypt) { |
| 1314 | if ((length < taglen) || (length > inlen + taglen)) { |
| 1315 | /* PKCS #11 module should not return a length smaller than |
| 1316 | * taglen, or bigger than inlen+taglen */ |
| 1317 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 1318 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1319 | goto fail; |
| 1320 | } |
| 1321 | length = length - taglen; |
| 1322 | if (allocOut) { |
| 1323 | /* |
| 1324 | * If we used a temporary buffer, copy it out to the original |
| 1325 | * buffer. |
| 1326 | */ |
| 1327 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length); |
| 1328 | } |
| 1329 | /* if the tag isn't in the right place, copy it out */ |
| 1330 | if (tag != out + length) { |
| 1331 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(tag, out + length, taglen); |
| 1332 | } |
| 1333 | } |
| 1334 | *outlen = length; |
| 1335 | rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1336 | fail: |
| 1337 | if (allocOut) { |
| 1338 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(allocOut); |
| 1339 | } |
| 1340 | return rv; |
| 1341 | } |
| 1342 | |
| 1343 | /* |
| 1344 | * Do an AEAD operation. This function optionally returns |
| 1345 | * and IV on Encrypt for all mechanism. NSS knows which mechanisms |
| 1346 | * generate IV's in the token and which don't. This allows the |
| 1347 | * applications to make a single call without special handling for |
| 1348 | * each AEAD mechanism (the special handling is all contained here. |
| 1349 | */ |
| 1350 | SECStatus |
| 1351 | PK11_AEADOp(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen, |
| 1352 | int fixedbits, unsigned char *iv, int ivlen, |
| 1353 | const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen, |
| 1354 | unsigned char *out, int *outlen, |
| 1355 | int maxout, unsigned char *tag, int taglen, |
| 1356 | const unsigned char *in, int inlen) |
| 1357 | { |
| 1358 | CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcm_message; |
| 1359 | CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS ccm_message; |
| 1360 | CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS chacha_poly_message; |
| 1361 | void *params; |
| 1362 | int paramslen; |
| 1363 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1364 | |
| 1365 | switch (context->simulate_mechanism) { |
| 1366 | case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY13050x00004021UL: |
| 1367 | case CKM_SALSA20_POLY13050x00004022UL: |
| 1368 | case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 28): |
| 1369 | if (taglen != 16) { |
| 1370 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1371 | return SECFailure; |
| 1372 | } |
| 1373 | chacha_poly_message.pNonce = iv; |
| 1374 | chacha_poly_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen; |
| 1375 | chacha_poly_message.pTag = tag; |
| 1376 | params = &chacha_poly_message; |
| 1377 | paramslen = sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS); |
| 1378 | /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv |
| 1379 | * internally, Do it here. */ |
| 1380 | if (context->operation == (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL)) { |
| 1381 | /* simulate generating the IV */ |
| 1382 | rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ivgen, fixedbits, iv, ivlen); |
| 1383 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1384 | return rv; |
| 1385 | } |
| 1386 | } |
| 1387 | break; |
| 1388 | case CKM_AES_GCM0x00001087UL: |
| 1389 | gcm_message.pIv = iv; |
| 1390 | gcm_message.ulIvLen = ivlen; |
| 1391 | gcm_message.ivGenerator = ivgen; |
| 1392 | gcm_message.ulIvFixedBits = fixedbits; |
| 1393 | gcm_message.pTag = tag; |
| 1394 | gcm_message.ulTagBits = taglen * 8; |
| 1395 | params = &gcm_message; |
| 1396 | paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS); |
| 1397 | /* GCM generates IV internally */ |
| 1398 | break; |
| 1399 | case CKM_AES_CCM0x00001088UL: |
| 1400 | ccm_message.ulDataLen = inlen; |
| 1401 | ccm_message.pNonce = iv; |
| 1402 | ccm_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen; |
| 1403 | ccm_message.nonceGenerator = ivgen; |
| 1404 | ccm_message.ulNonceFixedBits = fixedbits; |
| 1405 | ccm_message.pMAC = tag; |
| 1406 | ccm_message.ulMACLen = taglen; |
| 1407 | params = &ccm_message; |
| 1408 | paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS); |
| 1409 | /* CCM generates IV internally */ |
| 1410 | break; |
| 1411 | |
| 1412 | default: |
| 1413 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 1414 | return SECFailure; |
| 1415 | } |
| 1416 | return PK11_AEADRawOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen, out, outlen, |
| 1417 | maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1418 | } |
| 1419 | |
| 1420 | /* Do and AED operation. The application builds the params on it's own |
| 1421 | * and passes them in. This allows applications direct access to the params |
| 1422 | * so they can use mechanisms not yet understood by, NSS, or get semantics |
| 1423 | * not suppied by PK11_AEAD. */ |
| 1424 | SECStatus |
| 1425 | PK11_AEADRawOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen, |
| 1426 | const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen, |
| 1427 | unsigned char *out, int *outlen, |
| 1428 | int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) |
| 1429 | { |
| 1430 | CK_RV crv = CKR_OK0x00000000UL; |
| 1431 | CK_ULONG length = maxout; |
| 1432 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1433 | |
| 1434 | PORT_Assert(outlen != NULL)((outlen != ((void*)0)) ? ((void)0) : PR_Assert("outlen != NULL" , "/root/firefox-clang/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c", 1434 )); |
| 1435 | *outlen = 0; |
| 1436 | if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) != CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 1437 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1438 | return SECFailure; |
| 1439 | } |
| 1440 | |
| 1441 | /* |
| 1442 | * The PKCS 11 module does not support the message interface, fall |
| 1443 | * back to using single shot operation */ |
| 1444 | if (context->simulate_message) { |
| 1445 | return pk11_AEADSimulateOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen, |
| 1446 | out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen); |
| 1447 | } |
| 1448 | |
| 1449 | /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored |
| 1450 | * state. |
| 1451 | */ |
| 1452 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 1453 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1454 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1455 | context->savedLength); |
| 1456 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1457 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1458 | return rv; |
| 1459 | } |
| 1460 | } |
| 1461 | |
| 1462 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 1463 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 1464 | length = maxout; |
| 1465 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); |
| 1466 | break; |
| 1467 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 1468 | length = maxout; |
| 1469 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); |
| 1470 | break; |
| 1471 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 1472 | length = maxout; |
| 1473 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SignMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length); |
| 1474 | break; |
| 1475 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 1476 | length = maxout; /* sig length */ |
| 1477 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifyMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out /* sig */, length); |
| 1478 | break; |
| 1479 | default: |
| 1480 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 1481 | break; |
| 1482 | } |
| 1483 | |
| 1484 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1485 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1486 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1487 | } else { |
| 1488 | *outlen = length; |
| 1489 | } |
| 1490 | |
| 1491 | /* |
| 1492 | * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex |
| 1493 | */ |
| 1494 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1495 | context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1496 | &context->savedLength); |
| 1497 | if (context->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1498 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1499 | |
| 1500 | /* clear out out session for others to use */ |
| 1501 | pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 1502 | } |
| 1503 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1504 | return rv; |
| 1505 | } |
| 1506 | |
| 1507 | /* |
| 1508 | * execute a digest/signature operation |
| 1509 | */ |
| 1510 | SECStatus |
| 1511 | PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char *in, unsigned inLen) |
| 1512 | { |
| 1513 | CK_RV crv = CKR_OK0x00000000UL; |
| 1514 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1515 | |
| 1516 | if (inLen == 0) { |
| 1517 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1518 | } |
| 1519 | if (!in) { |
| 1520 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1521 | return SECFailure; |
| 1522 | } |
| 1523 | |
| 1524 | /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored |
| 1525 | * state. |
| 1526 | */ |
| 1527 | context->init = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1528 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 1529 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1530 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1531 | context->savedLength); |
| 1532 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1533 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1534 | return rv; |
| 1535 | } |
| 1536 | } |
| 1537 | |
| 1538 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 1539 | /* also for MAC'ing */ |
| 1540 | case CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 1541 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SignUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); |
| 1542 | break; |
| 1543 | case CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 1544 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); |
| 1545 | break; |
| 1546 | case CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE(0x83000000L | 0x0000010AUL): |
| 1547 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifySignatureUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); |
| 1548 | break; |
| 1549 | case CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L: |
| 1550 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen); |
| 1551 | break; |
| 1552 | default: |
| 1553 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 1554 | break; |
| 1555 | } |
| 1556 | |
| 1557 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1558 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1559 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1560 | } |
| 1561 | |
| 1562 | /* |
| 1563 | * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex |
| 1564 | */ |
| 1565 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1566 | context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1567 | &context->savedLength); |
| 1568 | if (context->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1569 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1570 | |
| 1571 | /* clear out out session for others to use */ |
| 1572 | pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 1573 | } |
| 1574 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1575 | return rv; |
| 1576 | } |
| 1577 | |
| 1578 | /* |
| 1579 | * Digest a key if possible./ |
| 1580 | */ |
| 1581 | SECStatus |
| 1582 | PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key) |
| 1583 | { |
| 1584 | CK_RV crv = CKR_OK0x00000000UL; |
| 1585 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 1586 | PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1587 | |
| 1588 | if (!context || !key) { |
| 1589 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1590 | return SECFailure; |
| 1591 | } |
| 1592 | |
| 1593 | /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored |
| 1594 | * state. |
| 1595 | */ |
| 1596 | if (context->slot != key->slot) { |
| 1597 | newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC0x00000381UL, CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL, key); |
| 1598 | } else { |
| 1599 | newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key); |
| 1600 | } |
| 1601 | |
| 1602 | context->init = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1603 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 1604 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1605 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1606 | context->savedLength); |
| 1607 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1608 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1609 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); |
| 1610 | return rv; |
| 1611 | } |
| 1612 | } |
| 1613 | |
| 1614 | if (newKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1615 | crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT0x00000063UL; |
| 1616 | if (key->data.data) { |
| 1617 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, key->data.data, key->data.len); |
| 1618 | } |
| 1619 | } else { |
| 1620 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestKey(context->session, newKey->objectID); |
| 1621 | } |
| 1622 | |
| 1623 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1624 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1625 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1626 | } |
| 1627 | |
| 1628 | /* |
| 1629 | * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex |
| 1630 | */ |
| 1631 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1632 | context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1633 | &context->savedLength); |
| 1634 | if (context->savedData == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 1635 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 1636 | |
| 1637 | /* clear out out session for others to use */ |
| 1638 | pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 1639 | } |
| 1640 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1641 | if (newKey) |
| 1642 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey); |
| 1643 | return rv; |
| 1644 | } |
| 1645 | |
| 1646 | /* |
| 1647 | * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize(). |
| 1648 | */ |
| 1649 | SECStatus |
| 1650 | PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) |
| 1651 | { |
| 1652 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1653 | |
| 1654 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 1655 | rv = pk11_Finalize(context); |
| 1656 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1657 | return rv; |
| 1658 | } |
| 1659 | |
| 1660 | /* |
| 1661 | * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by |
| 1662 | * someone new. |
| 1663 | */ |
| 1664 | SECStatus |
| 1665 | pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) |
| 1666 | { |
| 1667 | CK_ULONG count = 0; |
| 1668 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1669 | unsigned char stackBuf[256]; |
| 1670 | unsigned char *buffer = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1671 | |
| 1672 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1673 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1674 | } |
| 1675 | |
| 1676 | finalize: |
| 1677 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 1678 | case CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 1679 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); |
| 1680 | break; |
| 1681 | case CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 1682 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); |
| 1683 | break; |
| 1684 | case CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 1685 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SignFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); |
| 1686 | break; |
| 1687 | case CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 1688 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, buffer, count); |
| 1689 | break; |
| 1690 | case CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE(0x83000000L | 0x0000010AUL): |
| 1691 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifySignatureFinal(context->session); |
| 1692 | break; |
| 1693 | case CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L: |
| 1694 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestFinal(context->session, buffer, &count); |
| 1695 | break; |
| 1696 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 1697 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session); |
| 1698 | break; |
| 1699 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 1700 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session); |
| 1701 | break; |
| 1702 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 1703 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageSignFinal(context->session); |
| 1704 | break; |
| 1705 | case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 1706 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_MessageVerifyFinal(context->session); |
| 1707 | break; |
| 1708 | default: |
| 1709 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 1710 | break; |
| 1711 | } |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1714 | if (buffer != stackBuf) { |
| 1715 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(buffer); |
| 1716 | } |
| 1717 | if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL) { |
| 1718 | /* if there's no operation, it is finalized */ |
| 1719 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1720 | } |
| 1721 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1722 | return SECFailure; |
| 1723 | } |
| 1724 | |
| 1725 | /* Message interface does not need to allocate a final buffer */ |
| 1726 | /* nor does CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE. We could use a clever trick |
| 1727 | * here to include the CKA_NSS_SIGNATURE addition, but this form is |
| 1728 | * more clear to the reader what is happenning */ |
| 1729 | if ((((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) || |
| 1730 | ((context->operation) == CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE(0x83000000L | 0x0000010AUL))) { |
| 1731 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1732 | } |
| 1733 | |
| 1734 | /* try to finalize the session with a buffer */ |
| 1735 | if (buffer == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1736 | if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) { |
| 1737 | buffer = stackBuf; |
| 1738 | } else { |
| 1739 | buffer = PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(count); |
| 1740 | if (buffer == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1741 | return SECFailure; |
| 1742 | } |
| 1743 | } |
| 1744 | goto finalize; |
| 1745 | } |
| 1746 | if (buffer != stackBuf) { |
| 1747 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(buffer); |
| 1748 | } |
| 1749 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1750 | } |
| 1751 | |
| 1752 | /* |
| 1753 | * Return the final digested or signed data... |
| 1754 | * this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data |
| 1755 | * either out of an arena or out of the standard heap. |
| 1756 | */ |
| 1757 | SECStatus |
| 1758 | PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *data, |
| 1759 | unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length) |
| 1760 | { |
| 1761 | CK_ULONG len; |
| 1762 | CK_RV crv; |
| 1763 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1764 | |
| 1765 | /* message interface returns no data on Final, Should not use DigestFinal |
| 1766 | * in this case */ |
| 1767 | if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK0xff000000L) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L) { |
| 1768 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1769 | return SECFailure; |
| 1770 | } |
| 1771 | |
| 1772 | /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored |
| 1773 | * state. |
| 1774 | */ |
| 1775 | PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context); |
| 1776 | if (!context->ownSession) { |
| 1777 | rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData, |
| 1778 | context->savedLength); |
| 1779 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1780 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1781 | return rv; |
| 1782 | } |
| 1783 | } |
| 1784 | |
| 1785 | len = length; |
| 1786 | switch (context->operation) { |
| 1787 | case CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL: |
| 1788 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_SignFinal(context->session, data, &len); |
| 1789 | break; |
| 1790 | case CKA_VERIFY0x0000010AUL: |
| 1791 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, data, len); |
| 1792 | break; |
| 1793 | case CKA_NSS_VERIFY_SIGNATURE(0x83000000L | 0x0000010AUL): |
| 1794 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_VerifySignatureFinal(context->session); |
| 1795 | break; |
| 1796 | case CKA_DIGEST0x81000000L: |
| 1797 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DigestFinal(context->session, data, &len); |
| 1798 | break; |
| 1799 | case CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL: |
| 1800 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, data, &len); |
| 1801 | break; |
| 1802 | case CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL: |
| 1803 | crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)((CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_2_PTR)((context->slot)->functionList ))->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, data, &len); |
| 1804 | break; |
| 1805 | default: |
| 1806 | crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED0x00000091UL; |
| 1807 | break; |
| 1808 | } |
| 1809 | PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context); |
| 1810 | |
| 1811 | context->init = PR_FALSE0; /* allow Begin to start up again */ |
| 1812 | |
| 1813 | if (crv != CKR_OK0x00000000UL) { |
| 1814 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PK11_MapError(crv)); |
| 1815 | return SECFailure; |
| 1816 | } |
| 1817 | *outLen = (unsigned int)len; |
| 1818 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1819 | } |
| 1820 | |
| 1821 | PRBool |
| 1822 | PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(PK11Context *context) |
| 1823 | { |
| 1824 | if (context->slot == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1825 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1826 | } |
| 1827 | return pk11slot_GetFIPSStatus(context->slot, context->session, |
| 1828 | CK_INVALID_HANDLE0, context->init ? CKT_NSS_SESSION_CHECK1UL : CKT_NSS_SESSION_LAST_CHECK4UL); |
| 1829 | } |