| File: | s/lib/ssl/tls13con.c |
| Warning: | line 3127, column 9 Value stored to 'rv' is never read |
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| 1 | /* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * TLS 1.3 Protocol |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| 6 | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| 7 | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
| 8 | |
| 9 | #include "sslt.h" |
| 10 | #include "stdarg.h" |
| 11 | #include "cert.h" |
| 12 | #include "ssl.h" |
| 13 | #include "keyhi.h" |
| 14 | #include "pk11func.h" |
| 15 | #include "prerr.h" |
| 16 | #include "secitem.h" |
| 17 | #include "secmod.h" |
| 18 | #include "sslimpl.h" |
| 19 | #include "sslproto.h" |
| 20 | #include "sslerr.h" |
| 21 | #include "ssl3exthandle.h" |
| 22 | #include "tls13hkdf.h" |
| 23 | #include "tls13con.h" |
| 24 | #include "tls13err.h" |
| 25 | #include "tls13ech.h" |
| 26 | #include "tls13exthandle.h" |
| 27 | #include "tls13hashstate.h" |
| 28 | #include "tls13subcerts.h" |
| 29 | #include "tls13psk.h" |
| 30 | |
| 31 | static SECStatus tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch, |
| 32 | SSLSecretDirection install, |
| 33 | PRBool deleteSecret); |
| 34 | static SECStatus tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss); |
| 35 | static SECStatus tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss); |
| 36 | static void tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group); |
| 37 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, |
| 38 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare); |
| 39 | static SECStatus tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest( |
| 40 | sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, |
| 41 | const PRUint8 *token, unsigned int tokenLen); |
| 42 | |
| 43 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss); |
| 44 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, |
| 45 | PRUint32 length); |
| 46 | static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); |
| 47 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateDecode( |
| 48 | sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); |
| 49 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificate( |
| 50 | sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, PRBool alreadyHashed); |
| 51 | static SECStatus tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(sslSocket *ss); |
| 52 | static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); |
| 53 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, |
| 54 | PRUint32 length); |
| 55 | static SECStatus |
| 56 | tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey); |
| 57 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateVerify( |
| 58 | sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); |
| 59 | static SECStatus tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, |
| 60 | sslSessionID *sid); |
| 61 | static SECStatus |
| 62 | tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 63 | const char *prefix, |
| 64 | const char *suffix, |
| 65 | const char *keylogLabel, |
| 66 | PK11SymKey **dest); |
| 67 | SECStatus |
| 68 | tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 69 | const char *label, |
| 70 | unsigned int labelLen, |
| 71 | const SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
| 72 | PK11SymKey **dest, |
| 73 | SSLHashType hash); |
| 74 | static SECStatus tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss); |
| 75 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *b, |
| 76 | PRUint32 length); |
| 77 | static SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss); |
| 78 | static SECStatus tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey); |
| 79 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, size_t length, |
| 80 | SSL3Hashes *hashes, SSLHashType type); |
| 81 | static SECStatus tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType message, |
| 82 | PK11SymKey *secret, |
| 83 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, |
| 84 | const SSL3Hashes *hashes); |
| 85 | static SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, |
| 86 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); |
| 87 | static SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, |
| 88 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); |
| 89 | static SECStatus tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, |
| 90 | const PRUint8 *appToken, |
| 91 | unsigned int appTokenLen); |
| 92 | static SECStatus tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, |
| 93 | PRUint32 length); |
| 94 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(sslSocket *ss); |
| 95 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss); |
| 96 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss); |
| 97 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss); |
| 98 | static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinished( |
| 99 | sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, SSLHashType hashType, |
| 100 | const SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, |
| 101 | unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen); |
| 102 | static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); |
| 103 | static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(sslSocket *ss); |
| 104 | static SECStatus tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); |
| 105 | |
| 106 | const char kHkdfLabelClient[] = "c"; |
| 107 | const char kHkdfLabelServer[] = "s"; |
| 108 | const char kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret[] = "derived"; |
| 109 | const char kHkdfLabelResPskBinderKey[] = "res binder"; |
| 110 | const char kHkdfLabelExtPskBinderKey[] = "ext binder"; |
| 111 | const char kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "e traffic"; |
| 112 | const char kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "e exp master"; |
| 113 | const char kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret[] = "hs traffic"; |
| 114 | const char kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret[] = "ap traffic"; |
| 115 | const char kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret[] = "finished"; |
| 116 | const char kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret[] = "res master"; |
| 117 | const char kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret[] = "exp master"; |
| 118 | const char kHkdfLabelResumption[] = "resumption"; |
| 119 | const char kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate[] = "traffic upd"; |
| 120 | const char kHkdfPurposeKey[] = "key"; |
| 121 | const char kHkdfPurposeSn[] = "sn"; |
| 122 | const char kHkdfPurposeIv[] = "iv"; |
| 123 | |
| 124 | const char keylogLabelClientEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; |
| 125 | const char keylogLabelClientHsTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; |
| 126 | const char keylogLabelServerHsTrafficSecret[] = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; |
| 127 | const char keylogLabelClientTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; |
| 128 | const char keylogLabelServerTrafficSecret[] = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; |
| 129 | const char keylogLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"; |
| 130 | const char keylogLabelExporterSecret[] = "EXPORTER_SECRET"; |
| 131 | |
| 132 | /* Belt and suspenders in case we ever add a TLS 1.4. */ |
| 133 | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED <=extern void pr_static_assert(int arg[(0x0304 <= 0x0304) ? 1 : -1]) |
| 134 | SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)extern void pr_static_assert(int arg[(0x0304 <= 0x0304) ? 1 : -1]); |
| 135 | |
| 136 | void |
| 137 | tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc) |
| 138 | { |
| 139 | PORT_Assert(desc != internal_error)((desc != internal_error)?((void)0):PR_Assert("desc != internal_error" ,"tls13con.c",139)); /* These should never happen */ |
| 140 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
| 141 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(prError); |
| 142 | } |
| 143 | |
| 144 | #ifdef TRACE |
| 145 | #define STATE_CASE(a)case a: return "a" \ |
| 146 | case a: \ |
| 147 | return #a |
| 148 | static char * |
| 149 | tls13_HandshakeState(SSL3WaitState st) |
| 150 | { |
| 151 | switch (st) { |
| 152 | STATE_CASE(idle_handshake)case idle_handshake: return "idle_handshake"; |
| 153 | STATE_CASE(wait_client_hello)case wait_client_hello: return "wait_client_hello"; |
| 154 | STATE_CASE(wait_end_of_early_data)case wait_end_of_early_data: return "wait_end_of_early_data"; |
| 155 | STATE_CASE(wait_client_cert)case wait_client_cert: return "wait_client_cert"; |
| 156 | STATE_CASE(wait_client_key)case wait_client_key: return "wait_client_key"; |
| 157 | STATE_CASE(wait_cert_verify)case wait_cert_verify: return "wait_cert_verify"; |
| 158 | STATE_CASE(wait_change_cipher)case wait_change_cipher: return "wait_change_cipher"; |
| 159 | STATE_CASE(wait_finished)case wait_finished: return "wait_finished"; |
| 160 | STATE_CASE(wait_server_hello)case wait_server_hello: return "wait_server_hello"; |
| 161 | STATE_CASE(wait_certificate_status)case wait_certificate_status: return "wait_certificate_status"; |
| 162 | STATE_CASE(wait_server_cert)case wait_server_cert: return "wait_server_cert"; |
| 163 | STATE_CASE(wait_server_key)case wait_server_key: return "wait_server_key"; |
| 164 | STATE_CASE(wait_cert_request)case wait_cert_request: return "wait_cert_request"; |
| 165 | STATE_CASE(wait_hello_done)case wait_hello_done: return "wait_hello_done"; |
| 166 | STATE_CASE(wait_new_session_ticket)case wait_new_session_ticket: return "wait_new_session_ticket"; |
| 167 | STATE_CASE(wait_encrypted_extensions)case wait_encrypted_extensions: return "wait_encrypted_extensions"; |
| 168 | default: |
| 169 | break; |
| 170 | } |
| 171 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",171)); |
| 172 | return "unknown"; |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | #endif |
| 175 | |
| 176 | #define TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK0x80 0x80 |
| 177 | |
| 178 | #define TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ws)(ws & ~0x80) (ws & ~TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK0x80) |
| 179 | /* We don't mask idle_handshake because other parts of the code use it*/ |
| 180 | #define TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws)(((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | 0x80) (((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK0x80) |
| 181 | #define TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, err, ...)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, "err", __func__, "tls13con.c", 181 , ..., wait_invalid) \ |
| 182 | tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, #err, __func__, __FILE__"tls13con.c", __LINE__182, \ |
| 183 | __VA_ARGS__, \ |
| 184 | wait_invalid) |
| 185 | void |
| 186 | tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws, |
| 187 | const char *func, const char *file, int line) |
| 188 | { |
| 189 | #ifdef TRACE |
| 190 | const char *new_state_name = |
| 191 | tls13_HandshakeState(ws); |
| 192 | |
| 193 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), tls13_HandshakeState((ss->ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), new_state_name , func, file, line) |
| 194 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), tls13_HandshakeState((ss->ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), new_state_name , func, file, line) |
| 195 | tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), tls13_HandshakeState((ss->ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), new_state_name , func, file, line) |
| 196 | new_state_name,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), tls13_HandshakeState((ss->ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), new_state_name , func, file, line) |
| 197 | func, file, line))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), tls13_HandshakeState((ss->ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), new_state_name , func, file, line); |
| 198 | #endif |
| 199 | |
| 200 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws)(((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | 0x80); |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | |
| 203 | static PRBool |
| 204 | tls13_InHsStateV(sslSocket *ss, va_list ap) |
| 205 | { |
| 206 | SSL3WaitState ws; |
| 207 | |
| 208 | while ((ws = va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)__builtin_va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)) != wait_invalid) { |
| 209 | if (TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws)(((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | 0x80) == ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { |
| 210 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 214 | } |
| 215 | |
| 216 | PRBool |
| 217 | tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...) |
| 218 | { |
| 219 | PRBool found; |
| 220 | va_list ap; |
| 221 | |
| 222 | va_start(ap, ss)__builtin_va_start(ap, ss); |
| 223 | found = tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap); |
| 224 | va_end(ap)__builtin_va_end(ap); |
| 225 | |
| 226 | return found; |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | static SECStatus |
| 230 | tls13_CheckHsState(sslSocket *ss, int err, const char *error_name, |
| 231 | const char *func, const char *file, int line, |
| 232 | ...) |
| 233 | { |
| 234 | va_list ap; |
| 235 | va_start(ap, line)__builtin_va_start(ap, line); |
| 236 | if (tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap)) { |
| 237 | va_end(ap)__builtin_va_end(ap); |
| 238 | return SECSuccess; |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | va_end(ap)__builtin_va_end(ap); |
| 241 | |
| 242 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, error_name, tls13_HandshakeState((ss-> ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), func, file, line) |
| 243 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, error_name, tls13_HandshakeState((ss-> ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), func, file, line) |
| 244 | error_name,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, error_name, tls13_HandshakeState((ss-> ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), func, file, line) |
| 245 | tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, error_name, tls13_HandshakeState((ss-> ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), func, file, line) |
| 246 | func, file, line))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, error_name, tls13_HandshakeState((ss-> ssl3.hs.ws & ~0x80)), func, file, line); |
| 247 | tls13_FatalError(ss, err, unexpected_message); |
| 248 | return SECFailure; |
| 249 | } |
| 250 | |
| 251 | PRBool |
| 252 | tls13_IsPostHandshake(const sslSocket *ss) |
| 253 | { |
| 254 | return ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304 && ss->firstHsDone; |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | |
| 257 | SSLHashType |
| 258 | tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ssl3CipherSuite suite) |
| 259 | { |
| 260 | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipherDef = |
| 261 | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); |
| 262 | PORT_Assert(cipherDef)((cipherDef)?((void)0):PR_Assert("cipherDef","tls13con.c",262 )); |
| 263 | if (!cipherDef) { |
| 264 | return ssl_hash_none; |
| 265 | } |
| 266 | return cipherDef->prf_hash; |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | |
| 269 | SSLHashType |
| 270 | tls13_GetHash(const sslSocket *ss) |
| 271 | { |
| 272 | /* suite_def may not be set yet when doing EPSK 0-Rtt. */ |
| 273 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { |
| 274 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 275 | return ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash; |
| 276 | } |
| 277 | /* This should never happen. */ |
| 278 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",278)); |
| 279 | return ssl_hash_none; |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | |
| 282 | /* All TLS 1.3 cipher suites must have an explict PRF hash. */ |
| 283 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none)((ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none)?((void )0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none" ,"tls13con.c",283)); |
| 284 | return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; |
| 285 | } |
| 286 | |
| 287 | SECStatus |
| 288 | tls13_GetHashAndCipher(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, |
| 289 | SSLHashType *hash, const ssl3BulkCipherDef **cipher) |
| 290 | { |
| 291 | if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 292 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 293 | return SECFailure; |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | // Lookup and check the suite. |
| 297 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; |
| 298 | if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(cipherSuite, &vrange)) { |
| 299 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 300 | return SECFailure; |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(cipherSuite); |
| 303 | const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef); |
| 304 | if (cipherDef->type != type_aead) { |
| 305 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 306 | return SECFailure; |
| 307 | } |
| 308 | *hash = suiteDef->prf_hash; |
| 309 | if (cipher != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 310 | *cipher = cipherDef; |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | return SECSuccess; |
| 313 | } |
| 314 | |
| 315 | unsigned int |
| 316 | tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(SSLHashType hash) |
| 317 | { |
| 318 | switch (hash) { |
| 319 | case ssl_hash_sha256: |
| 320 | return 32; |
| 321 | case ssl_hash_sha384: |
| 322 | return 48; |
| 323 | default: |
| 324 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",324)); |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | return 32; |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | |
| 329 | unsigned int |
| 330 | tls13_GetHashSize(const sslSocket *ss) |
| 331 | { |
| 332 | return tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | |
| 335 | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
| 336 | tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(SSLHashType hashType) |
| 337 | { |
| 338 | switch (hashType) { |
| 339 | case ssl_hash_sha256: |
| 340 | return CKM_SHA256_HMAC0x00000251UL; |
| 341 | case ssl_hash_sha384: |
| 342 | return CKM_SHA384_HMAC0x00000261UL; |
| 343 | default: |
| 344 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",344)); |
| 345 | } |
| 346 | return CKM_SHA256_HMAC0x00000251UL; |
| 347 | } |
| 348 | |
| 349 | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
| 350 | tls13_GetHmacMechanism(const sslSocket *ss) |
| 351 | { |
| 352 | return tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | |
| 355 | SECStatus |
| 356 | tls13_ComputeHash(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
| 357 | const PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int len, |
| 358 | SSLHashType hash) |
| 359 | { |
| 360 | SECStatus rv; |
| 361 | |
| 362 | rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash), hashes->u.raw, buf, len); |
| 363 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 364 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 364); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 365 | return SECFailure; |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | hashes->len = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hash); |
| 368 | |
| 369 | return SECSuccess; |
| 370 | } |
| 371 | |
| 372 | static SECStatus |
| 373 | tls13_CreateKEMKeyPair(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, |
| 374 | sslKeyPair **outKeyPair) |
| 375 | { |
| 376 | PORT_Assert(groupDef)((groupDef)?((void)0):PR_Assert("groupDef","tls13con.c",376)); |
| 377 | if (groupDef->name != ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00) { |
| 378 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 379 | return SECFailure; |
| 380 | } |
| 381 | |
| 382 | sslKeyPair *keyPair = NULL((void*)0); |
| 383 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 384 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 385 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_NSS_KYBER_KEY_PAIR_GEN((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 45); |
| 386 | CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE paramSet = CKP_NSS_KYBER_768_ROUND3((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 1); |
| 387 | |
| 388 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mechanism, ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 389 | if (!slot) { |
| 390 | goto loser; |
| 391 | } |
| 392 | |
| 393 | privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(slot, mechanism, |
| 394 | ¶mSet, &pubKey, PK11_ATTR_SESSION0x00000002L | PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE0x00000040L | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE0x00000004L, |
| 395 | CKF_DERIVE0x00080000UL, CKF_DERIVE0x00080000UL, ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 396 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 397 | if (!privKey || !pubKey) { |
| 398 | goto loser; |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | |
| 401 | keyPair = ssl_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey); |
| 402 | if (!keyPair) { |
| 403 | goto loser; |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: SSL[%d]: Create Kyber ephemeral key %d",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: SSL[%d]: Create Kyber ephemeral key %d" , getpid(), ss ? ss->fd : ((void*)0), groupDef->name) |
| 407 | SSL_GETPID(), ss ? ss->fd : NULL, groupDef->name))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: SSL[%d]: Create Kyber ephemeral key %d" , getpid(), ss ? ss->fd : ((void*)0), groupDef->name); |
| 408 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Public Key", pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.data,if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Public Key", pubKey ->u.kyber.publicValue.data, pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue .len) |
| 409 | pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Public Key", pubKey ->u.kyber.publicValue.data, pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue .len); |
| 410 | #ifdef TRACE |
| 411 | if (ssl_trace >= 50) { |
| 412 | SECItem d = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 413 | SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, privKey, CKA_VALUE0x00000011UL, &d); |
| 414 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 415 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Private Key", d.data, d.len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Private Key", d. data, d.len); |
| 416 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&d, PR_FALSE0); |
| 417 | } else { |
| 418 | SSL_TRC(50, ("Error extracting private key"))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("Error extracting private key" ); |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | } |
| 421 | #endif |
| 422 | |
| 423 | *outKeyPair = keyPair; |
| 424 | return SECSuccess; |
| 425 | |
| 426 | loser: |
| 427 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); |
| 428 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
| 429 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); |
| 430 | return SECFailure; |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | |
| 433 | SECStatus |
| 434 | tls13_CreateKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, |
| 435 | sslEphemeralKeyPair **outKeyPair) |
| 436 | { |
| 437 | SECStatus rv; |
| 438 | const ssl3DHParams *params; |
| 439 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL((void*)0); |
| 440 | |
| 441 | PORT_Assert(groupDef)((groupDef)?((void)0):PR_Assert("groupDef","tls13con.c",441)); |
| 442 | switch (groupDef->keaType) { |
| 443 | case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid: |
| 444 | if (groupDef->name != ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00) { |
| 445 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 446 | return SECFailure; |
| 447 | } |
| 448 | rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, ssl_LookupNamedGroup(ssl_grp_ec_curve25519), &keyPair); |
| 449 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 450 | return SECFailure; |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | keyPair->group = groupDef; |
| 453 | break; |
| 454 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
| 455 | rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); |
| 456 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 457 | return SECFailure; |
| 458 | } |
| 459 | break; |
| 460 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
| 461 | params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); |
| 462 | PORT_Assert(params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom)((params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom","tls13con.c",462)); |
| 463 | rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); |
| 464 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 465 | return SECFailure; |
| 466 | } |
| 467 | break; |
| 468 | default: |
| 469 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",469)); |
| 470 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 471 | return SECFailure; |
| 472 | } |
| 473 | |
| 474 | // If we're creating an ECDH + KEM hybrid share and we're the client, then |
| 475 | // we still need to generate the KEM key pair. Otherwise we're done. |
| 476 | if (groupDef->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 477 | rv = tls13_CreateKEMKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair->kemKeys); |
| 478 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 479 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); |
| 480 | return SECFailure; |
| 481 | } |
| 482 | } |
| 483 | |
| 484 | *outKeyPair = keyPair; |
| 485 | return SECSuccess; |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | |
| 488 | SECStatus |
| 489 | tls13_AddKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) |
| 490 | { |
| 491 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL((void*)0); |
| 492 | SECStatus rv; |
| 493 | |
| 494 | rv = tls13_CreateKeyShare(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); |
| 495 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 496 | return SECFailure; |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)do { (&keyPair->link)->next = (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs ); (&keyPair->link)->prev = (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs )->prev; (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->prev->next = (&keyPair->link); (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)-> prev = (&keyPair->link); } while (0); |
| 499 | return SECSuccess; |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | |
| 502 | SECStatus |
| 503 | SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, unsigned int count) |
| 504 | { |
| 505 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 506 | if (!ss) { |
| 507 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 508 | return SECFailure; |
| 509 | } |
| 510 | |
| 511 | ss->additionalShares = count; |
| 512 | return SECSuccess; |
| 513 | } |
| 514 | |
| 515 | /* |
| 516 | * Generate shares for ECDHE and FFDHE. This picks the first enabled group of |
| 517 | * the requisite type and creates a share for that. |
| 518 | * |
| 519 | * Called from ssl3_SendClientHello. |
| 520 | */ |
| 521 | SECStatus |
| 522 | tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType chType) |
| 523 | { |
| 524 | unsigned int i; |
| 525 | SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); |
| 526 | NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL((void*)0); |
| 527 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
| 528 | unsigned int numShares = 0; |
| 529 | SECStatus rv; |
| 530 | |
| 531 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",531)); |
| 532 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",532)); |
| 533 | |
| 534 | rv = tls13_ClientSetupEch(ss, chType); |
| 535 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 536 | return SECFailure; |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | |
| 539 | /* Everything below here is only run on the first CH. */ |
| 540 | if (chType != client_hello_initial) { |
| 541 | return SECSuccess; |
| 542 | } |
| 543 | |
| 544 | rv = tls13_ClientGreaseSetup(ss); |
| 545 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 546 | return SECFailure; |
| 547 | } |
| 548 | |
| 549 | /* Select the first enabled group. |
| 550 | * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): be smarter about offering the group |
| 551 | * that the other side negotiated if we are resuming. */ |
| 552 | PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs))((((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->next == (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs )))?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)" ,"tls13con.c",552)); |
| 553 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT32; ++i) { |
| 554 | if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]) { |
| 555 | continue; |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]); |
| 558 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 559 | return SECFailure; |
| 560 | } |
| 561 | if (++numShares > ss->additionalShares) { |
| 562 | break; |
| 563 | } |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | |
| 566 | if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->next == (&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs ))) { |
| 567 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); |
| 568 | return SECFailure; |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | /* Try to do stateless resumption, if we can. */ |
| 572 | if (sid->cached != never_cached && |
| 573 | sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 574 | /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. */ |
| 575 | session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; |
| 576 | PORT_Assert(session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data)((session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data)?( (void)0):PR_Assert("session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data" ,"tls13con.c",576)); |
| 577 | |
| 578 | if (ssl_TicketTimeValid(ss, session_ticket)) { |
| 579 | ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE1; |
| 580 | } |
| 581 | |
| 582 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 583 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid)((ss->sec.ci.sid)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.ci.sid", "tls13con.c",583)); |
| 584 | rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid); |
| 585 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 586 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 586); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 587 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->sch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
| 588 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 589 | ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
| 590 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL((void*)0); |
| 591 | return SECFailure; |
| 592 | } |
| 593 | |
| 594 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; |
| 595 | rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_FALSE0); |
| 596 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 597 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 597); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), internal_error); } while (0); |
| 598 | return SECFailure; |
| 599 | } |
| 600 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3. hs.psks)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)" ,"tls13con.c",600)); |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | } |
| 603 | |
| 604 | /* Derive the binder keys if any PSKs. */ |
| 605 | if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3.hs. psks))) { |
| 606 | /* If an External PSK specified a suite, use that. */ |
| 607 | sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next; |
| 608 | if (!ss->statelessResume && |
| 609 | psk->type == ssl_psk_external && |
| 610 | psk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL0x0000) { |
| 611 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = psk->zeroRttSuite; |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | |
| 614 | rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(ss); |
| 615 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 616 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 616); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 617 | return SECFailure; |
| 618 | } |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | |
| 621 | return SECSuccess; |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | |
| 624 | static SECStatus |
| 625 | tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, |
| 626 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, |
| 627 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
| 628 | { |
| 629 | SECStatus rv; |
| 630 | SECItem publicValue = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 631 | |
| 632 | publicValue.data = b; |
| 633 | publicValue.len = length; |
| 634 | if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&pubKey->u.dh.prime, &publicValue)) { |
| 635 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); |
| 636 | return SECFailure; |
| 637 | } |
| 638 | |
| 639 | peerKey->keyType = dhKey; |
| 640 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, |
| 641 | &pubKey->u.dh.prime); |
| 642 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 643 | return SECFailure; |
| 644 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, |
| 645 | &pubKey->u.dh.base); |
| 646 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 647 | return SECFailure; |
| 648 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, |
| 649 | &publicValue); |
| 650 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 651 | return SECFailure; |
| 652 | |
| 653 | return SECSuccess; |
| 654 | } |
| 655 | |
| 656 | static SECStatus |
| 657 | tls13_ImportKEMKeyShare(SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry) |
| 658 | { |
| 659 | SECItem pk = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 660 | SECStatus rv; |
| 661 | |
| 662 | if (entry->group->name != ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00) { |
| 663 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 664 | return SECFailure; |
| 665 | } |
| 666 | |
| 667 | if (entry->key_exchange.len != X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U + KYBER768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES1184U) { |
| 668 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HYBRID_KEY_SHARE); |
| 669 | return SECFailure; |
| 670 | } |
| 671 | pk.data = entry->key_exchange.data + X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U; |
| 672 | pk.len = entry->key_exchange.len - X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U; |
| 673 | |
| 674 | peerKey->keyType = kyberKey; |
| 675 | peerKey->u.kyber.params = params_kyber768_round3; |
| 676 | |
| 677 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.kyber.publicValue, &pk); |
| 678 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 679 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 680 | return SECFailure; |
| 681 | } |
| 682 | |
| 683 | return SECSuccess; |
| 684 | } |
| 685 | |
| 686 | static SECStatus |
| 687 | tls13_HandleKEMCiphertext(sslSocket *ss, TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, sslKeyPair *keyPair, PK11SymKey **outKey) |
| 688 | { |
| 689 | SECItem ct = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 690 | SECStatus rv; |
| 691 | |
| 692 | switch (entry->group->name) { |
| 693 | case ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00: |
| 694 | if (entry->key_exchange.len != X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U + KYBER768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES1088U) { |
| 695 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HYBRID_KEY_SHARE); |
| 696 | return SECFailure; |
| 697 | } |
| 698 | ct.data = entry->key_exchange.data + X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U; |
| 699 | ct.len = entry->key_exchange.len - X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U; |
| 700 | break; |
| 701 | default: |
| 702 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",702)); |
| 703 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 704 | return SECFailure; |
| 705 | } |
| 706 | |
| 707 | rv = PK11_Decapsulate(keyPair->privKey, &ct, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, PK11_ATTR_SESSION0x00000002L | PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE0x00000040L, CKF_DERIVE0x00080000UL, outKey); |
| 708 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 709 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
| 710 | } |
| 711 | return rv; |
| 712 | } |
| 713 | |
| 714 | static SECStatus |
| 715 | tls13_HandleKEMKey(sslSocket *ss, |
| 716 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, |
| 717 | PK11SymKey **key, |
| 718 | SECItem **ciphertext) |
| 719 | { |
| 720 | PORTCheapArenaPool arena; |
| 721 | SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey; |
| 722 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle; |
| 723 | SECStatus rv; |
| 724 | |
| 725 | PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE(2048)); |
| 726 | peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(&arena.arena, SECKEYPublicKey)(SECKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc_Util(&arena.arena, sizeof (SECKEYPublicKey)); |
| 727 | if (peerKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 728 | goto loser; |
| 729 | } |
| 730 | peerKey->arena = &arena.arena; |
| 731 | peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL((void*)0); |
| 732 | peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 733 | |
| 734 | rv = tls13_ImportKEMKeyShare(peerKey, entry); |
| 735 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 736 | goto loser; |
| 737 | } |
| 738 | |
| 739 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_NSS_KYBER((0x80000000UL | 0x4E534350) + 46), ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 740 | if (!slot) { |
| 741 | goto loser; |
| 742 | } |
| 743 | |
| 744 | handle = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, peerKey, PR_FALSE0); |
| 745 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* peerKey holds a slot reference on success. */ |
| 746 | if (handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE0) { |
| 747 | goto loser; |
| 748 | } |
| 749 | |
| 750 | rv = PK11_Encapsulate(peerKey, |
| 751 | CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, PK11_ATTR_SESSION0x00000002L | PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE0x00000040L | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE0x00000004L, |
| 752 | CKF_DERIVE0x00080000UL, key, ciphertext); |
| 753 | |
| 754 | /* Destroy the imported public key */ |
| 755 | PORT_Assert(peerKey->pkcs11Slot)((peerKey->pkcs11Slot)?((void)0):PR_Assert("peerKey->pkcs11Slot" ,"tls13con.c",755)); |
| 756 | PK11_DestroyObject(peerKey->pkcs11Slot, peerKey->pkcs11ID); |
| 757 | PK11_FreeSlot(peerKey->pkcs11Slot); |
| 758 | |
| 759 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
| 760 | return SECSuccess; |
| 761 | |
| 762 | loser: |
| 763 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
| 764 | return SECFailure; |
| 765 | } |
| 766 | |
| 767 | SECStatus |
| 768 | tls13_HandleKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, |
| 769 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, |
| 770 | sslKeyPair *keyPair, |
| 771 | SSLHashType hash, |
| 772 | PK11SymKey **out) |
| 773 | { |
| 774 | PORTCheapArenaPool arena; |
| 775 | SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey; |
| 776 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; |
| 777 | PK11SymKey *key; |
| 778 | SECStatus rv; |
| 779 | int keySize = 0; |
| 780 | |
| 781 | PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE(2048)); |
| 782 | peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(&arena.arena, SECKEYPublicKey)(SECKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc_Util(&arena.arena, sizeof (SECKEYPublicKey)); |
| 783 | if (peerKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 784 | goto loser; |
| 785 | } |
| 786 | peerKey->arena = &arena.arena; |
| 787 | peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL((void*)0); |
| 788 | peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE0; |
| 789 | |
| 790 | switch (entry->group->keaType) { |
| 791 | case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid: |
| 792 | if (entry->group->name != ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00 || entry->key_exchange.len < X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U) { |
| 793 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HYBRID_KEY_SHARE); |
| 794 | goto loser; |
| 795 | } |
| 796 | rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(peerKey, |
| 797 | entry->key_exchange.data, |
| 798 | X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES32U, |
| 799 | ssl_LookupNamedGroup(ssl_grp_ec_curve25519)); |
| 800 | mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE0x00001050UL; |
| 801 | break; |
| 802 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
| 803 | rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(peerKey, |
| 804 | entry->key_exchange.data, |
| 805 | entry->key_exchange.len, |
| 806 | entry->group); |
| 807 | mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE0x00001050UL; |
| 808 | break; |
| 809 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
| 810 | rv = tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(peerKey, |
| 811 | entry->key_exchange.data, |
| 812 | entry->key_exchange.len, |
| 813 | keyPair->pubKey); |
| 814 | mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE0x00000021UL; |
| 815 | keySize = peerKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; |
| 816 | break; |
| 817 | default: |
| 818 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",818)); |
| 819 | goto loser; |
| 820 | } |
| 821 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 822 | goto loser; |
| 823 | } |
| 824 | |
| 825 | key = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF( |
| 826 | keyPair->privKey, peerKey, PR_FALSE0, NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), mechanism, |
| 827 | CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL, keySize, CKD_NULL0x00000001UL, NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0)); |
| 828 | if (!key) { |
| 829 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
| 830 | goto loser; |
| 831 | } |
| 832 | |
| 833 | *out = key; |
| 834 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
| 835 | return SECSuccess; |
| 836 | |
| 837 | loser: |
| 838 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
| 839 | return SECFailure; |
| 840 | } |
| 841 | |
| 842 | static PRBool |
| 843 | tls13_UseServerSecret(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) |
| 844 | { |
| 845 | return ss->sec.isServer == (direction == ssl_secret_write); |
| 846 | } |
| 847 | |
| 848 | static PK11SymKey ** |
| 849 | tls13_TrafficSecretRef(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) |
| 850 | { |
| 851 | if (tls13_UseServerSecret(ss, direction)) { |
| 852 | return &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret; |
| 853 | } |
| 854 | return &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret; |
| 855 | } |
| 856 | |
| 857 | SECStatus |
| 858 | tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) |
| 859 | { |
| 860 | PK11SymKey **secret; |
| 861 | PK11SymKey *updatedSecret; |
| 862 | PRUint16 epoch; |
| 863 | SECStatus rv; |
| 864 | |
| 865 | secret = tls13_TrafficSecretRef(ss, direction); |
| 866 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(*secret, tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 867 | NULL((void*)0), 0, |
| 868 | kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate, |
| 869 | strlen(kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate), |
| 870 | tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss), |
| 871 | tls13_GetHashSize(ss), |
| 872 | ss->protocolVariant, |
| 873 | &updatedSecret); |
| 874 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 875 | return SECFailure; |
| 876 | } |
| 877 | |
| 878 | PK11_FreeSymKey(*secret); |
| 879 | *secret = updatedSecret; |
| 880 | |
| 881 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockRead_Util((ss)->specLock ); }; |
| 882 | if (direction == ssl_secret_read) { |
| 883 | epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; |
| 884 | } else { |
| 885 | epoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch; |
| 886 | } |
| 887 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockRead_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 888 | |
| 889 | if (epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX65535U) { |
| 890 | /* Good chance that this is an overflow from too many updates. */ |
| 891 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 891); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES , internal_error); } while (0); |
| 892 | return SECFailure; |
| 893 | } |
| 894 | ++epoch; |
| 895 | |
| 896 | if (ss->secretCallback) { |
| 897 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, epoch, direction, updatedSecret, |
| 898 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 899 | } |
| 900 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, epoch, direction, PR_FALSE0); |
| 901 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 902 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 902); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 903 | return SECFailure; |
| 904 | } |
| 905 | return SECSuccess; |
| 906 | } |
| 907 | |
| 908 | SECStatus |
| 909 | tls13_SendKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, tls13KeyUpdateRequest request, PRBool buffer) |
| 910 | { |
| 911 | SECStatus rv; |
| 912 | |
| 913 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), (request == update_requested) ? "requested" : "not requested" ) |
| 914 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), (request == update_requested) ? "requested" : "not requested" ) |
| 915 | (request == update_requested) ? "requested"if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), (request == update_requested) ? "requested" : "not requested" ) |
| 916 | : "not requested"))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), (request == update_requested) ? "requested" : "not requested" ); |
| 917 | |
| 918 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",918)); |
| 919 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested)((!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested)?( (void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested" ,"tls13con.c",919)); |
| 920 | |
| 921 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 922 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 923 | return SECFailure; |
| 924 | } |
| 925 | |
| 926 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, "SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 927, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 927 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, "SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 927, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 928 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 929 | return SECFailure; |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | |
| 932 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 933 | rv = dtls13_MaybeSendKeyUpdate(ss, request, buffer); |
| 934 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 935 | /* Error code set already. */ |
| 936 | return SECFailure; |
| 937 | } |
| 938 | return rv; |
| 939 | } |
| 940 | |
| 941 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 942 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_key_update, 1); |
| 943 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 944 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 944); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 945 | goto loser; |
| 946 | } |
| 947 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, request, 1); |
| 948 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 949 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 949); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 950 | goto loser; |
| 951 | } |
| 952 | |
| 953 | /* If we have been asked to buffer, then do so. This allows us to coalesce |
| 954 | * a KeyUpdate with a pending write. */ |
| 955 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, buffer ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER0x40000000 : 0); |
| 956 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 957 | goto loser; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
| 958 | } |
| 959 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 960 | |
| 961 | rv = tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(ss, ssl_secret_write); |
| 962 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 963 | goto loser; /* error code set by tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys */ |
| 964 | } |
| 965 | |
| 966 | return SECSuccess; |
| 967 | |
| 968 | loser: |
| 969 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 970 | return SECFailure; |
| 971 | } |
| 972 | |
| 973 | SECStatus |
| 974 | SSLExp_KeyUpdate(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool requestUpdate) |
| 975 | { |
| 976 | SECStatus rv; |
| 977 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 978 | if (!ss) { |
| 979 | return SECFailure; |
| 980 | } |
| 981 | |
| 982 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 983 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 984 | return SECFailure; |
| 985 | } |
| 986 | |
| 987 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { |
| 988 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR(-5998L)); |
| 989 | return SECFailure; |
| 990 | } |
| 991 | |
| 992 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 993, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 993 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 993, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 994 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 995 | return SECFailure; |
| 996 | } |
| 997 | |
| 998 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { ((!((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss )->xmitBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",998)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 999 | rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, requestUpdate ? update_requested : update_not_requested, |
| 1000 | PR_FALSE0 /* don't buffer */); |
| 1001 | |
| 1002 | /* Remember that we are the ones that initiated this KeyUpdate. */ |
| 1003 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 1004 | ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1005 | } |
| 1006 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 1007 | return rv; |
| 1008 | } |
| 1009 | |
| 1010 | SECStatus |
| 1011 | SSLExp_SetCertificateCompressionAlgorithm(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCertificateCompressionAlgorithm alg) |
| 1012 | { |
| 1013 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 1014 | if (!ss) { |
| 1015 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 1016 | } |
| 1017 | |
| 1018 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { ((!((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss )->xmitBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",1018)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 1019 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount == MAX_SUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION_ALGS32) { |
| 1020 | goto loser; |
| 1021 | } |
| 1022 | |
| 1023 | /* Reserved ID */ |
| 1024 | if (alg.id == 0) { |
| 1025 | goto loser; |
| 1026 | } |
| 1027 | |
| 1028 | if (alg.encode == NULL((void*)0) && alg.decode == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 1029 | goto loser; |
| 1030 | } |
| 1031 | |
| 1032 | /* Checking that we have not yet registed an algorithm with the same ID. */ |
| 1033 | for (int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; i++) { |
| 1034 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].id == alg.id) { |
| 1035 | goto loser; |
| 1036 | } |
| 1037 | } |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(&ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms |
| 1040 | [ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount], |
| 1041 | &alg, sizeof(alg)); |
| 1042 | ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount += 1; |
| 1043 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 1044 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1045 | |
| 1046 | loser: |
| 1047 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1048 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 1049 | return SECFailure; |
| 1050 | } |
| 1051 | |
| 1052 | /* |
| 1053 | * enum { |
| 1054 | * update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255) |
| 1055 | * } KeyUpdateRequest; |
| 1056 | * |
| 1057 | * struct { |
| 1058 | * KeyUpdateRequest request_update; |
| 1059 | * } KeyUpdate; |
| 1060 | */ |
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | /* If we're handing the DTLS1.3 message, we silently fail if there is a parsing problem. */ |
| 1063 | static SECStatus |
| 1064 | tls13_HandleKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, unsigned int length) |
| 1065 | { |
| 1066 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1067 | PRUint32 update; |
| 1068 | |
| 1069 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s handle key update",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s handle key update" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1070 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s handle key update" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1071 | |
| 1072 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",1072)); |
| 1073 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",1073)); |
| 1074 | |
| 1075 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 1076 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, unexpected_message)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 1076); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE , unexpected_message); } while (0); |
| 1077 | return SECFailure; |
| 1078 | } |
| 1079 | |
| 1080 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1081, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 1081 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1081, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 1082 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1083 | /* We should never be idle_handshake prior to firstHsDone. */ |
| 1084 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1084); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 1085 | return SECFailure; |
| 1086 | } |
| 1087 | |
| 1088 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &update, 1, &b, &length); |
| 1089 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1090 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ |
| 1091 | } |
| 1092 | if (length != 0) { |
| 1093 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 1093); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 1094 | return SECFailure; |
| 1095 | } |
| 1096 | if (!(update == update_requested || |
| 1097 | update == update_not_requested)) { |
| 1098 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 1098); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 1099 | return SECFailure; |
| 1100 | } |
| 1101 | |
| 1102 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 1103 | return dtls13_HandleKeyUpdate(ss, b, length, update); |
| 1104 | } |
| 1105 | |
| 1106 | rv = tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(ss, ssl_secret_read); |
| 1107 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1108 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set by tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys. */ |
| 1109 | } |
| 1110 | |
| 1111 | if (update == update_requested) { |
| 1112 | PRBool sendUpdate; |
| 1113 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { |
| 1114 | /* Post-handshake auth is in progress; defer sending a key update. */ |
| 1115 | ss->ssl3.hs.keyUpdateDeferred = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1116 | ss->ssl3.hs.deferredKeyUpdateRequest = update_not_requested; |
| 1117 | sendUpdate = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1118 | } else if (ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate) { |
| 1119 | /* Only send an update if we have sent with the current spec. This |
| 1120 | * prevents us from being forced to crank forward pointlessly. */ |
| 1121 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockRead_Util((ss)->specLock ); }; |
| 1122 | sendUpdate = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum > 0; |
| 1123 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockRead_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 1124 | } else { |
| 1125 | sendUpdate = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1126 | } |
| 1127 | if (sendUpdate) { |
| 1128 | /* Respond immediately (don't buffer). */ |
| 1129 | rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, update_not_requested, PR_FALSE0); |
| 1130 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1131 | return SECFailure; /* Error already set. */ |
| 1132 | } |
| 1133 | } |
| 1134 | ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1135 | } |
| 1136 | |
| 1137 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1138 | } |
| 1139 | |
| 1140 | SECStatus |
| 1141 | SSLExp_SendCertificateRequest(PRFileDesc *fd) |
| 1142 | { |
| 1143 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1144 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 1145 | if (!ss) { |
| 1146 | return SECFailure; |
| 1147 | } |
| 1148 | |
| 1149 | /* Not supported. */ |
| 1150 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 1151 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION); |
| 1152 | return SECFailure; |
| 1153 | } |
| 1154 | |
| 1155 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 1156 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 1157 | return SECFailure; |
| 1158 | } |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { |
| 1161 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR(-5998L)); |
| 1162 | return SECFailure; |
| 1163 | } |
| 1164 | |
| 1165 | /* Disallow a CertificateRequest if this connection uses an external PSK. */ |
| 1166 | if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 1167 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED); |
| 1168 | return SECFailure; |
| 1169 | } |
| 1170 | |
| 1171 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1172, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 1172 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1172, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 1173 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1174 | return SECFailure; |
| 1175 | } |
| 1176 | |
| 1177 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn)) { |
| 1178 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXTENSION); |
| 1179 | return SECFailure; |
| 1180 | } |
| 1181 | |
| 1182 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { ((!((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss )->xmitBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",1182)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 1183 | |
| 1184 | rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss); |
| 1185 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 1186 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 1187 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 1188 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 1189 | ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested = PR_TRUE1; |
| 1190 | } |
| 1191 | |
| 1192 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 1193 | return rv; |
| 1194 | } |
| 1195 | |
| 1196 | SECStatus |
| 1197 | tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 1198 | { |
| 1199 | if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) { |
| 1200 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: successfully decrypted handshake after "if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: successfully decrypted handshake after " "failed 0-RTT", getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 1201 | "failed 0-RTT",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: successfully decrypted handshake after " "failed 0-RTT", getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 1202 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: successfully decrypted handshake after " "failed 0-RTT", getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 1203 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; |
| 1204 | } |
| 1205 | |
| 1206 | /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Would it be better to check all the states here? */ |
| 1207 | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { |
| 1208 | case ssl_hs_certificate: |
| 1209 | return tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length, PR_FALSE0); |
| 1210 | case ssl_hs_compressed_certificate: |
| 1211 | return tls13_HandleCertificateDecode(ss, b, length); |
| 1212 | case ssl_hs_certificate_request: |
| 1213 | return tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); |
| 1214 | |
| 1215 | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: |
| 1216 | return tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length); |
| 1217 | |
| 1218 | case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: |
| 1219 | return tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(ss, b, length); |
| 1220 | |
| 1221 | case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: |
| 1222 | return tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); |
| 1223 | |
| 1224 | case ssl_hs_finished: |
| 1225 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 1226 | return tls13_ServerHandleFinished(ss, b, length); |
| 1227 | } else { |
| 1228 | return tls13_ClientHandleFinished(ss, b, length); |
| 1229 | } |
| 1230 | |
| 1231 | case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data: |
| 1232 | return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss, b, length); |
| 1233 | |
| 1234 | case ssl_hs_key_update: |
| 1235 | return tls13_HandleKeyUpdate(ss, b, length); |
| 1236 | |
| 1237 | default: |
| 1238 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, unexpected_message)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 1238); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE , unexpected_message); } while (0); |
| 1239 | return SECFailure; |
| 1240 | } |
| 1241 | |
| 1242 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",1242)); /* Unreached */ |
| 1243 | return SECFailure; |
| 1244 | } |
| 1245 | |
| 1246 | static SECStatus |
| 1247 | tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) |
| 1248 | { |
| 1249 | PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ |
| 1250 | SECItem wrappedMS = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 1251 | SSLHashType hashType; |
| 1252 | |
| 1253 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1254 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1255 | |
| 1256 | /* Now find the hash used as the PRF for the previous handshake. */ |
| 1257 | hashType = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite); |
| 1258 | |
| 1259 | /* If we are the server, we compute the wrapping key, but if we |
| 1260 | * are the client, its coordinates are stored with the ticket. */ |
| 1261 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 1262 | wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL((void*)0), |
| 1263 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
| 1264 | ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 1265 | } else { |
| 1266 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, |
| 1267 | sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); |
| 1268 | if (!slot) |
| 1269 | return SECFailure; |
| 1270 | |
| 1271 | wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, |
| 1272 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, |
| 1273 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
| 1274 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, |
| 1275 | ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 1276 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 1277 | } |
| 1278 | if (!wrapKey) { |
| 1279 | return SECFailure; |
| 1280 | } |
| 1281 | |
| 1282 | wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; |
| 1283 | wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; |
| 1284 | |
| 1285 | PK11SymKey *unwrappedPsk = ssl_unwrapSymKey(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
| 1286 | NULL((void*)0), &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE0x00000371UL, |
| 1287 | CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL, tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType), |
| 1288 | CKF_SIGN0x00000800UL | CKF_VERIFY0x00002000, ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
| 1289 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); |
| 1290 | if (!unwrappedPsk) { |
| 1291 | return SECFailure; |
| 1292 | } |
| 1293 | sslPsk *rpsk = tls13_MakePsk(unwrappedPsk, ssl_psk_resume, hashType, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 1294 | if (!rpsk) { |
| 1295 | PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedPsk); |
| 1296 | return SECFailure; |
| 1297 | } |
| 1298 | if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) { |
| 1299 | rpsk->maxEarlyData = sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size; |
| 1300 | rpsk->zeroRttSuite = sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; |
| 1301 | } |
| 1302 | PRINT_KEY(50, (ss, "Recovered RMS", rpsk->key))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintKey (ss, "Recovered RMS", rpsk ->key); |
| 1303 | PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) ||((((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3.hs .psks)) || ((sslPsk *)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next)-> type != ssl_psk_resume)?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) || ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->type != ssl_psk_resume" ,"tls13con.c",1304)) |
| 1304 | ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->type != ssl_psk_resume)((((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3.hs .psks)) || ((sslPsk *)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next)-> type != ssl_psk_resume)?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) || ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->type != ssl_psk_resume" ,"tls13con.c",1304)); |
| 1305 | |
| 1306 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 1307 | /* In server, we couldn't select the RPSK in the extension handler |
| 1308 | * since it was not unwrapped yet. We're committed now, so select |
| 1309 | * it and add it to the list (to ensure it is freed). */ |
| 1310 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = rpsk; |
| 1311 | } |
| 1312 | PR_APPEND_LINK(&rpsk->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks)do { (&rpsk->link)->next = (&ss->ssl3.hs.psks ); (&rpsk->link)->prev = (&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) ->prev; (&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->prev->next = (& rpsk->link); (&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->prev = (&rpsk ->link); } while (0); |
| 1313 | |
| 1314 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1315 | } |
| 1316 | |
| 1317 | /* Key Derivation Functions. |
| 1318 | * |
| 1319 | * 0 |
| 1320 | * | |
| 1321 | * v |
| 1322 | * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret |
| 1323 | * | |
| 1324 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") |
| 1325 | * | = binder_key |
| 1326 | * | |
| 1327 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", |
| 1328 | * | ClientHello) |
| 1329 | * | = client_early_traffic_secret |
| 1330 | * | |
| 1331 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", |
| 1332 | * | ClientHello) |
| 1333 | * | = early_exporter_secret |
| 1334 | * v |
| 1335 | * Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") |
| 1336 | * | |
| 1337 | * v |
| 1338 | *(EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret |
| 1339 | * | |
| 1340 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c hs traffic", |
| 1341 | * | ClientHello...ServerHello) |
| 1342 | * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret |
| 1343 | * | |
| 1344 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s hs traffic", |
| 1345 | * | ClientHello...ServerHello) |
| 1346 | * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret |
| 1347 | * v |
| 1348 | * Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") |
| 1349 | * | |
| 1350 | * v |
| 1351 | * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret |
| 1352 | * | |
| 1353 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic", |
| 1354 | * | ClientHello...Server Finished) |
| 1355 | * | = client_traffic_secret_0 |
| 1356 | * | |
| 1357 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic", |
| 1358 | * | ClientHello...Server Finished) |
| 1359 | * | = server_traffic_secret_0 |
| 1360 | * | |
| 1361 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master", |
| 1362 | * | ClientHello...Server Finished) |
| 1363 | * | = exporter_secret |
| 1364 | * | |
| 1365 | * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "res master", |
| 1366 | * ClientHello...Client Finished) |
| 1367 | * = resumption_master_secret |
| 1368 | * |
| 1369 | */ |
| 1370 | static SECStatus |
| 1371 | tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1372 | { |
| 1373 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1374 | |
| 1375 | SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1376 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1377 | |
| 1378 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)((!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1378)); |
| 1379 | sslPsk *psk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1380 | |
| 1381 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 1382 | psk = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk; |
| 1383 | } else { |
| 1384 | /* Client to use the first PSK for early secrets. */ |
| 1385 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3. hs.psks)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)" ,"tls13con.c",1385)); |
| 1386 | psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next; |
| 1387 | } |
| 1388 | PORT_Assert(psk && psk->key)((psk && psk->key)?((void)0):PR_Assert("psk && psk->key" ,"tls13con.c",1388)); |
| 1389 | PORT_Assert(psk->hash != ssl_hash_none)((psk->hash != ssl_hash_none)?((void)0):PR_Assert("psk->hash != ssl_hash_none" ,"tls13con.c",1389)); |
| 1390 | |
| 1391 | PK11SymKey *earlySecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1392 | rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL((void*)0), psk->key, psk->hash, &earlySecret); |
| 1393 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1394 | return SECFailure; |
| 1395 | } |
| 1396 | |
| 1397 | /* No longer need the raw input key */ |
| 1398 | PK11_FreeSymKey(psk->key); |
| 1399 | psk->key = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1400 | const char *label = (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) ? kHkdfLabelResPskBinderKey : kHkdfLabelExtPskBinderKey; |
| 1401 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, earlySecret, |
| 1402 | label, strlen(label), |
| 1403 | &psk->binderKey, psk->hash); |
| 1404 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1405 | PK11_FreeSymKey(earlySecret); |
| 1406 | return SECFailure; |
| 1407 | } |
| 1408 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = earlySecret; |
| 1409 | |
| 1410 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1411 | } |
| 1412 | |
| 1413 | /* This derives the early traffic and early exporter secrets. */ |
| 1414 | static SECStatus |
| 1415 | tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1416 | { |
| 1417 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1418 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)((ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1418)); |
| 1419 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1420 | kHkdfLabelClient, |
| 1421 | kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret, |
| 1422 | keylogLabelClientEarlyTrafficSecret, |
| 1423 | &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); |
| 1424 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1425 | return SECFailure; |
| 1426 | } |
| 1427 | |
| 1428 | if (ss->secretCallback) { |
| 1429 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, |
| 1430 | ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write, |
| 1431 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret, |
| 1432 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 1433 | } |
| 1434 | |
| 1435 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1436 | NULL((void*)0), kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret, |
| 1437 | keylogLabelEarlyExporterSecret, |
| 1438 | &ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); |
| 1439 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1440 | return SECFailure; |
| 1441 | } |
| 1442 | |
| 1443 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1444 | } |
| 1445 | |
| 1446 | static SECStatus |
| 1447 | tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1448 | { |
| 1449 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1450 | PK11SymKey *derivedSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1451 | PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1452 | SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secret (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1453 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1454 | |
| 1455 | /* If no PSK, generate the default early secret. */ |
| 1456 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { |
| 1457 | PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)((!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk" ,"tls13con.c",1457)); |
| 1458 | rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), |
| 1459 | tls13_GetHash(ss), &ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
| 1460 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1461 | return SECFailure; |
| 1462 | } |
| 1463 | } |
| 1464 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)((ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1464)); |
| 1465 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret)((ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1465)); |
| 1466 | |
| 1467 | /* Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") */ |
| 1468 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1469 | kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret, |
| 1470 | strlen(kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret), |
| 1471 | &derivedSecret, tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 1472 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1473 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1473); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1474 | return rv; |
| 1475 | } |
| 1476 | |
| 1477 | /* HKDF-Extract(ECDHE, .) = Handshake Secret */ |
| 1478 | rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(derivedSecret, ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret, |
| 1479 | tls13_GetHash(ss), &newSecret); |
| 1480 | PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedSecret); |
| 1481 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1482 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1482); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1483 | return rv; |
| 1484 | } |
| 1485 | |
| 1486 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
| 1487 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; |
| 1488 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1489 | } |
| 1490 | |
| 1491 | static SECStatus |
| 1492 | tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1493 | { |
| 1494 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1495 | PK11SymKey *derivedSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1496 | PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1497 | |
| 1498 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); |
| 1499 | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1500 | |
| 1501 | SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1502 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1503 | |
| 1504 | /* Now compute |*HsTrafficSecret| */ |
| 1505 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1506 | kHkdfLabelClient, |
| 1507 | kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, |
| 1508 | keylogLabelClientHsTrafficSecret, |
| 1509 | &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); |
| 1510 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1511 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1511); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1512 | return rv; |
| 1513 | } |
| 1514 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1515 | kHkdfLabelServer, |
| 1516 | kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, |
| 1517 | keylogLabelServerHsTrafficSecret, |
| 1518 | &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); |
| 1519 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1520 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1520); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1521 | return rv; |
| 1522 | } |
| 1523 | |
| 1524 | if (ss->secretCallback) { |
| 1525 | SSLSecretDirection dir = |
| 1526 | ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write; |
| 1527 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyHandshake, dir, |
| 1528 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret, |
| 1529 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 1530 | dir = ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_write : ssl_secret_read; |
| 1531 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyHandshake, dir, |
| 1532 | ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret, |
| 1533 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 1534 | } |
| 1535 | |
| 1536 | SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 1537 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (5)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 1538 | |
| 1539 | /* Crank HKDF forward to make master secret, which we |
| 1540 | * stuff in current secret. */ |
| 1541 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1542 | kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret, |
| 1543 | strlen(kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret), |
| 1544 | &derivedSecret, tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 1545 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1546 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1546); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1547 | return rv; |
| 1548 | } |
| 1549 | rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(derivedSecret, |
| 1550 | NULL((void*)0), |
| 1551 | tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 1552 | &newSecret); |
| 1553 | PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedSecret); |
| 1554 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1555 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 1555); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 1556 | return SECFailure; |
| 1557 | } |
| 1558 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
| 1559 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; |
| 1560 | |
| 1561 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1562 | } |
| 1563 | |
| 1564 | static SECStatus |
| 1565 | tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1566 | { |
| 1567 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1568 | |
| 1569 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1570 | kHkdfLabelClient, |
| 1571 | kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, |
| 1572 | keylogLabelClientTrafficSecret, |
| 1573 | &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); |
| 1574 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1575 | return SECFailure; |
| 1576 | } |
| 1577 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1578 | kHkdfLabelServer, |
| 1579 | kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, |
| 1580 | keylogLabelServerTrafficSecret, |
| 1581 | &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); |
| 1582 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1583 | return SECFailure; |
| 1584 | } |
| 1585 | |
| 1586 | if (ss->secretCallback) { |
| 1587 | SSLSecretDirection dir = |
| 1588 | ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write; |
| 1589 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 1590 | dir, ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret, |
| 1591 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 1592 | dir = ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_write : ssl_secret_read; |
| 1593 | ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 1594 | dir, ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret, |
| 1595 | ss->secretCallbackArg); |
| 1596 | } |
| 1597 | |
| 1598 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1599 | NULL((void*)0), kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret, |
| 1600 | keylogLabelExporterSecret, |
| 1601 | &ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); |
| 1602 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1603 | return SECFailure; |
| 1604 | } |
| 1605 | |
| 1606 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1607 | } |
| 1608 | |
| 1609 | static SECStatus |
| 1610 | tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1611 | { |
| 1612 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1613 | |
| 1614 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret)((!ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1614)); |
| 1615 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret)((!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1615)); |
| 1616 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)((ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret" ,"tls13con.c",1616)); |
| 1617 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, |
| 1618 | NULL((void*)0), kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret, |
| 1619 | NULL((void*)0), |
| 1620 | &ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); |
| 1621 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
| 1622 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1623 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1624 | return SECFailure; |
| 1625 | } |
| 1626 | |
| 1627 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1628 | } |
| 1629 | |
| 1630 | static void |
| 1631 | tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) |
| 1632 | { |
| 1633 | /* Set these to match the cached value. |
| 1634 | * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Make a version with the "true" values. |
| 1635 | * Bug 1256137. |
| 1636 | */ |
| 1637 | ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; |
| 1638 | ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; |
| 1639 | ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); |
| 1640 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; |
| 1641 | } |
| 1642 | |
| 1643 | /* Check whether resumption-PSK is allowed. */ |
| 1644 | static PRBool |
| 1645 | tls13_CanResume(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) |
| 1646 | { |
| 1647 | const sslServerCert *sc; |
| 1648 | |
| 1649 | if (!sid) { |
| 1650 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1651 | } |
| 1652 | |
| 1653 | if (sid->version != ss->version) { |
| 1654 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1655 | } |
| 1656 | |
| 1657 | #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
| 1658 | /* When fuzzing, sid could contain garbage that will crash tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite. |
| 1659 | * Do a direct comparison of cipher suites. This makes us refuse to resume when the |
| 1660 | * protocol allows it, but resumption is discretionary anyway. */ |
| 1661 | if (sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { |
| 1662 | #else |
| 1663 | if (tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) { |
| 1664 | #endif |
| 1665 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1666 | } |
| 1667 | |
| 1668 | /* Server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, but they |
| 1669 | * do remember the type of certificate we originally used, so we can locate |
| 1670 | * it again, provided that the current ssl socket has had its server certs |
| 1671 | * configured the same as the previous one. */ |
| 1672 | sc = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve); |
| 1673 | if (!sc || !sc->serverCert) { |
| 1674 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1675 | } |
| 1676 | |
| 1677 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 1678 | } |
| 1679 | |
| 1680 | static PRBool |
| 1681 | tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) |
| 1682 | { |
| 1683 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent","tls13con.c", 1683)); |
| 1684 | sslPsk *psk = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk; |
| 1685 | |
| 1686 | if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) { |
| 1687 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1688 | } |
| 1689 | if (!psk) { |
| 1690 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1691 | } |
| 1692 | if (psk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL0x0000) { |
| 1693 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1694 | } |
| 1695 | if (!psk->maxEarlyData) { |
| 1696 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1697 | } |
| 1698 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != psk->zeroRttSuite) { |
| 1699 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1700 | } |
| 1701 | if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { |
| 1702 | if (!sid) { |
| 1703 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1704 | } |
| 1705 | PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data)((sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data )?((void)0):PR_Assert("sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data" ,"tls13con.c",1705)); |
| 1706 | PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume)((ss->statelessResume)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->statelessResume" ,"tls13con.c",1706)); |
| 1707 | if (!ss->statelessResume) { |
| 1708 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1709 | } |
| 1710 | if (SECITEM_CompareItemSECITEM_CompareItem_Util(&ss->xtnData.nextProto, |
| 1711 | &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != 0) { |
| 1712 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1713 | } |
| 1714 | } else if (psk->type != ssl_psk_external) { |
| 1715 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",1715)); |
| 1716 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1717 | } |
| 1718 | |
| 1719 | if (tls13_IsReplay(ss, sid)) { |
| 1720 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1721 | } |
| 1722 | |
| 1723 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 1724 | } |
| 1725 | |
| 1726 | /* Called from tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 to update the state of 0-RTT handling. |
| 1727 | * |
| 1728 | * 0-RTT is only permitted if: |
| 1729 | * 1. The early data extension was present. |
| 1730 | * 2. We are resuming a session. |
| 1731 | * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. |
| 1732 | * 4. The ticket allowed 0-RTT. |
| 1733 | * 5. We negotiated the same ALPN value as in the ticket. |
| 1734 | */ |
| 1735 | static void |
| 1736 | tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) |
| 1737 | { |
| 1738 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p" , getpid(), ss->fd, sid) |
| 1739 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p" , getpid(), ss->fd, sid); |
| 1740 | |
| 1741 | /* tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn sets this to ssl_0rtt_sent, so this will |
| 1742 | * be ssl_0rtt_none unless early_data is present. */ |
| 1743 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) { |
| 1744 | return; |
| 1745 | } |
| 1746 | |
| 1747 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored) { |
| 1748 | /* HelloRetryRequest causes 0-RTT to be ignored. On the second |
| 1749 | * ClientHello, reset the ignore state so that decryption failure is |
| 1750 | * handled normally. */ |
| 1751 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr) { |
| 1752 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry)((ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry" ,"tls13con.c",1752)); |
| 1753 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; |
| 1754 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; |
| 1755 | } else { |
| 1756 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: application ignored 0-RTT",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: application ignored 0-RTT" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 1757 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: application ignored 0-RTT" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 1758 | } |
| 1759 | return; |
| 1760 | } |
| 1761 | |
| 1762 | if (!tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid)) { |
| 1763 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore 0-RTT", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore 0-RTT" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 1764 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; |
| 1765 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; |
| 1766 | return; |
| 1767 | } |
| 1768 | |
| 1769 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: enable 0-RTT", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: enable 0-RTT" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 1770 | PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)((ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->xtnData.selectedPsk" ,"tls13con.c",1770)); |
| 1771 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; |
| 1772 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; |
| 1773 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; |
| 1774 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite(1U << 2); |
| 1775 | } |
| 1776 | |
| 1777 | /* Check if the offered group is acceptable. */ |
| 1778 | static PRBool |
| 1779 | tls13_isGroupAcceptable(const sslNamedGroupDef *offered, |
| 1780 | const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup) |
| 1781 | { |
| 1782 | /* We accept epsilon (e) bits around the offered group size. */ |
| 1783 | const unsigned int e = 2; |
| 1784 | |
| 1785 | PORT_Assert(offered)((offered)?((void)0):PR_Assert("offered","tls13con.c",1785)); |
| 1786 | PORT_Assert(preferredGroup)((preferredGroup)?((void)0):PR_Assert("preferredGroup","tls13con.c" ,1786)); |
| 1787 | |
| 1788 | if (offered->bits >= preferredGroup->bits - e && |
| 1789 | offered->bits <= preferredGroup->bits + e) { |
| 1790 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 1791 | } |
| 1792 | |
| 1793 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 1794 | } |
| 1795 | |
| 1796 | /* Find remote key share for given group and return it. |
| 1797 | * Returns NULL if no key share is found. */ |
| 1798 | static TLS13KeyShareEntry * |
| 1799 | tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) |
| 1800 | { |
| 1801 | PRCList *cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)->next); |
| 1802 | while (cur_p != &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares) { |
| 1803 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p; |
| 1804 | if (offer->group == group) { |
| 1805 | return offer; |
| 1806 | } |
| 1807 | cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)((cur_p)->next); |
| 1808 | } |
| 1809 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 1810 | } |
| 1811 | |
| 1812 | static SECStatus |
| 1813 | tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, |
| 1814 | const sslNamedGroupDef **requestedGroup, |
| 1815 | TLS13KeyShareEntry **clientShare) |
| 1816 | { |
| 1817 | unsigned int index; |
| 1818 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1819 | const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1820 | |
| 1821 | /* We insist on DHE. */ |
| 1822 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { |
| 1823 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn)) { |
| 1824 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1825); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES , missing_extension); } while (0) |
| 1825 | missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1825); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 1826 | return SECFailure; |
| 1827 | } |
| 1828 | /* Since the server insists on DHE to provide forward secracy, for |
| 1829 | * every other PskKem value but DHE stateless resumption is disabled, |
| 1830 | * this includes other specified and GREASE values. */ |
| 1831 | if (!memchr(ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.data, tls13_psk_dh_ke, |
| 1832 | ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.len)) { |
| 1833 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client offered PSK without DH",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client offered PSK without DH" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 1834 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client offered PSK without DH" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 1835 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE0; |
| 1836 | } |
| 1837 | } |
| 1838 | |
| 1839 | /* Now figure out which key share we like the best out of the |
| 1840 | * mutually supported groups, regardless of what the client offered |
| 1841 | * for key shares. |
| 1842 | */ |
| 1843 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { |
| 1844 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1845); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0) |
| 1845 | missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1845); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 1846 | return SECFailure; |
| 1847 | } |
| 1848 | |
| 1849 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected KE = %s", SSL_GETPID(),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected KE = %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, ss->statelessResume || ss->xtnData .selectedPsk ? "PSK + (EC)DHE" : "(EC)DHE") |
| 1850 | ss->fd, ss->statelessResume || ss->xtnData.selectedPsk ? "PSK + (EC)DHE" : "(EC)DHE"))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected KE = %s" , getpid(), ss->fd, ss->statelessResume || ss->xtnData .selectedPsk ? "PSK + (EC)DHE" : "(EC)DHE"); |
| 1851 | |
| 1852 | /* Find the preferred group and an according client key share available. */ |
| 1853 | for (index = 0; index < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT32; ++index) { |
| 1854 | /* Continue to the next group if this one is not enabled. */ |
| 1855 | if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]) { |
| 1856 | /* There's a gap in the preferred groups list. Assume this is a group |
| 1857 | * that's not supported by the client but preferred by the server. */ |
| 1858 | if (preferredGroup) { |
| 1859 | entry = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1860 | break; |
| 1861 | } |
| 1862 | continue; |
| 1863 | } |
| 1864 | |
| 1865 | /* Check if the client sent a key share for this group. */ |
| 1866 | entry = tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]); |
| 1867 | |
| 1868 | if (preferredGroup) { |
| 1869 | /* We already found our preferred group but the group didn't have a share. */ |
| 1870 | if (entry) { |
| 1871 | /* The client sent a key share with group ss->namedGroupPreferences[index] */ |
| 1872 | if (tls13_isGroupAcceptable(ss->namedGroupPreferences[index], |
| 1873 | preferredGroup)) { |
| 1874 | /* This is not the preferred group, but it's acceptable */ |
| 1875 | preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; |
| 1876 | } else { |
| 1877 | /* The proposed group is not acceptable. */ |
| 1878 | entry = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1879 | } |
| 1880 | } |
| 1881 | break; |
| 1882 | } else { |
| 1883 | /* The first enabled group is the preferred group. */ |
| 1884 | preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; |
| 1885 | if (entry) { |
| 1886 | break; |
| 1887 | } |
| 1888 | } |
| 1889 | } |
| 1890 | |
| 1891 | if (!preferredGroup) { |
| 1892 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, __func__, "tls13con.c", 1892); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP , handshake_failure); } while (0); |
| 1893 | return SECFailure; |
| 1894 | } |
| 1895 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: group = %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: group = %d" , getpid(), ss->fd, preferredGroup->name) |
| 1896 | preferredGroup->name))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: group = %d" , getpid(), ss->fd, preferredGroup->name); |
| 1897 | |
| 1898 | /* Either provide a share, or provide a group that should be requested in a |
| 1899 | * HelloRetryRequest, but not both. */ |
| 1900 | if (entry) { |
| 1901 | PORT_Assert(preferredGroup == entry->group)((preferredGroup == entry->group)?((void)0):PR_Assert("preferredGroup == entry->group" ,"tls13con.c",1901)); |
| 1902 | *clientShare = entry; |
| 1903 | *requestedGroup = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1904 | } else { |
| 1905 | *clientShare = NULL((void*)0); |
| 1906 | *requestedGroup = preferredGroup; |
| 1907 | } |
| 1908 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1909 | } |
| 1910 | |
| 1911 | SECStatus |
| 1912 | tls13_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) |
| 1913 | { |
| 1914 | PRCList *cursor; |
| 1915 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1916 | |
| 1917 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { |
| 1918 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1919); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0) |
| 1919 | missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1919); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 1920 | return SECFailure; |
| 1921 | } |
| 1922 | |
| 1923 | /* This picks the first certificate that has: |
| 1924 | * a) the right authentication method, and |
| 1925 | * b) the right named curve (EC only) |
| 1926 | * |
| 1927 | * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all |
| 1928 | * based on what order they are configured in. */ |
| 1929 | for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts)((&ss->serverCerts)->next); |
| 1930 | cursor != &ss->serverCerts; |
| 1931 | cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)((cursor)->next)) { |
| 1932 | sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; |
| 1933 | |
| 1934 | if (SSL_CERT_IS_ONLY(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt)((cert)->authTypes == (1 << (ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt)))) { |
| 1935 | continue; |
| 1936 | } |
| 1937 | |
| 1938 | rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, |
| 1939 | cert->serverCert, |
| 1940 | cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey, |
| 1941 | cert->serverKeyPair->privKey, |
| 1942 | ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, |
| 1943 | ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, |
| 1944 | PR_FALSE0, |
| 1945 | &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
| 1946 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 1947 | /* Found one. */ |
| 1948 | ss->sec.serverCert = cert; |
| 1949 | |
| 1950 | /* If we can use a delegated credential (DC) for authentication in |
| 1951 | * the current handshake, then commit to using it now. We'll send a |
| 1952 | * DC as an extension and use the DC private key to sign the |
| 1953 | * handshake. |
| 1954 | * |
| 1955 | * This sets the signature scheme to be the signature scheme |
| 1956 | * indicated by the DC. |
| 1957 | */ |
| 1958 | rv = tls13_MaybeSetDelegatedCredential(ss); |
| 1959 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 1960 | return SECFailure; /* Failure indicates an internal error. */ |
| 1961 | } |
| 1962 | |
| 1963 | ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = |
| 1964 | ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
| 1965 | ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; |
| 1966 | return SECSuccess; |
| 1967 | } |
| 1968 | } |
| 1969 | |
| 1970 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1971); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM , handshake_failure); } while (0) |
| 1971 | handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM , __func__, "tls13con.c", 1971); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM , handshake_failure); } while (0); |
| 1972 | return SECFailure; |
| 1973 | } |
| 1974 | |
| 1975 | /* Note: |requestedGroup| is non-NULL when we send a key_share extension. */ |
| 1976 | static SECStatus |
| 1977 | tls13_MaybeSendHelloRetry(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup, |
| 1978 | PRBool *hrrSent) |
| 1979 | { |
| 1980 | SSLHelloRetryRequestAction action = ssl_hello_retry_accept; |
| 1981 | PRUint8 token[256] = { 0 }; |
| 1982 | unsigned int tokenLen = 0; |
| 1983 | SECStatus rv; |
| 1984 | |
| 1985 | if (ss->hrrCallback) { |
| 1986 | action = ss->hrrCallback(!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry, |
| 1987 | ss->xtnData.applicationToken.data, |
| 1988 | ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len, |
| 1989 | token, &tokenLen, sizeof(token), |
| 1990 | ss->hrrCallbackArg); |
| 1991 | } |
| 1992 | |
| 1993 | /* These use SSL3_SendAlert directly to avoid an assertion in |
| 1994 | * tls13_FatalError(), which is ordinarily OK. */ |
| 1995 | if (action == ssl_hello_retry_request && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 1996 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); |
| 1997 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); |
| 1998 | return SECFailure; |
| 1999 | } |
| 2000 | |
| 2001 | if (action != ssl_hello_retry_request && tokenLen) { |
| 2002 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); |
| 2003 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); |
| 2004 | return SECFailure; |
| 2005 | } |
| 2006 | |
| 2007 | if (tokenLen > sizeof(token)) { |
| 2008 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); |
| 2009 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); |
| 2010 | return SECFailure; |
| 2011 | } |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | if (action == ssl_hello_retry_fail) { |
| 2014 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT, handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT, __func__, "tls13con.c", 2014); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT , handshake_failure); } while (0); |
| 2015 | return SECFailure; |
| 2016 | } |
| 2017 | |
| 2018 | if (action == ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt) { |
| 2019 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; |
| 2020 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; |
| 2021 | } |
| 2022 | |
| 2023 | if (!requestedGroup && action != ssl_hello_retry_request) { |
| 2024 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2025 | } |
| 2026 | |
| 2027 | rv = tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(ss, requestedGroup, token, tokenLen); |
| 2028 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2029 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 2030 | } |
| 2031 | |
| 2032 | /* We may have received ECH, but have to start over with CH2. */ |
| 2033 | ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE0; |
| 2034 | PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2035 | ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2036 | |
| 2037 | *hrrSent = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2038 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2039 | } |
| 2040 | |
| 2041 | static SECStatus |
| 2042 | tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(sslSocket *ss) |
| 2043 | { |
| 2044 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 2045 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected resumption PSK authentication",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected resumption PSK authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2046 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected resumption PSK authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2047 | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
| 2048 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 2049 | /* Overwritten by tls13_RestoreCipherInfo. */ |
| 2050 | ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 2051 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2052 | } else if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 2053 | /* If the EPSK doesn't specify a suite, use what was negotiated. |
| 2054 | * Else, only use the EPSK if we negotiated that suite. */ |
| 2055 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL0x0000 || |
| 2056 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite == ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite) { |
| 2057 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected external PSK authentication",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected external PSK authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2058 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected external PSK authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2059 | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
| 2060 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 2061 | ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 2062 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2063 | } |
| 2064 | } |
| 2065 | |
| 2066 | /* If there were PSKs, they are no longer needed. */ |
| 2067 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 2068 | tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); |
| 2069 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2070 | } |
| 2071 | |
| 2072 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected certificate authentication",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected certificate authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2073 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected certificate authentication" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2074 | SECStatus rv = tls13_SelectServerCert(ss); |
| 2075 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2076 | return SECFailure; |
| 2077 | } |
| 2078 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2079 | } |
| 2080 | /* Called from ssl3_HandleClientHello after we have parsed the |
| 2081 | * ClientHello and are sure that we are going to do TLS 1.3 |
| 2082 | * or fail. */ |
| 2083 | SECStatus |
| 2084 | tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, |
| 2085 | const SECItem *suites, |
| 2086 | sslSessionID *sid, |
| 2087 | const PRUint8 *msg, |
| 2088 | unsigned int len) |
| 2089 | { |
| 2090 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2091 | SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); |
| 2092 | const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2093 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *clientShare = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2094 | ssl3CipherSuite previousCipherSuite = 0; |
| 2095 | const sslNamedGroupDef *previousGroup = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2096 | PRBool hrr = PR_FALSE0; |
| 2097 | PRBool previousOfferedEch; |
| 2098 | |
| 2099 | /* If the legacy_version field is set to 0x300 or smaller, |
| 2100 | * reject the connection with protocol_version alert. */ |
| 2101 | if (ss->clientHelloVersion <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_00x0300) { |
| 2102 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, protocol_version)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2102); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO , protocol_version); } while (0); |
| 2103 | goto loser; |
| 2104 | } |
| 2105 | |
| 2106 | ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2107 | |
| 2108 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { |
| 2109 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; |
| 2110 | } |
| 2111 | |
| 2112 | /* Negotiate cipher suite. */ |
| 2113 | rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2114 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2115 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2115); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), handshake_failure ); } while (0); |
| 2116 | goto loser; |
| 2117 | } |
| 2118 | |
| 2119 | /* If we are going around again, then we should make sure that the cipher |
| 2120 | * suite selection doesn't change. That's a sign of client shennanigans. */ |
| 2121 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 2122 | |
| 2123 | /* Update sequence numbers before checking the cookie so that any alerts |
| 2124 | * we generate are sent with the right sequence numbers. */ |
| 2125 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 2126 | /* Count the first ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest. */ |
| 2127 | ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 1; |
| 2128 | ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 1; |
| 2129 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 2130 | /* Increase the write sequence number. The read sequence number |
| 2131 | * will be reset after this to early data or handshake. */ |
| 2132 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum = 1; |
| 2133 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 2134 | } |
| 2135 | |
| 2136 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn) || |
| 2137 | !ss->xtnData.cookie.len) { |
| 2138 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2139); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0) |
| 2139 | missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2139); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 2140 | goto loser; |
| 2141 | } |
| 2142 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Client sent cookie",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Client sent cookie" , ss->xtnData.cookie.data, ss->xtnData.cookie.len) |
| 2143 | ss->xtnData.cookie.data, ss->xtnData.cookie.len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Client sent cookie" , ss->xtnData.cookie.data, ss->xtnData.cookie.len); |
| 2144 | |
| 2145 | rv = tls13_HandleHrrCookie(ss, ss->xtnData.cookie.data, |
| 2146 | ss->xtnData.cookie.len, |
| 2147 | &previousCipherSuite, |
| 2148 | &previousGroup, |
| 2149 | &previousOfferedEch, NULL((void*)0), PR_TRUE1); |
| 2150 | |
| 2151 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2152 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2152); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 2153 | goto loser; |
| 2154 | } |
| 2155 | } |
| 2156 | |
| 2157 | /* Now merge the ClientHello into the hash state. */ |
| 2158 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len); |
| 2159 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2160 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2160); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2161 | goto loser; |
| 2162 | } |
| 2163 | |
| 2164 | /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ |
| 2165 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
| 2166 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; |
| 2167 | |
| 2168 | /* Note: We call this quite a bit earlier than with TLS 1.2 and |
| 2169 | * before. */ |
| 2170 | rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); |
| 2171 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2172 | goto loser; /* An alert has already been sent. */ |
| 2173 | } |
| 2174 | |
| 2175 | /* Check if we could in principle resume. */ |
| 2176 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 2177 | PORT_Assert(sid)((sid)?((void)0):PR_Assert("sid","tls13con.c",2177)); |
| 2178 | if (!sid) { |
| 2179 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2179); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2180 | return SECFailure; |
| 2181 | } |
| 2182 | if (!tls13_CanResume(ss, sid)) { |
| 2183 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE0; |
| 2184 | } |
| 2185 | } |
| 2186 | |
| 2187 | /* Select key exchange. */ |
| 2188 | rv = tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(ss, &requestedGroup, &clientShare); |
| 2189 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2190 | goto loser; |
| 2191 | } |
| 2192 | /* We should get either one of these, but not both. */ |
| 2193 | PORT_Assert((requestedGroup && !clientShare) ||(((requestedGroup && !clientShare) || (!requestedGroup && clientShare))?((void)0):PR_Assert("(requestedGroup && !clientShare) || (!requestedGroup && clientShare)" ,"tls13con.c",2194)) |
| 2194 | (!requestedGroup && clientShare))(((requestedGroup && !clientShare) || (!requestedGroup && clientShare))?((void)0):PR_Assert("(requestedGroup && !clientShare) || (!requestedGroup && clientShare)" ,"tls13con.c",2194)); |
| 2195 | |
| 2196 | /* After HelloRetryRequest, check consistency of cipher and group. */ |
| 2197 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 2198 | PORT_Assert(previousCipherSuite)((previousCipherSuite)?((void)0):PR_Assert("previousCipherSuite" ,"tls13con.c",2198)); |
| 2199 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != previousCipherSuite) { |
| 2200 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2201); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 2201 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2201); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 2202 | goto loser; |
| 2203 | } |
| 2204 | if (!clientShare) { |
| 2205 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2206); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 2206 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2206); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 2207 | goto loser; |
| 2208 | } |
| 2209 | |
| 2210 | /* CH1/CH2 must either both include ECH, or both exclude it. */ |
| 2211 | if (previousOfferedEch != (ss->xtnData.ech != NULL((void*)0))) { |
| 2212 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2213); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , previousOfferedEch ? missing_extension : illegal_parameter) ; } while (0) |
| 2213 | previousOfferedEch ? missing_extension : illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2213); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , previousOfferedEch ? missing_extension : illegal_parameter) ; } while (0); |
| 2214 | goto loser; |
| 2215 | } |
| 2216 | |
| 2217 | /* If we requested a new key share, check that the client provided just |
| 2218 | * one of the right type. */ |
| 2219 | if (previousGroup) { |
| 2220 | if (PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)->prev) != |
| 2221 | PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)->next)) { |
| 2222 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2223); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 2223 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2223); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 2224 | goto loser; |
| 2225 | } |
| 2226 | if (clientShare->group != previousGroup) { |
| 2227 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2228); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 2228 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2228); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 2229 | goto loser; |
| 2230 | } |
| 2231 | } |
| 2232 | } |
| 2233 | |
| 2234 | rv = tls13_MaybeSendHelloRetry(ss, requestedGroup, &hrr); |
| 2235 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2236 | goto loser; |
| 2237 | } |
| 2238 | if (hrr) { |
| 2239 | if (sid) { /* Free the sid. */ |
| 2240 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 2241 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 2242 | } |
| 2243 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry)((ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry" ,"tls13con.c",2243)); |
| 2244 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2245 | } |
| 2246 | |
| 2247 | /* Select the authentication (this is also handshake shape). */ |
| 2248 | rv = tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(ss); |
| 2249 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2250 | goto loser; |
| 2251 | } |
| 2252 | |
| 2253 | if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 2254 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 2255 | /* We are now committed to trying to resume. */ |
| 2256 | PORT_Assert(sid)((sid)?((void)0):PR_Assert("sid","tls13con.c",2256)); |
| 2257 | /* Check that the negotiated SNI and the cached SNI match. */ |
| 2258 | if (SECITEM_CompareItemSECITEM_CompareItem_Util(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, |
| 2259 | &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName) != SECEqual) { |
| 2260 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2261); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO , handshake_failure); } while (0) |
| 2261 | handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 2261); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO , handshake_failure); } while (0); |
| 2262 | goto loser; |
| 2263 | } |
| 2264 | |
| 2265 | ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, |
| 2266 | sid->namedCurve); |
| 2267 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert)((ss->sec.serverCert)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.serverCert" ,"tls13con.c",2267)); |
| 2268 | |
| 2269 | rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, sid); |
| 2270 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2271 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
| 2272 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2272); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2273 | goto loser; |
| 2274 | } |
| 2275 | tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); |
| 2276 | |
| 2277 | ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); |
| 2278 | if (sid->peerCert != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2279 | ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); |
| 2280 | } |
| 2281 | } else if (sid) { |
| 2282 | /* We should never have a SID in the non-resumption case. */ |
| 2283 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",2283)); |
| 2284 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 2285 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 2286 | sid = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2287 | } |
| 2288 | ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender( |
| 2289 | ss, &ss->xtnData, |
| 2290 | ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn); |
| 2291 | tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid); |
| 2292 | |
| 2293 | rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(ss); |
| 2294 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2295 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2295); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2296 | return SECFailure; |
| 2297 | } |
| 2298 | } else { |
| 2299 | if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ |
| 2300 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
| 2301 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 2302 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 2303 | sid = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2304 | } |
| 2305 | tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 2306 | } |
| 2307 | |
| 2308 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 2309 | PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)((ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->xtnData.selectedPsk" ,"tls13con.c",2309)); |
| 2310 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk) ?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk" ,"tls13con.c",2310)); |
| 2311 | } |
| 2312 | |
| 2313 | /* Now that we have the binder key, check the binder. */ |
| 2314 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 2315 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 2316 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen)((ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen )?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen" ,"tls13con.c",2316)); |
| 2317 | rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash( |
| 2318 | ss, |
| 2319 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
| 2320 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len - ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen, |
| 2321 | &hashes, tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 2322 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2323 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2323); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2324 | goto loser; |
| 2325 | } |
| 2326 | |
| 2327 | PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash == tls13_GetHash(ss))((ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash == tls13_GetHash(ss))?( (void)0):PR_Assert("ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash == tls13_GetHash(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2327)); |
| 2328 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def)((ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def" ,"tls13con.c",2328)); |
| 2329 | rv = tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, |
| 2330 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->binderKey, |
| 2331 | ss->xtnData.pskBinder.data, |
| 2332 | ss->xtnData.pskBinder.len, |
| 2333 | &hashes); |
| 2334 | } |
| 2335 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2336 | goto loser; |
| 2337 | } |
| 2338 | |
| 2339 | /* This needs to go after we verify the psk binder. */ |
| 2340 | rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); |
| 2341 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2342 | goto loser; |
| 2343 | } |
| 2344 | |
| 2345 | /* If this is TLS 1.3 we are expecting a ClientKeyShare |
| 2346 | * extension. Missing/absent extension cause failure |
| 2347 | * below. */ |
| 2348 | rv = tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(ss, clientShare); |
| 2349 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2350 | goto loser; /* An alert was sent already. */ |
| 2351 | } |
| 2352 | |
| 2353 | /* From this point we are either committed to resumption, or not. */ |
| 2354 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 2355 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_hits); |
| 2356 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_stateless_resumes); |
| 2357 | } else { |
| 2358 | if (sid) { |
| 2359 | /* We had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it. */ |
| 2360 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
| 2361 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 2362 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 2363 | } else if (!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 2364 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_misses); |
| 2365 | } |
| 2366 | |
| 2367 | sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2368 | if (!sid) { |
| 2369 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2369); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), internal_error) ; } while (0); |
| 2370 | return SECFailure; |
| 2371 | } |
| 2372 | } |
| 2373 | /* Take ownership of the session. */ |
| 2374 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
| 2375 | sid = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2376 | |
| 2377 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 2378 | rv = tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(ss); |
| 2379 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2380 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2380); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2381 | return SECFailure; |
| 2382 | } |
| 2383 | } |
| 2384 | |
| 2385 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2386 | rv = tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); |
| 2387 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2388 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2389 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2389); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), handshake_failure ); } while (0); |
| 2390 | return SECFailure; |
| 2391 | } |
| 2392 | |
| 2393 | /* We're done with PSKs */ |
| 2394 | tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); |
| 2395 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2396 | |
| 2397 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2398 | |
| 2399 | loser: |
| 2400 | if (sid) { |
| 2401 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 2402 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 2403 | } |
| 2404 | return SECFailure; |
| 2405 | } |
| 2406 | |
| 2407 | SECStatus |
| 2408 | SSLExp_HelloRetryRequestCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, |
| 2409 | SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback cb, void *arg) |
| 2410 | { |
| 2411 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 2412 | if (!ss) { |
| 2413 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 2414 | } |
| 2415 | |
| 2416 | ss->hrrCallback = cb; |
| 2417 | ss->hrrCallbackArg = arg; |
| 2418 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2419 | } |
| 2420 | |
| 2421 | /* |
| 2422 | * struct { |
| 2423 | * ProtocolVersion server_version; |
| 2424 | * CipherSuite cipher_suite; |
| 2425 | * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; |
| 2426 | * } HelloRetryRequest; |
| 2427 | * |
| 2428 | * Note: this function takes an empty buffer and returns |
| 2429 | * a non-empty one on success, in which case the caller must |
| 2430 | * eventually clean up. |
| 2431 | */ |
| 2432 | SECStatus |
| 2433 | tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, |
| 2434 | ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, |
| 2435 | const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, |
| 2436 | PRUint8 *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen, |
| 2437 | const PRUint8 *cookieGreaseEchSignal, |
| 2438 | sslBuffer *buffer) |
| 2439 | { |
| 2440 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2441 | sslBuffer extensionsBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 2442 | PORT_Assert(buffer->len == 0)((buffer->len == 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("buffer->len == 0" ,"tls13con.c",2442)); |
| 2443 | |
| 2444 | /* Note: cookie is pointing to a stack variable, so is only valid |
| 2445 | * now. */ |
| 2446 | ss->xtnData.selectedGroup = selectedGroup; |
| 2447 | ss->xtnData.cookie.data = cookie; |
| 2448 | ss->xtnData.cookie.len = cookieLen; |
| 2449 | |
| 2450 | /* Set restored ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf value for ECH HRR extension |
| 2451 | * reconstruction. */ |
| 2452 | if (cookieGreaseEchSignal) { |
| 2453 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.len)((!ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.len)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.len" ,"tls13con.c",2453)); |
| 2454 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf, |
| 2455 | cookieGreaseEchSignal, |
| 2456 | TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN8); |
| 2457 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2458 | goto loser; |
| 2459 | } |
| 2460 | } |
| 2461 | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionsBuf, |
| 2462 | ssl_hs_hello_retry_request); |
| 2463 | /* Reset ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf if it was changed. */ |
| 2464 | if (cookieGreaseEchSignal) { |
| 2465 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); |
| 2466 | } |
| 2467 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2468 | goto loser; |
| 2469 | } |
| 2470 | /* These extensions can't be empty. */ |
| 2471 | PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionsBuf) > 0)((((&extensionsBuf)->len) > 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert( "SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionsBuf) > 0","tls13con.c",2471 )); |
| 2472 | |
| 2473 | /* Clean up cookie so we're not pointing at random memory. */ |
| 2474 | ss->xtnData.cookie.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2475 | ss->xtnData.cookie.len = 0; |
| 2476 | |
| 2477 | rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_TRUE1, &extensionsBuf, buffer); |
| 2478 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2479 | goto loser; |
| 2480 | } |
| 2481 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionsBuf); |
| 2482 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2483 | |
| 2484 | loser: |
| 2485 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionsBuf); |
| 2486 | sslBuffer_Clear(buffer); |
| 2487 | return SECFailure; |
| 2488 | } |
| 2489 | |
| 2490 | static SECStatus |
| 2491 | tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, |
| 2492 | const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup, |
| 2493 | const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen) |
| 2494 | { |
| 2495 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2496 | unsigned int cookieLen; |
| 2497 | PRUint8 cookie[1024]; |
| 2498 | sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 2499 | |
| 2500 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send hello retry request handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send hello retry request handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2501 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send hello retry request handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2502 | |
| 2503 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2503)); |
| 2504 | |
| 2505 | /* If an ECH backend or shared-mode server accepted ECH when offered, |
| 2506 | * the HRR extension's payload must be set to 8 zero bytes, these are |
| 2507 | * overwritten with the accept_confirmation value after the handshake |
| 2508 | * transcript calculation. |
| 2509 | * If a client-facing or shared-mode server did not accept ECH when offered |
| 2510 | * OR if ECH GREASE is enabled on the server and a ECH extension was |
| 2511 | * received, a 8 byte random value is set as the extension's payload |
| 2512 | * [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7]. |
| 2513 | * |
| 2514 | * The (temporary) payload is written to the extension in tls13exthandle.c/ |
| 2515 | * tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(). */ |
| 2516 | if (ss->xtnData.ech) { |
| 2517 | PRUint8 echGreaseRaw[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN8] = { 0 }; |
| 2518 | if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || |
| 2519 | (ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && |
| 2520 | ss->xtnData.ech && |
| 2521 | ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn))) { |
| 2522 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(echGreaseRaw, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN8); |
| 2523 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2524 | return SECFailure; |
| 2525 | } |
| 2526 | SSL_TRC(100, ("Generated random value for ECH HRR GREASE."))if (ssl_trace >= (100)) ssl_Trace ("Generated random value for ECH HRR GREASE." ); |
| 2527 | } |
| 2528 | sslBuffer echGreaseBuffer = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 2529 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&echGreaseBuffer, echGreaseRaw, sizeof(echGreaseRaw)); |
| 2530 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2531 | return SECFailure; |
| 2532 | } |
| 2533 | /* HRR GREASE/accept_confirmation zero bytes placeholder buffer. */ |
| 2534 | ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf = echGreaseBuffer; |
| 2535 | } |
| 2536 | |
| 2537 | /* Compute the cookie we are going to need. */ |
| 2538 | rv = tls13_MakeHrrCookie(ss, requestedGroup, |
| 2539 | appToken, appTokenLen, |
| 2540 | cookie, &cookieLen, sizeof(cookie)); |
| 2541 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2542 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2542); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2543 | return SECFailure; |
| 2544 | } |
| 2545 | |
| 2546 | /* Now build the body of the message. */ |
| 2547 | rv = tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, |
| 2548 | requestedGroup, |
| 2549 | cookie, cookieLen, |
| 2550 | NULL((void*)0), &messageBuf); |
| 2551 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2552 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2552); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 2553 | return SECFailure; |
| 2554 | } |
| 2555 | |
| 2556 | /* And send it. */ |
| 2557 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2558 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, |
| 2559 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)((&messageBuf)->len)); |
| 2560 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2561 | goto loser; |
| 2562 | } |
| 2563 | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &messageBuf); |
| 2564 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2565 | goto loser; |
| 2566 | } |
| 2567 | sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); /* Done with messageBuf */ |
| 2568 | |
| 2569 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len) { |
| 2570 | PRInt32 sent; |
| 2571 | |
| 2572 | PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss))((!(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram))?((void)0 ):PR_Assert("!IS_DTLS(ss)","tls13con.c",2572)); |
| 2573 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
| 2574 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2575 | goto loser; |
| 2576 | } |
| 2577 | /* ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt() only flushes to the output buffer, so we |
| 2578 | * have to force a send. */ |
| 2579 | sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); |
| 2580 | if (sent < 0 && PORT_GetErrorPORT_GetError_Util() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR(-5998L)) { |
| 2581 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); |
| 2582 | goto loser; |
| 2583 | } |
| 2584 | } else { |
| 2585 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 2586 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2587 | goto loser; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
| 2588 | } |
| 2589 | } |
| 2590 | |
| 2591 | /* We depend on this being exactly one record and one message. */ |
| 2592 | PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 &&((!(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) || (ss-> ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 && ss->ssl3.cwSpec-> nextSeqNum == 1))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 && ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum == 1)" ,"tls13con.c",2593)) |
| 2593 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum == 1))((!(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) || (ss-> ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 && ss->ssl3.cwSpec-> nextSeqNum == 1))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 && ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum == 1)" ,"tls13con.c",2593)); |
| 2594 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2595 | |
| 2596 | ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2597 | |
| 2598 | /* We received early data but have to ignore it because we sent a retry. */ |
| 2599 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { |
| 2600 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; |
| 2601 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr; |
| 2602 | } |
| 2603 | |
| 2604 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2605 | |
| 2606 | loser: |
| 2607 | sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); |
| 2608 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2609 | return SECFailure; |
| 2610 | } |
| 2611 | |
| 2612 | /* Called from tls13_HandleClientHello. |
| 2613 | * |
| 2614 | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
| 2615 | */ |
| 2616 | |
| 2617 | static SECStatus |
| 2618 | tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare) |
| 2619 | { |
| 2620 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2621 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; /* ours */ |
| 2622 | SECItem *ciphertext = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2623 | PK11SymKey *dheSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2624 | PK11SymKey *kemSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2625 | |
| 2626 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2627 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2628 | |
| 2629 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2629)); |
| 2630 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2630)); |
| 2631 | PORT_Assert(peerShare)((peerShare)?((void)0):PR_Assert("peerShare","tls13con.c",2631 )); |
| 2632 | |
| 2633 | tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, peerShare->group); |
| 2634 | |
| 2635 | /* Generate our key */ |
| 2636 | rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(ss, peerShare->group); |
| 2637 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2638 | return rv; |
| 2639 | } |
| 2640 | |
| 2641 | /* We should have exactly one key share. */ |
| 2642 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs))((!((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->next == (&ss-> ephemeralKeyPairs)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)" ,"tls13con.c",2642)); |
| 2643 | PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==((((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->prev) == ((&ss-> ephemeralKeyPairs)->next))?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)" ,"tls13con.c",2644)) |
| 2644 | PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs))((((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->prev) == ((&ss-> ephemeralKeyPairs)->next))?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)" ,"tls13con.c",2644)); |
| 2645 | |
| 2646 | keyPair = ((sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)((&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)->next)); |
| 2647 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); |
| 2648 | |
| 2649 | /* Register the sender */ |
| 2650 | rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, |
| 2651 | tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn); |
| 2652 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2653 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ |
| 2654 | } |
| 2655 | |
| 2656 | rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, peerShare, keyPair->keys, |
| 2657 | tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 2658 | &dheSecret); |
| 2659 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2660 | goto loser; /* Error code already set. */ |
| 2661 | } |
| 2662 | |
| 2663 | if (peerShare->group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid) { |
| 2664 | rv = tls13_HandleKEMKey(ss, peerShare, &kemSecret, &ciphertext); |
| 2665 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2666 | goto loser; /* Error set by tls13_HandleKEMKey */ |
| 2667 | } |
| 2668 | // We may need to handle different "combiners" here in the future. For |
| 2669 | // now this is specific to xyber768d00. |
| 2670 | PORT_Assert(peerShare->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00)((peerShare->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00)?(( void)0):PR_Assert("peerShare->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00" ,"tls13con.c",2670)); |
| 2671 | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = PK11_ConcatSymKeys(dheSecret, kemSecret, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL); |
| 2672 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) { |
| 2673 | goto loser; /* Error set by PK11_ConcatSymKeys */ |
| 2674 | } |
| 2675 | keyPair->kemCt = ciphertext; |
| 2676 | PK11_FreeSymKey(dheSecret); |
| 2677 | PK11_FreeSymKey(kemSecret); |
| 2678 | } else { |
| 2679 | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = dheSecret; |
| 2680 | } |
| 2681 | |
| 2682 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2683 | |
| 2684 | loser: |
| 2685 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(ciphertext, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2686 | PK11_FreeSymKey(dheSecret); |
| 2687 | PK11_FreeSymKey(kemSecret); |
| 2688 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2688); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), illegal_parameter ); } while (0); |
| 2689 | return SECFailure; |
| 2690 | } |
| 2691 | |
| 2692 | /* |
| 2693 | * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.3.2 |
| 2694 | * |
| 2695 | * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; |
| 2696 | * |
| 2697 | * struct { |
| 2698 | * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; |
| 2699 | * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; |
| 2700 | * } CertificateExtension; |
| 2701 | * |
| 2702 | * struct { |
| 2703 | * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; |
| 2704 | * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm |
| 2705 | * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; |
| 2706 | * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; |
| 2707 | * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>; |
| 2708 | * } CertificateRequest; |
| 2709 | */ |
| 2710 | static SECStatus |
| 2711 | tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) |
| 2712 | { |
| 2713 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2714 | sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 2715 | unsigned int offset = 0; |
| 2716 | |
| 2717 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2718 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2719 | |
| 2720 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 2721 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL","tls13con.c",2721) ); |
| 2722 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); |
| 2723 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 2724 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 2725 | return SECFailure; |
| 2726 | } |
| 2727 | } |
| 2728 | |
| 2729 | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_certificate_request); |
| 2730 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2731 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 2732 | } |
| 2733 | /* We should always have at least one of these. */ |
| 2734 | PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf) > 0)((((&extensionBuf)->len) > 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf) > 0" ,"tls13con.c",2734)); |
| 2735 | |
| 2736 | /* Create a new request context for post-handshake authentication */ |
| 2737 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 2738 | PRUint8 context[16]; |
| 2739 | SECItem contextItem = { siBuffer, context, sizeof(context) }; |
| 2740 | |
| 2741 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(context, sizeof(context)); |
| 2742 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2743 | goto loser; |
| 2744 | } |
| 2745 | |
| 2746 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE0); |
| 2747 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &ss->xtnData.certReqContext, &contextItem); |
| 2748 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2749 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 2749); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 2750 | goto loser; |
| 2751 | } |
| 2752 | |
| 2753 | offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len); |
| 2754 | } |
| 2755 | |
| 2756 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, |
| 2757 | 1 + /* request context length */ |
| 2758 | ss->xtnData.certReqContext.len + |
| 2759 | 2 + /* extension length */ |
| 2760 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf)((&extensionBuf)->len)); |
| 2761 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2762 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 2763 | } |
| 2764 | |
| 2765 | /* Context. */ |
| 2766 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data, |
| 2767 | ss->xtnData.certReqContext.len, 1); |
| 2768 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2769 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 2770 | } |
| 2771 | /* Extensions. */ |
| 2772 | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionBuf, 2); |
| 2773 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2774 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 2775 | } |
| 2776 | |
| 2777 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 2778 | rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, |
| 2779 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->buf) + offset, |
| 2780 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len) - offset); |
| 2781 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2782 | goto loser; |
| 2783 | } |
| 2784 | } |
| 2785 | |
| 2786 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
| 2787 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2788 | |
| 2789 | loser: |
| 2790 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
| 2791 | return SECFailure; |
| 2792 | } |
| 2793 | |
| 2794 | /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; S 4.4.1] says: |
| 2795 | * |
| 2796 | * Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... MN) = |
| 2797 | * Hash(message_hash || // Handshake type |
| 2798 | * 00 00 Hash.length || // Handshake message length |
| 2799 | * Hash(ClientHello1) || // Hash of ClientHello1 |
| 2800 | * HelloRetryRequest ... MN) |
| 2801 | * |
| 2802 | * For an ECH handshake, the process occurs for the outer |
| 2803 | * transcript in |ss->ssl3.hs.messages| and the inner |
| 2804 | * transcript in |ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages|. |
| 2805 | */ |
| 2806 | static SECStatus |
| 2807 | tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(sslSocket *ss) |
| 2808 | { |
| 2809 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 2810 | SSL3Hashes echInnerHashes; |
| 2811 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2812 | |
| 2813 | /* First compute the hash. */ |
| 2814 | rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, |
| 2815 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
| 2816 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, |
| 2817 | tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 2818 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2819 | return SECFailure; |
| 2820 | } |
| 2821 | |
| 2822 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { |
| 2823 | rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &echInnerHashes, |
| 2824 | ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf, |
| 2825 | ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len, |
| 2826 | tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 2827 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2828 | return SECFailure; |
| 2829 | } |
| 2830 | } |
| 2831 | |
| 2832 | ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); |
| 2833 | |
| 2834 | /* Reinject the message. The Default context variant updates |
| 2835 | * the default hash state. Use it for both non-ECH and ECH Outer. */ |
| 2836 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, |
| 2837 | hashes.u.raw, hashes.len); |
| 2838 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2839 | return SECFailure; |
| 2840 | } |
| 2841 | |
| 2842 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { |
| 2843 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, |
| 2844 | echInnerHashes.u.raw, |
| 2845 | echInnerHashes.len); |
| 2846 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2847 | return SECFailure; |
| 2848 | } |
| 2849 | } |
| 2850 | |
| 2851 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2852 | } |
| 2853 | static unsigned int |
| 2854 | ssl_ListCount(PRCList *list) |
| 2855 | { |
| 2856 | unsigned int c = 0; |
| 2857 | PRCList *cur; |
| 2858 | for (cur = PR_NEXT_LINK(list)((list)->next); cur != list; cur = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur)((cur)->next)) { |
| 2859 | ++c; |
| 2860 | } |
| 2861 | return c; |
| 2862 | } |
| 2863 | |
| 2864 | /* |
| 2865 | * savedMsg contains the HelloRetryRequest message. When its extensions are parsed |
| 2866 | * in ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions, the handler for ECH HRR extensions (tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn) |
| 2867 | * will take a reference into the message buffer. |
| 2868 | * |
| 2869 | * This reference is then used in tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal in order to compute |
| 2870 | * the transcript for the ECH signal calculation. This was felt to be preferable |
| 2871 | * to re-parsing the HelloRetryRequest message in order to create the transcript. |
| 2872 | * |
| 2873 | * Consequently, savedMsg should not be moved or mutated between these |
| 2874 | * function calls. |
| 2875 | */ |
| 2876 | SECStatus |
| 2877 | tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, |
| 2878 | PRUint32 savedLength) |
| 2879 | { |
| 2880 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2881 | |
| 2882 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle hello retry request",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle hello retry request" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 2883 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle hello retry request" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 2884 | |
| 2885 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2885)); |
| 2886 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",2886)); |
| 2887 | |
| 2888 | if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 2889 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , __func__, "tls13con.c", 2890); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , unexpected_message); } while (0) |
| 2890 | unexpected_message)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , __func__, "tls13con.c", 2890); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , unexpected_message); } while (0); |
| 2891 | return SECFailure; |
| 2892 | } |
| 2893 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello","tls13con.c",2893)); |
| 2894 | |
| 2895 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { |
| 2896 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; |
| 2897 | /* Restore the null cipher spec for writing. */ |
| 2898 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 2899 | ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
| 2900 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_write, |
| 2901 | TrafficKeyClearText); |
| 2902 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec)((ss->ssl3.cwSpec)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.cwSpec" ,"tls13con.c",2902)); |
| 2903 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 2904 | } else { |
| 2905 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none","tls13con.c", 2905)); |
| 2906 | } |
| 2907 | /* Set the spec version, because we want to send CH now with 0303 */ |
| 2908 | tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
| 2909 | |
| 2910 | /* Extensions must contain more than just supported_versions. This will |
| 2911 | * ensure that a HelloRetryRequest isn't a no-op: we must have at least two |
| 2912 | * extensions, supported_versions plus one other. That other must be one |
| 2913 | * that we understand and recognize as being valid for HelloRetryRequest, |
| 2914 | * and should alter our next Client Hello. */ |
| 2915 | unsigned int requiredExtensions = 1; |
| 2916 | /* The ECH HRR extension is a no-op from the client's perspective. */ |
| 2917 | if (ss->xtnData.ech) { |
| 2918 | requiredExtensions++; |
| 2919 | } |
| 2920 | if (ssl_ListCount(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions) <= requiredExtensions) { |
| 2921 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , __func__, "tls13con.c", 2922); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 2922 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , __func__, "tls13con.c", 2922); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 2923 | return SECFailure; |
| 2924 | } |
| 2925 | |
| 2926 | rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_hello_retry_request); |
| 2927 | ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); |
| 2928 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2929 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ |
| 2930 | } |
| 2931 | rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(ss, savedMsg, savedLength, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2932 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2933 | return SECFailure; |
| 2934 | } |
| 2935 | ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE1; |
| 2936 | rv = tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(ss); |
| 2937 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2938 | return rv; |
| 2939 | } |
| 2940 | |
| 2941 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, |
| 2942 | savedMsg, savedLength); |
| 2943 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2944 | return SECFailure; |
| 2945 | } |
| 2946 | |
| 2947 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2948 | if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && |
| 2949 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) { |
| 2950 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
| 2951 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2952 | goto loser; |
| 2953 | } |
| 2954 | } |
| 2955 | |
| 2956 | rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_retry); |
| 2957 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2958 | goto loser; |
| 2959 | } |
| 2960 | |
| 2961 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2962 | return SECSuccess; |
| 2963 | |
| 2964 | loser: |
| 2965 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2966 | return SECFailure; |
| 2967 | } |
| 2968 | |
| 2969 | static SECStatus |
| 2970 | tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
| 2971 | { |
| 2972 | SECStatus rv; |
| 2973 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { |
| 2974 | PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget")PR_Assert("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget","tls13con.c" ,2974); |
| 2975 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 2976 | return SECFailure; |
| 2977 | } |
| 2978 | |
| 2979 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) { |
| 2980 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondFlight because"if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondFlight because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd) |
| 2981 | " certificate authentication is still pending.",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondFlight because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd) |
| 2982 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondFlight because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd); |
| 2983 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate; |
| 2984 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR(-5998L)); |
| 2985 | return SECFailure; |
| 2986 | } |
| 2987 | |
| 2988 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2989 | rv = tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(ss); |
| 2990 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 2991 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake" ,"tls13con.c",2991)); |
| 2992 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL","tls13con.c",2992) ); |
| 2993 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE1); |
| 2994 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL((void*)0); |
| 2995 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 2996 | return SECFailure; |
| 2997 | } |
| 2998 | return rv; |
| 2999 | } |
| 3000 | |
| 3001 | static SECStatus |
| 3002 | tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 3003 | { |
| 3004 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3005 | SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3006 | SECItem extensionsData = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3007 | |
| 3008 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 3009 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 3010 | |
| 3011 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3011)); |
| 3012 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3012)); |
| 3013 | |
| 3014 | /* Client */ |
| 3015 | if (ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth) { |
| 3016 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3017, wait_cert_request, idle_handshake , wait_invalid) |
| 3017 | wait_cert_request, idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3017, wait_cert_request, idle_handshake , wait_invalid); |
| 3018 | } else { |
| 3019 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3020, wait_cert_request, wait_invalid ) |
| 3020 | wait_cert_request)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3020, wait_cert_request, wait_invalid ); |
| 3021 | } |
| 3022 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3023 | return SECFailure; |
| 3024 | } |
| 3025 | |
| 3026 | /* MUST NOT combine external PSKs with certificate authentication. */ |
| 3027 | if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 3028 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, unexpected_message)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3028); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST , unexpected_message); } while (0); |
| 3029 | return SECFailure; |
| 3030 | } |
| 3031 | |
| 3032 | if (tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 3033 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL","tls13con.c",3033) ); |
| 3034 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); |
| 3035 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3036 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 3037 | return SECFailure; |
| 3038 | } |
| 3039 | rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, b, length); |
| 3040 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3041 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3041); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 3042 | return SECFailure; |
| 3043 | } |
| 3044 | |
| 3045 | /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ |
| 3046 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3047 | CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); |
| 3048 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3049 | } |
| 3050 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3051 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
| 3052 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3053 | } |
| 3054 | if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3055 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
| 3056 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3057 | } |
| 3058 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3059 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); |
| 3060 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3061 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; |
| 3062 | } |
| 3063 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3064 | ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3065 | } else { |
| 3066 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL)((ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL","tls13con.c",3066)); |
| 3067 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL)((ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL","tls13con.c",3067)); |
| 3068 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL)((ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL","tls13con.c",3068)); |
| 3069 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == ((void*)0))?(( void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL" ,"tls13con.c",3069)); |
| 3070 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0)((ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0)?((void)0 ):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0" ,"tls13con.c",3070)); |
| 3071 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested)((!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested" ,"tls13con.c",3071)); |
| 3072 | PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data == NULL)((ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data == ((void*)0))?((void)0) :PR_Assert("ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data == NULL","tls13con.c" ,3072)); |
| 3073 | } |
| 3074 | |
| 3075 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); |
| 3076 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3077 | return SECFailure; |
| 3078 | } |
| 3079 | |
| 3080 | /* Unless it is a post-handshake client auth, the certificate |
| 3081 | * request context must be empty. */ |
| 3082 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) && context.len > 0) { |
| 3083 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3083); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 3084 | return SECFailure; |
| 3085 | } |
| 3086 | |
| 3087 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionsData, 2, &b, &length); |
| 3088 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3089 | return SECFailure; |
| 3090 | } |
| 3091 | |
| 3092 | if (length) { |
| 3093 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3093); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 3094 | return SECFailure; |
| 3095 | } |
| 3096 | |
| 3097 | /* Process all the extensions. */ |
| 3098 | rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensionsData.data, &extensionsData.len, |
| 3099 | ssl_hs_certificate_request); |
| 3100 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3101 | return SECFailure; |
| 3102 | } |
| 3103 | |
| 3104 | if (!ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes) { |
| 3105 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3106); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0) |
| 3106 | missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3106); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 3107 | return SECFailure; |
| 3108 | } |
| 3109 | |
| 3110 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &ss->xtnData.certReqContext, &context); |
| 3111 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3112 | return SECFailure; |
| 3113 | } |
| 3114 | |
| 3115 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested = PR_TRUE1; |
| 3116 | |
| 3117 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 3118 | |
| 3119 | /* Request a client certificate. */ |
| 3120 | rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest( |
| 3121 | ss, ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, |
| 3122 | &ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities); |
| 3123 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3124 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3124); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 3125 | return rv; |
| 3126 | } |
| 3127 | rv = tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate(ss); |
Value stored to 'rv' is never read | |
| 3128 | } else { |
| 3129 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_cert)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_server_cert, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3129); |
| 3130 | } |
| 3131 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3132 | } |
| 3133 | |
| 3134 | PRBool |
| 3135 | tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3136 | { |
| 3137 | /* Even if we are configured to request a certificate, we can't |
| 3138 | * if this handshake used a PSK, even when we are resuming. */ |
| 3139 | return ss->opt.requestCertificate && |
| 3140 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_psk; |
| 3141 | } |
| 3142 | |
| 3143 | static SECStatus |
| 3144 | tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3145 | { |
| 3146 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3147 | |
| 3148 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); |
| 3149 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3150 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3151 | } |
| 3152 | |
| 3153 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 3154 | ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3155 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3156 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3156); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 3157 | return SECFailure; |
| 3158 | } |
| 3159 | |
| 3160 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 3161 | rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, |
| 3162 | ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, |
| 3163 | ssl_SendEmptyExtension); |
| 3164 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3165 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ |
| 3166 | } |
| 3167 | } |
| 3168 | |
| 3169 | rv = tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss); |
| 3170 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3171 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3172 | } |
| 3173 | |
| 3174 | if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { |
| 3175 | rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss); |
| 3176 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3177 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3178 | } |
| 3179 | } |
| 3180 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none) { |
| 3181 | SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; |
| 3182 | |
| 3183 | rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); |
| 3184 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3185 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3186 | } |
| 3187 | |
| 3188 | if (tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { |
| 3189 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Signing with delegated credential",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Signing with delegated credential" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 3190 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Signing with delegated credential" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 3191 | svrPrivKey = ss->sec.serverCert->delegCredKeyPair->privKey; |
| 3192 | } else { |
| 3193 | svrPrivKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; |
| 3194 | } |
| 3195 | |
| 3196 | rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, svrPrivKey); |
| 3197 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3198 | return SECFailure; /* err code is set. */ |
| 3199 | } |
| 3200 | } |
| 3201 | |
| 3202 | rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); |
| 3203 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3204 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3205 | } |
| 3206 | |
| 3207 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3208 | } |
| 3209 | |
| 3210 | /* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello */ |
| 3211 | static SECStatus |
| 3212 | tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3213 | { |
| 3214 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3215 | PRErrorCode err = 0; |
| 3216 | |
| 3217 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 3218 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 3219 | |
| 3220 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3220)); |
| 3221 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3221)); |
| 3222 | |
| 3223 | rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, |
| 3224 | ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, |
| 3225 | tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn); |
| 3226 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3227 | return SECFailure; |
| 3228 | } |
| 3229 | |
| 3230 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(ss); |
| 3231 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3232 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3233 | } |
| 3234 | |
| 3235 | rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); |
| 3236 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3237 | return rv; /* err code is set. */ |
| 3238 | } |
| 3239 | |
| 3240 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len) { |
| 3241 | PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss))((!(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram))?((void)0 ):PR_Assert("!IS_DTLS(ss)","tls13con.c",3241)); |
| 3242 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3243 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 3244 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
| 3245 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3246 | return rv; |
| 3247 | } |
| 3248 | } |
| 3249 | } |
| 3250 | |
| 3251 | rv = tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(ss); |
| 3252 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3253 | err = PORT_GetErrorPORT_GetError_Util(); |
| 3254 | } |
| 3255 | /* Even if we get an error, since the ServerHello was successfully |
| 3256 | * serialized, we should give it a chance to reach the network. This gives |
| 3257 | * the client a chance to perform the key exchange and decrypt the alert |
| 3258 | * we're about to send. */ |
| 3259 | rv |= ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 3260 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3261 | if (err) { |
| 3262 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(err); |
| 3263 | } |
| 3264 | return SECFailure; |
| 3265 | } |
| 3266 | |
| 3267 | /* Compute the rest of the secrets except for the resumption |
| 3268 | * and exporter secret. */ |
| 3269 | rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); |
| 3270 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3271 | LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError())do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3271); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); |
| 3272 | return SECFailure; |
| 3273 | } |
| 3274 | |
| 3275 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 3276 | ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3277 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3278 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3278); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 3279 | return SECFailure; |
| 3280 | } |
| 3281 | |
| 3282 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 3283 | /* We need this for reading ACKs. */ |
| 3284 | ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.crSpec); |
| 3285 | } |
| 3286 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 3287 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, |
| 3288 | ssl_secret_read, PR_TRUE1); |
| 3289 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3290 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3290); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 3291 | return SECFailure; |
| 3292 | } |
| 3293 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_end_of_early_data)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_end_of_early_data, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3293); |
| 3294 | } else { |
| 3295 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none ||((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || ss->ssl3 .hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored" ,"tls13con.c",3296)) |
| 3296 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || ss->ssl3 .hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored" ,"tls13con.c",3296)); |
| 3297 | |
| 3298 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, |
| 3299 | TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 3300 | ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3301 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3302 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3302); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 3303 | return SECFailure; |
| 3304 | } |
| 3305 | if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { |
| 3306 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_client_cert)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_client_cert, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3306); |
| 3307 | } else { |
| 3308 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_finished, __func__, "tls13con.c", 3308 ); |
| 3309 | } |
| 3310 | } |
| 3311 | |
| 3312 | /* Here we set a baseline value for our RTT estimation. |
| 3313 | * This value is updated when we get a response from the client. */ |
| 3314 | ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss); |
| 3315 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3316 | } |
| 3317 | |
| 3318 | SECStatus |
| 3319 | tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength) |
| 3320 | { |
| 3321 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3322 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
| 3323 | SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); |
| 3324 | |
| 3325 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { |
| 3326 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3. hs.psks)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)" ,"tls13con.c",3326)); |
| 3327 | PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)((ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->xtnData.selectedPsk" ,"tls13con.c",3327)); |
| 3328 | |
| 3329 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type != ssl_psk_resume) { |
| 3330 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE0; |
| 3331 | } |
| 3332 | } else { |
| 3333 | /* We may have offered a PSK. If the server didn't negotiate |
| 3334 | * it, clear this state to re-extract the Early Secret. */ |
| 3335 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { |
| 3336 | /* We might have dropped incompatible PSKs on HRR |
| 3337 | * (see RFC8466, Section 4.1.4). */ |
| 3338 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry ||((ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)" ,"tls13con.c",3339)) |
| 3339 | ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn))((ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)" ,"tls13con.c",3339)); |
| 3340 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
| 3341 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3342 | } |
| 3343 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE0; |
| 3344 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3345 | } |
| 3346 | |
| 3347 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 3348 | PORT_Assert(sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((sid->version >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",3348)); |
| 3349 | if (tls13_GetHash(ss) != |
| 3350 | tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) { |
| 3351 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3352); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 3352 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3352); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 3353 | return SECFailure; |
| 3354 | } |
| 3355 | } |
| 3356 | |
| 3357 | /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ |
| 3358 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
| 3359 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; |
| 3360 | |
| 3361 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 3362 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 3363 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 3364 | tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); |
| 3365 | if (sid->peerCert) { |
| 3366 | ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); |
| 3367 | } |
| 3368 | |
| 3369 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_hits); |
| 3370 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); |
| 3371 | } else { |
| 3372 | ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; |
| 3373 | } |
| 3374 | } else { |
| 3375 | if (ss->statelessResume && |
| 3376 | ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { |
| 3377 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_misses); |
| 3378 | } |
| 3379 | if (sid->cached == in_client_cache) { |
| 3380 | /* If we tried to resume and failed, let's not try again. */ |
| 3381 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 3382 | } |
| 3383 | } |
| 3384 | |
| 3385 | /* Discard current SID and make a new one, though it may eventually |
| 3386 | * end up looking a lot like the old one. |
| 3387 | */ |
| 3388 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 3389 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3390 | if (sid == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3391 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3391); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), internal_error) ; } while (0); |
| 3392 | return SECFailure; |
| 3393 | } |
| 3394 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
| 3395 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.peerCert)((ss->sec.peerCert)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.peerCert" ,"tls13con.c",3395)); |
| 3396 | sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); |
| 3397 | } |
| 3398 | sid->version = ss->version; |
| 3399 | |
| 3400 | rv = tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(ss); |
| 3401 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3402 | return SECFailure; |
| 3403 | } |
| 3404 | |
| 3405 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(ss); |
| 3406 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3407 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3408 | } |
| 3409 | |
| 3410 | rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(ss, savedMsg, savedLength, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3411 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3412 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3413 | } |
| 3414 | |
| 3415 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); |
| 3416 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3417 | return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ |
| 3418 | } |
| 3419 | |
| 3420 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { |
| 3421 | /* When we send 0-RTT, we saved the null spec in case we needed it to |
| 3422 | * send another ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest. Now |
| 3423 | * that we won't be receiving a HelloRetryRequest, release the spec. */ |
| 3424 | ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_write, TrafficKeyClearText); |
| 3425 | } |
| 3426 | |
| 3427 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 3428 | ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3429 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3430 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3430); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE , internal_error); } while (0); |
| 3431 | return SECFailure; |
| 3432 | } |
| 3433 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_encrypted_extensions)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_encrypted_extensions, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3433); |
| 3434 | |
| 3435 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3436 | } |
| 3437 | |
| 3438 | static void |
| 3439 | tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) |
| 3440 | { |
| 3441 | ss->sec.keaGroup = group; |
| 3442 | switch (group->keaType) { |
| 3443 | /* Note: These overwrite on resumption.... so if you start with ECDH |
| 3444 | * and resume with DH, we report DH. That's fine, since no answer |
| 3445 | * is really right. */ |
| 3446 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
| 3447 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = |
| 3448 | ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_ecdh_psk : ssl_kea_ecdh; |
| 3449 | ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_ecdh; |
| 3450 | break; |
| 3451 | case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid: |
| 3452 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = |
| 3453 | ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk : ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid; |
| 3454 | ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid; |
| 3455 | break; |
| 3456 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
| 3457 | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = |
| 3458 | ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_dh_psk : ssl_kea_dh; |
| 3459 | ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_dh; |
| 3460 | break; |
| 3461 | default: |
| 3462 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",3462)); |
| 3463 | } |
| 3464 | } |
| 3465 | |
| 3466 | /* |
| 3467 | * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello. |
| 3468 | * |
| 3469 | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
| 3470 | */ |
| 3471 | static SECStatus |
| 3472 | tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3473 | { |
| 3474 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3475 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry; |
| 3476 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; |
| 3477 | PK11SymKey *dheSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3478 | PK11SymKey *kemSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3479 | |
| 3480 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 3481 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 3482 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3482)); |
| 3483 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3483)); |
| 3484 | |
| 3485 | /* This list should have one entry. */ |
| 3486 | if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)->next == (&ss-> xtnData.remoteKeyShares))) { |
| 3487 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, missing_extension)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, __func__, "tls13con.c", 3487); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE , missing_extension); } while (0); |
| 3488 | return SECFailure; |
| 3489 | } |
| 3490 | |
| 3491 | entry = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)->next); |
| 3492 | PORT_Assert(PR_NEXT_LINK(&entry->link) == &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)((((&entry->link)->next) == &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares )?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_NEXT_LINK(&entry->link) == &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares" ,"tls13con.c",3492)); |
| 3493 | |
| 3494 | /* Now get our matching key. */ |
| 3495 | keyPair = ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair(ss, entry->group); |
| 3496 | if (!keyPair) { |
| 3497 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3497); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 3498 | return SECFailure; |
| 3499 | } |
| 3500 | |
| 3501 | PORT_Assert(ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, entry->group))((ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, entry->group))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, entry->group)","tls13con.c",3501 )); |
| 3502 | |
| 3503 | rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, entry, keyPair->keys, |
| 3504 | tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 3505 | &dheSecret); |
| 3506 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3507 | goto loser; /* Error code already set. */ |
| 3508 | } |
| 3509 | |
| 3510 | if (entry->group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid) { |
| 3511 | rv = tls13_HandleKEMCiphertext(ss, entry, keyPair->kemKeys, &kemSecret); |
| 3512 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3513 | goto loser; /* Error set by tls13_HandleKEMCiphertext */ |
| 3514 | } |
| 3515 | // We may need to handle different "combiners" here in the future. For |
| 3516 | // now this is specific to xyber768d00. |
| 3517 | PORT_Assert(entry->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00)((entry->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00)?((void )0):PR_Assert("entry->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00" ,"tls13con.c",3517)); |
| 3518 | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = PK11_ConcatSymKeys(dheSecret, kemSecret, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, CKA_DERIVE0x0000010CUL); |
| 3519 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) { |
| 3520 | goto loser; /* Error set by PK11_ConcatSymKeys */ |
| 3521 | } |
| 3522 | PK11_FreeSymKey(dheSecret); |
| 3523 | PK11_FreeSymKey(kemSecret); |
| 3524 | } else { |
| 3525 | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = dheSecret; |
| 3526 | } |
| 3527 | |
| 3528 | tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, entry->group); |
| 3529 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); |
| 3530 | |
| 3531 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3532 | |
| 3533 | loser: |
| 3534 | PK11_FreeSymKey(dheSecret); |
| 3535 | PK11_FreeSymKey(kemSecret); |
| 3536 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3536); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), illegal_parameter ); } while (0); |
| 3537 | return SECFailure; |
| 3538 | } |
| 3539 | |
| 3540 | static PRBool |
| 3541 | tls13_FindCompressionAlgAndCheckIfSupportsEncoding(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3542 | { |
| 3543 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3543)); |
| 3544 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3544)); |
| 3545 | |
| 3546 | for (int j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; j++) { |
| 3547 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].id == ss->xtnData.compressionAlg) { |
| 3548 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].encode != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3549 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 3550 | } |
| 3551 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 3552 | } |
| 3553 | } |
| 3554 | |
| 3555 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 3556 | } |
| 3557 | |
| 3558 | static SECStatus |
| 3559 | tls13_FindCompressionAlgAndEncodeCertificate( |
| 3560 | sslSocket *ss, SECItem *certificateToEncode, SECItem *encodedCertificate) |
| 3561 | { |
| 3562 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3562)); |
| 3563 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3563)); |
| 3564 | |
| 3565 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 3566 | for (int j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; j++) { |
| 3567 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].id == ss->xtnData.compressionAlg && |
| 3568 | ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].encode != NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3569 | rv = ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].encode( |
| 3570 | certificateToEncode, encodedCertificate); |
| 3571 | return rv; |
| 3572 | } |
| 3573 | } |
| 3574 | |
| 3575 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| 3576 | return SECFailure; |
| 3577 | } |
| 3578 | |
| 3579 | static SECStatus |
| 3580 | tls13_SendCompressedCertificate(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *bufferCertificate) |
| 3581 | { |
| 3582 | /* TLS Certificate Compression. RFC 8879 */ |
| 3583 | /* As the encoding function takes as input a SECItem, |
| 3584 | * we convert bufferCertificate to certificateToEncode. |
| 3585 | * |
| 3586 | * encodedCertificate is used to store the certificate |
| 3587 | * after encoding. |
| 3588 | */ |
| 3589 | SECItem encodedCertificate = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3590 | SECItem certificateToEncode = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3591 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 3592 | |
| 3593 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3593)); |
| 3594 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3594)); |
| 3595 | |
| 3596 | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is encoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm",if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is encoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, ss->xtnData .compressionAlg)) |
| 3597 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is encoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, ss->xtnData .compressionAlg)) |
| 3598 | ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, ss->xtnData.compressionAlg)))if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is encoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, ss->xtnData .compressionAlg)); |
| 3599 | |
| 3600 | PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "The certificate before encoding:",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "The certificate before encoding:" , bufferCertificate->buf, bufferCertificate->len) |
| 3601 | bufferCertificate->buf, bufferCertificate->len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "The certificate before encoding:" , bufferCertificate->buf, bufferCertificate->len); |
| 3602 | |
| 3603 | PRUint32 lengthUnencodedMessage = bufferCertificate->len; |
| 3604 | rv = ssl3_CopyToSECItem(bufferCertificate, &certificateToEncode); |
| 3605 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3606 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate.",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate." , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 3607 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate." , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 3608 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3609 | } |
| 3610 | |
| 3611 | rv = tls13_FindCompressionAlgAndEncodeCertificate(ss, &certificateToEncode, |
| 3612 | &encodedCertificate); |
| 3613 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3614 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate.",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate." , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 3615 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s has failed encoding the certificate." , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 3616 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 3617 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3618 | } |
| 3619 | |
| 3620 | /* The CompressedCertificate message is formed as follows: |
| 3621 | * struct { |
| 3622 | * CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithm; |
| 3623 | * uint24 uncompressed_length; |
| 3624 | * opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>; |
| 3625 | * } CompressedCertificate; |
| 3626 | */ |
| 3627 | |
| 3628 | if (encodedCertificate.len < 1) { |
| 3629 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 3630 | goto loser; |
| 3631 | } |
| 3632 | |
| 3633 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_compressed_certificate, |
| 3634 | encodedCertificate.len + 2 + 3 + 3); |
| 3635 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3636 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3637 | } |
| 3638 | |
| 3639 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->xtnData.compressionAlg, 2); |
| 3640 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3641 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3642 | } |
| 3643 | |
| 3644 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, lengthUnencodedMessage, 3); |
| 3645 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3646 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3647 | } |
| 3648 | |
| 3649 | PRINT_BUF(30, (NULL, "The encoded certificate: ",if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "The encoded certificate: " , encodedCertificate.data, encodedCertificate.len) |
| 3650 | encodedCertificate.data, encodedCertificate.len))if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "The encoded certificate: " , encodedCertificate.data, encodedCertificate.len); |
| 3651 | |
| 3652 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, encodedCertificate.data, encodedCertificate.len, 3); |
| 3653 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3654 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3655 | } |
| 3656 | |
| 3657 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&certificateToEncode, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3658 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&encodedCertificate, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3659 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3660 | |
| 3661 | loser: |
| 3662 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&certificateToEncode, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3663 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&encodedCertificate, PR_FALSE0); |
| 3664 | return SECFailure; |
| 3665 | } |
| 3666 | |
| 3667 | /* |
| 3668 | * opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>; |
| 3669 | * |
| 3670 | * struct { |
| 3671 | * ASN1Cert cert_data; |
| 3672 | * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; |
| 3673 | * } CertificateEntry; |
| 3674 | * |
| 3675 | * struct { |
| 3676 | * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; |
| 3677 | * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; |
| 3678 | * } Certificate; |
| 3679 | */ |
| 3680 | static SECStatus |
| 3681 | tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3682 | { |
| 3683 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3684 | CERTCertificateList *certChain; |
| 3685 | int certChainLen = 0; |
| 3686 | int i; |
| 3687 | SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 3688 | sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 3689 | sslBuffer bufferCertificate = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 3690 | |
| 3691 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: send certificate handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: send certificate handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 3692 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: send certificate handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 3693 | |
| 3694 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3694)); |
| 3695 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3695)); |
| 3696 | |
| 3697 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 3698 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.localCert)((!ss->sec.localCert)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->sec.localCert" ,"tls13con.c",3698)); |
| 3699 | /* A server certificate is selected in tls13_SelectServerCert(). */ |
| 3700 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert)((ss->sec.serverCert)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.serverCert" ,"tls13con.c",3700)); |
| 3701 | |
| 3702 | certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; |
| 3703 | ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); |
| 3704 | } else { |
| 3705 | if (ss->sec.localCert) |
| 3706 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); |
| 3707 | |
| 3708 | certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; |
| 3709 | ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
| 3710 | } |
| 3711 | |
| 3712 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 3713 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested)((ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested" ,"tls13con.c",3713)); |
| 3714 | context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext; |
| 3715 | } |
| 3716 | |
| 3717 | if (certChain) { |
| 3718 | for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { |
| 3719 | /* Each cert is 3 octet length, cert, and extensions */ |
| 3720 | certChainLen += 3 + certChain->certs[i].len + 2; |
| 3721 | } |
| 3722 | |
| 3723 | /* Build the extensions. This only applies to the leaf cert, because we |
| 3724 | * don't yet send extensions for non-leaf certs. */ |
| 3725 | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_certificate); |
| 3726 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3727 | return SECFailure; /* code already set */ |
| 3728 | } |
| 3729 | /* extensionBuf.len is only added once, for the leaf cert. */ |
| 3730 | certChainLen += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf)((&extensionBuf)->len); |
| 3731 | } |
| 3732 | |
| 3733 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&bufferCertificate, context.data, context.len, 1); |
| 3734 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3735 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3736 | } |
| 3737 | |
| 3738 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&bufferCertificate, certChainLen, 3); |
| 3739 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3740 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3741 | } |
| 3742 | |
| 3743 | if (certChain) { |
| 3744 | for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { |
| 3745 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&bufferCertificate, certChain->certs[i].data, |
| 3746 | certChain->certs[i].len, 3); |
| 3747 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3748 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3749 | } |
| 3750 | |
| 3751 | if (i) { |
| 3752 | /* Not end-entity. */ |
| 3753 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&bufferCertificate, 0, 2); |
| 3754 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3755 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3756 | } |
| 3757 | continue; |
| 3758 | } |
| 3759 | |
| 3760 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(&bufferCertificate, &extensionBuf, 2); |
| 3761 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3762 | goto loser; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3763 | } |
| 3764 | } |
| 3765 | } |
| 3766 | |
| 3767 | /* If no compression mechanism was established or |
| 3768 | * the compression mechanism supports only decoding, |
| 3769 | * we continue as before. */ |
| 3770 | if (ss->xtnData.compressionAlg == 0 || !tls13_FindCompressionAlgAndCheckIfSupportsEncoding(ss)) { |
| 3771 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, |
| 3772 | 1 + context.len + 3 + certChainLen); |
| 3773 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3774 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3775 | } |
| 3776 | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &bufferCertificate); |
| 3777 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3778 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 3779 | } |
| 3780 | } else { |
| 3781 | rv = tls13_SendCompressedCertificate(ss, &bufferCertificate); |
| 3782 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3783 | goto loser; /* err set by tls13_SendCompressedCertificate. */ |
| 3784 | } |
| 3785 | } |
| 3786 | |
| 3787 | sslBuffer_Clear(&bufferCertificate); |
| 3788 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
| 3789 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3790 | |
| 3791 | loser: |
| 3792 | sslBuffer_Clear(&bufferCertificate); |
| 3793 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
| 3794 | return SECFailure; |
| 3795 | } |
| 3796 | |
| 3797 | static SECStatus |
| 3798 | tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, PRBool first, |
| 3799 | CERTCertificate **certp) |
| 3800 | { |
| 3801 | SECStatus rv; |
| 3802 | SECItem certData; |
| 3803 | SECItem extensionsData; |
| 3804 | CERTCertificate *cert = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3805 | |
| 3806 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certData, |
| 3807 | 3, &data->data, &data->len); |
| 3808 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3809 | return SECFailure; |
| 3810 | } |
| 3811 | |
| 3812 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionsData, |
| 3813 | 2, &data->data, &data->len); |
| 3814 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3815 | return SECFailure; |
| 3816 | } |
| 3817 | |
| 3818 | /* Parse all the extensions. */ |
| 3819 | if (first && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 3820 | rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensionsData.data, |
| 3821 | &extensionsData.len, |
| 3822 | ssl_hs_certificate); |
| 3823 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3824 | return SECFailure; |
| 3825 | } |
| 3826 | /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Copy out SCTs. Bug 1315727. */ |
| 3827 | } |
| 3828 | |
| 3829 | cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certData, NULL((void*)0), |
| 3830 | PR_FALSE0, PR_TRUE1); |
| 3831 | |
| 3832 | if (!cert) { |
| 3833 | PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetErrorPORT_GetError_Util(); |
| 3834 | switch (errCode) { |
| 3835 | case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR(-6000L): |
| 3836 | case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: |
| 3837 | case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: |
| 3838 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, errCode, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, errCode, __func__, "tls13con.c", 3838) ; PORT_SetError_Util(errCode); } while (0); tls13_FatalError( ss, errCode, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 3839 | return SECFailure; |
| 3840 | default: |
| 3841 | ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); |
| 3842 | return SECFailure; |
| 3843 | } |
| 3844 | } |
| 3845 | |
| 3846 | *certp = cert; |
| 3847 | |
| 3848 | return SECSuccess; |
| 3849 | } |
| 3850 | |
| 3851 | static SECStatus |
| 3852 | tls13_EnsureCerticateExpected(sslSocket *ss) |
| 3853 | { |
| 3854 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 3855 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3855)); |
| 3856 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3856)); |
| 3857 | |
| 3858 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 3859 | /* Receiving this message might be the first sign we have that |
| 3860 | * early data is over, so pretend we received EOED. */ |
| 3861 | rv = tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(ss); |
| 3862 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3863 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3864 | } |
| 3865 | |
| 3866 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { |
| 3867 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3868, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 3868 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3868, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 3869 | } else { |
| 3870 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3871, wait_client_cert, wait_invalid ) |
| 3871 | wait_client_cert)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3871, wait_client_cert, wait_invalid ); |
| 3872 | } |
| 3873 | } else { |
| 3874 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3875, wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert , wait_invalid) |
| 3875 | wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3875, wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert , wait_invalid); |
| 3876 | } |
| 3877 | return rv; |
| 3878 | } |
| 3879 | |
| 3880 | /* RFC 8879 TLS Certificate Compression |
| 3881 | * struct { |
| 3882 | * CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithm; |
| 3883 | * uint24 uncompressed_length; |
| 3884 | * opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>; |
| 3885 | * } CompressedCertificate; |
| 3886 | */ |
| 3887 | static SECStatus |
| 3888 | tls13_HandleCertificateDecode(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 3889 | { |
| 3890 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3890)); |
| 3891 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",3891)); |
| 3892 | |
| 3893 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 3894 | |
| 3895 | if (!ss->xtnData.certificateCompressionAdvertised) { |
| 3896 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE , __func__, "tls13con.c", 3896); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 3897 | return SECFailure; |
| 3898 | } |
| 3899 | |
| 3900 | rv = tls13_EnsureCerticateExpected(ss); |
| 3901 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3902 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 3903 | } |
| 3904 | |
| 3905 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 3906 | rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_compressed_certificate, b, length); |
| 3907 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3908 | return rv; |
| 3909 | } |
| 3910 | } |
| 3911 | |
| 3912 | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: %s handles certificate compression handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: %s handles certificate compression handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 3913 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: %s handles certificate compression handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 3914 | |
| 3915 | PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "The certificate before decoding:", b, length))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "The certificate before decoding:" , b, length); |
| 3916 | /* Reading CertificateCompressionAlgorithm. */ |
| 3917 | PRUint32 compressionAlg = 0; |
| 3918 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compressionAlg, 2, &b, &length); |
| 3919 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3920 | return SECFailure; /* Alert already sent. */ |
| 3921 | } |
| 3922 | |
| 3923 | PRBool compressionAlgorithmIsSupported = PR_FALSE0; |
| 3924 | SECStatus (*certificateDecodingFunc)(const SECItem *, |
| 3925 | unsigned char *output, size_t outputLen, size_t *usedLen) = NULL((void*)0); |
| 3926 | for (int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; i++) { |
| 3927 | if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].id == compressionAlg) { |
| 3928 | compressionAlgorithmIsSupported = PR_TRUE1; |
| 3929 | certificateDecodingFunc = ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].decode; |
| 3930 | } |
| 3931 | } |
| 3932 | |
| 3933 | /* Peer selected a compression algorithm we do not support (and did not advertise). */ |
| 3934 | if (!compressionAlgorithmIsSupported) { |
| 3935 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| 3936 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3936); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), illegal_parameter ); } while (0); |
| 3937 | return SECFailure; |
| 3938 | } |
| 3939 | |
| 3940 | /* The algorithm does not support decoding. */ |
| 3941 | if (certificateDecodingFunc == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 3942 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 3943 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 3943); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), illegal_parameter ); } while (0); |
| 3944 | return SECFailure; |
| 3945 | } |
| 3946 | |
| 3947 | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is decoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm",if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is decoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3948 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is decoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3949 | ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg)))if (ssl_trace >= (30)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s is decoding the certificate using the %s compression algorithm" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )); |
| 3950 | PRUint32 decodedCertLen = 0; |
| 3951 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &decodedCertLen, 3, &b, &length); |
| 3952 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3953 | return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ |
| 3954 | } |
| 3955 | |
| 3956 | /* If the received CompressedCertificate message cannot be decompressed, |
| 3957 | * he connection MUST be terminated with the "bad_certificate" alert. |
| 3958 | */ |
| 3959 | if (decodedCertLen == 0) { |
| 3960 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoded certificate length is incorrect",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoded certificate length is incorrect" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3961 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoded certificate length is incorrect" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3962 | ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoded certificate length is incorrect" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )); |
| 3963 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3963); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , bad_certificate); } while (0); |
| 3964 | return SECFailure; |
| 3965 | } |
| 3966 | |
| 3967 | /* opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>; */ |
| 3968 | PRUint32 compressedCertLen = 0; |
| 3969 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compressedCertLen, 3, &b, &length); |
| 3970 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3971 | return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ |
| 3972 | } |
| 3973 | |
| 3974 | if (compressedCertLen == 0 || compressedCertLen != length) { |
| 3975 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3975); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , bad_certificate); } while (0); |
| 3976 | return SECFailure; |
| 3977 | } |
| 3978 | |
| 3979 | /* Decoding received certificate. */ |
| 3980 | PRUint8 *decodedCert = PORT_ZAllocPORT_ZAlloc_Util(decodedCertLen); |
| 3981 | if (!decodedCert) { |
| 3982 | return SECFailure; |
| 3983 | } |
| 3984 | |
| 3985 | size_t actualCertLen = 0; |
| 3986 | |
| 3987 | SECItem encodedCertAsSecItem = { siBuffer, b, compressedCertLen }; |
| 3988 | rv = certificateDecodingFunc(&encodedCertAsSecItem, |
| 3989 | decodedCert, decodedCertLen, &actualCertLen); |
| 3990 | |
| 3991 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 3992 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoding of the certificate has failed",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoding of the certificate has failed" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3993 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoding of the certificate has failed" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 3994 | ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s decoding of the certificate has failed" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )); |
| 3995 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 3995); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , bad_certificate); } while (0); |
| 3996 | goto loser; |
| 3997 | } |
| 3998 | PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", b, compressedCertLen))if (ssl_trace >= (60)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "consume bytes:", b, compressedCertLen); |
| 3999 | *b += compressedCertLen; |
| 4000 | length -= compressedCertLen; |
| 4001 | |
| 4002 | /* If, after decompression, the specified length does not match the actual length, |
| 4003 | * the party receiving the invalid message MUST abort the connection |
| 4004 | * with the "bad_certificate" alert. |
| 4005 | */ |
| 4006 | if (actualCertLen != decodedCertLen) { |
| 4007 | SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s certificate length does not correspond to extension length",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s certificate length does not correspond to extension length" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 4008 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s certificate length does not correspond to extension length" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )) |
| 4009 | ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s certificate length does not correspond to extension length" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, compressionAlg )); |
| 4010 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4010); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , bad_certificate); } while (0); |
| 4011 | goto loser; |
| 4012 | } |
| 4013 | |
| 4014 | PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Decoded certificate",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Decoded certificate" , decodedCert, decodedCertLen) |
| 4015 | decodedCert, decodedCertLen))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Decoded certificate" , decodedCert, decodedCertLen); |
| 4016 | |
| 4017 | /* compressed_certificate_message: The result of applying the indicated |
| 4018 | * compression algorithm to the encoded Certificate message that |
| 4019 | * would have been sent if certificate compression was not in use. |
| 4020 | * |
| 4021 | * After decompression, the Certificate message MUST be processed as if |
| 4022 | * it were encoded without being compressed. This way, the parsing and |
| 4023 | * the verification have the same security properties as they would have |
| 4024 | * in TLS normally. |
| 4025 | */ |
| 4026 | rv = tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, decodedCert, decodedCertLen, PR_TRUE1); |
| 4027 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4028 | goto loser; |
| 4029 | } |
| 4030 | /* We allow only one compressed certificate to be handled after each |
| 4031 | certificate compression advertisement. |
| 4032 | See test CertificateCompression_TwoEncodedCertificateRequests. */ |
| 4033 | ss->xtnData.certificateCompressionAdvertised = PR_FALSE0; |
| 4034 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(decodedCert); |
| 4035 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4036 | |
| 4037 | loser: |
| 4038 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(decodedCert); |
| 4039 | return SECFailure; |
| 4040 | } |
| 4041 | |
| 4042 | /* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete |
| 4043 | * tls13 Certificate message. |
| 4044 | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
| 4045 | */ |
| 4046 | static SECStatus |
| 4047 | tls13_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, PRBool alreadyHashed) |
| 4048 | { |
| 4049 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4050 | SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 4051 | SECItem certList; |
| 4052 | PRBool first = PR_TRUE1; |
| 4053 | ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4054 | |
| 4055 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 4056 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 4057 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4057)); |
| 4058 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4058)); |
| 4059 | |
| 4060 | rv = tls13_EnsureCerticateExpected(ss); |
| 4061 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4062 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 4063 | } |
| 4064 | |
| 4065 | /* We can ignore any other cleartext from the client. */ |
| 4066 | if (ss->sec.isServer && IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 4067 | ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, TrafficKeyClearText); |
| 4068 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
| 4069 | } |
| 4070 | |
| 4071 | /* AlreadyHashed is true only when Certificate Compression is used. */ |
| 4072 | if (ss->firstHsDone && !alreadyHashed) { |
| 4073 | rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, b, length); |
| 4074 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4075 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 4076 | return SECFailure; |
| 4077 | } |
| 4078 | } |
| 4079 | |
| 4080 | if (!ss->firstHsDone && ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 4081 | /* Our first shot an getting an RTT estimate. If the client took extra |
| 4082 | * time to fetch a certificate, this will be bad, but we can't do much |
| 4083 | * about that. */ |
| 4084 | ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss) - ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate; |
| 4085 | } |
| 4086 | |
| 4087 | /* Process the context string */ |
| 4088 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); |
| 4089 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 4090 | return SECFailure; |
| 4091 | |
| 4092 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { |
| 4093 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer)((ss->sec.isServer)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.isServer" ,"tls13con.c",4093)); |
| 4094 | if (SECITEM_CompareItemSECITEM_CompareItem_Util(&context, &ss->xtnData.certReqContext) != 0) { |
| 4095 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4095); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4096 | return SECFailure; |
| 4097 | } |
| 4098 | } |
| 4099 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certList, 3, &b, &length); |
| 4100 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4101 | return SECFailure; |
| 4102 | } |
| 4103 | if (length) { |
| 4104 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4104); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4105 | return SECFailure; |
| 4106 | } |
| 4107 | |
| 4108 | if (!certList.len) { |
| 4109 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 4110 | /* Servers always need to send some cert. */ |
| 4111 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4111); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE , bad_certificate); } while (0); |
| 4112 | return SECFailure; |
| 4113 | } else { |
| 4114 | /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ |
| 4115 | /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ |
| 4116 | rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); |
| 4117 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4118 | return SECFailure; |
| 4119 | } |
| 4120 | |
| 4121 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_finished, __func__, "tls13con.c", 4121 ); |
| 4122 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4123 | } |
| 4124 | } |
| 4125 | |
| 4126 | /* Now clean up. */ |
| 4127 | ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); |
| 4128 | ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArenaPORT_NewArena_Util(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE(2048)); |
| 4129 | if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 4130 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4130); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 4131 | return SECFailure; |
| 4132 | } |
| 4133 | |
| 4134 | while (certList.len) { |
| 4135 | CERTCertificate *cert; |
| 4136 | |
| 4137 | rv = tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(ss, &certList, first, |
| 4138 | &cert); |
| 4139 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4140 | ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; |
| 4141 | return SECFailure; |
| 4142 | } |
| 4143 | |
| 4144 | if (first) { |
| 4145 | ss->sec.peerCert = cert; |
| 4146 | |
| 4147 | if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { |
| 4148 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
| 4149 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, |
| 4150 | &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); |
| 4151 | ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; |
| 4152 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4153 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4153); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 4154 | return SECFailure; |
| 4155 | } |
| 4156 | } |
| 4157 | } else { |
| 4158 | ssl3CertNode *c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena,(ssl3CertNode *)PORT_ArenaAlloc_Util(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena , sizeof(ssl3CertNode)) |
| 4159 | ssl3CertNode)(ssl3CertNode *)PORT_ArenaAlloc_Util(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena , sizeof(ssl3CertNode)); |
| 4160 | if (!c) { |
| 4161 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4161); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 4162 | return SECFailure; |
| 4163 | } |
| 4164 | c->cert = cert; |
| 4165 | c->next = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4166 | |
| 4167 | if (lastCert) { |
| 4168 | lastCert->next = c; |
| 4169 | } else { |
| 4170 | ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; |
| 4171 | } |
| 4172 | lastCert = c; |
| 4173 | } |
| 4174 | |
| 4175 | first = PR_FALSE0; |
| 4176 | } |
| 4177 | SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); |
| 4178 | |
| 4179 | return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ |
| 4180 | } |
| 4181 | |
| 4182 | /* Add context to the hash functions as described in |
| 4183 | [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 4.9.1] */ |
| 4184 | SECStatus |
| 4185 | tls13_AddContextToHashes(sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
| 4186 | SSLHashType algorithm, PRBool sending, |
| 4187 | SSL3Hashes *tbsHash) |
| 4188 | { |
| 4189 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 4190 | PK11Context *ctx; |
| 4191 | const unsigned char context_padding[] = { |
| 4192 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4193 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4194 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4195 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4196 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4197 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4198 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, |
| 4199 | 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 |
| 4200 | }; |
| 4201 | |
| 4202 | const char *client_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; |
| 4203 | const char *server_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
| 4204 | const char *context_string = (sending ^ ss->sec.isServer) ? client_cert_verify_string |
| 4205 | : server_cert_verify_string; |
| 4206 | unsigned int hashlength; |
| 4207 | |
| 4208 | /* Double check that we are doing the same hash.*/ |
| 4209 | PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss))((hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)","tls13con.c",4209) ); |
| 4210 | |
| 4211 | ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(algorithm)); |
| 4212 | if (!ctx) { |
| 4213 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 4214 | goto loser; |
| 4215 | } |
| 4216 | |
| 4217 | PORT_Assert(SECFailure)((SECFailure)?((void)0):PR_Assert("SECFailure","tls13con.c",4217 )); |
| 4218 | PORT_Assert(!SECSuccess)((!SECSuccess)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!SECSuccess","tls13con.c" ,4218)); |
| 4219 | |
| 4220 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash without context", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash without context" , hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 4221 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Context string", context_string, strlen(context_string)))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Context string", context_string, strlen(context_string)); |
| 4222 | rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); |
| 4223 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, context_padding, sizeof(context_padding)); |
| 4224 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char *)context_string, |
| 4225 | strlen(context_string) + 1); /* +1 includes the terminating 0 */ |
| 4226 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 4227 | /* Update the hash in-place */ |
| 4228 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, tbsHash->u.raw, &hashlength, sizeof(tbsHash->u.raw)); |
| 4229 | PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 4230 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash with context", tbsHash->u.raw, hashlength))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash with context" , tbsHash->u.raw, hashlength); |
| 4231 | |
| 4232 | tbsHash->len = hashlength; |
| 4233 | tbsHash->hashAlg = algorithm; |
| 4234 | |
| 4235 | if (rv) { |
| 4236 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4237 | goto loser; |
| 4238 | } |
| 4239 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4240 | |
| 4241 | loser: |
| 4242 | return SECFailure; |
| 4243 | } |
| 4244 | |
| 4245 | /* |
| 4246 | * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) = |
| 4247 | * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, |
| 4248 | * Hash(Messages) + Hash(resumption_context), L)) |
| 4249 | */ |
| 4250 | SECStatus |
| 4251 | tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 4252 | const char *label, |
| 4253 | unsigned int labelLen, |
| 4254 | const SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
| 4255 | PK11SymKey **dest, |
| 4256 | SSLHashType hash) |
| 4257 | { |
| 4258 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4259 | |
| 4260 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(key, hash, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len, |
| 4261 | label, labelLen, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, |
| 4262 | tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hash), |
| 4263 | ss->protocolVariant, dest); |
| 4264 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4265 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4265); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 4266 | return SECFailure; |
| 4267 | } |
| 4268 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4269 | } |
| 4270 | |
| 4271 | /* Convenience wrapper for the empty hash. */ |
| 4272 | SECStatus |
| 4273 | tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 4274 | const char *label, |
| 4275 | unsigned int labelLen, |
| 4276 | PK11SymKey **dest, |
| 4277 | SSLHashType hash) |
| 4278 | { |
| 4279 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 4280 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4281 | PRUint8 buf[] = { 0 }; |
| 4282 | |
| 4283 | rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, buf, 0, hash); |
| 4284 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4285 | return SECFailure; |
| 4286 | } |
| 4287 | |
| 4288 | return tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, key, label, labelLen, &hashes, dest, hash); |
| 4289 | } |
| 4290 | |
| 4291 | /* Convenience wrapper that lets us supply a separate prefix and suffix. */ |
| 4292 | static SECStatus |
| 4293 | tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 4294 | const char *prefix, |
| 4295 | const char *suffix, |
| 4296 | const char *keylogLabel, |
| 4297 | PK11SymKey **dest) |
| 4298 | { |
| 4299 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4300 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 4301 | char buf[100]; |
| 4302 | const char *label; |
| 4303 | |
| 4304 | if (prefix) { |
| 4305 | if ((strlen(prefix) + strlen(suffix) + 2) > sizeof(buf)) { |
| 4306 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4306)); |
| 4307 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 4308 | return SECFailure; |
| 4309 | } |
| 4310 | (void)PR_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s", |
| 4311 | prefix, suffix); |
| 4312 | label = buf; |
| 4313 | } else { |
| 4314 | label = suffix; |
| 4315 | } |
| 4316 | |
| 4317 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving secret '%s'",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving secret '%s'" , getpid(), ss->fd, label) |
| 4318 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, label))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving secret '%s'" , getpid(), ss->fd, label); |
| 4319 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); |
| 4320 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4321 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4321)); /* Should never fail */ |
| 4322 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 4323 | return SECFailure; |
| 4324 | } |
| 4325 | |
| 4326 | rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, key, label, strlen(label), |
| 4327 | &hashes, dest, tls13_GetHash(ss)); |
| 4328 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4329 | return SECFailure; |
| 4330 | } |
| 4331 | |
| 4332 | if (keylogLabel) { |
| 4333 | ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, keylogLabel, *dest); |
| 4334 | } |
| 4335 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4336 | } |
| 4337 | |
| 4338 | SECStatus |
| 4339 | SSLExp_SecretCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSecretCallback cb, void *arg) |
| 4340 | { |
| 4341 | sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 4342 | if (!ss) { |
| 4343 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SecretCallback",if (ssl_debug) ssl_Trace ("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SecretCallback" , getpid(), fd) |
| 4344 | SSL_GETPID(), fd))if (ssl_debug) ssl_Trace ("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SecretCallback" , getpid(), fd); |
| 4345 | return SECFailure; |
| 4346 | } |
| 4347 | |
| 4348 | ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { (((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss) ->firstHandshakeLock)) > 0) || !((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount (((ss)->recvBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("PZ_InMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock) || !ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4348)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->firstHandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 4349 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { ((!((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss )->xmitBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4349)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 4350 | ss->secretCallback = cb; |
| 4351 | ss->secretCallbackArg = arg; |
| 4352 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 4353 | ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->firstHandshakeLock )); }; |
| 4354 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4355 | } |
| 4356 | |
| 4357 | /* Derive traffic keys for the next cipher spec in the queue. */ |
| 4358 | static SECStatus |
| 4359 | tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
| 4360 | TrafficKeyType type, |
| 4361 | PRBool deleteSecret) |
| 4362 | { |
| 4363 | size_t keySize = spec->cipherDef->key_size; |
| 4364 | size_t ivSize = spec->cipherDef->iv_size + |
| 4365 | spec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size; /* This isn't always going to |
| 4366 | * work, but it does for |
| 4367 | * AES-GCM */ |
| 4368 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkAlgorithm = ssl3_Alg2Mech(spec->cipherDef->calg); |
| 4369 | PK11SymKey **prkp = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4370 | PK11SymKey *prk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4371 | PRBool clientSecret; |
| 4372 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4373 | /* These labels are just used for debugging. */ |
| 4374 | static const char kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys[] = "early application data"; |
| 4375 | static const char kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys[] = "handshake data"; |
| 4376 | static const char kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys[] = "application data"; |
| 4377 | |
| 4378 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4378)); |
| 4379 | |
| 4380 | clientSecret = !tls13_UseServerSecret(ss, spec->direction); |
| 4381 | switch (type) { |
| 4382 | case TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData: |
| 4383 | PORT_Assert(clientSecret)((clientSecret)?((void)0):PR_Assert("clientSecret","tls13con.c" ,4383)); |
| 4384 | prkp = &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret; |
| 4385 | spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys; |
| 4386 | break; |
| 4387 | case TrafficKeyHandshake: |
| 4388 | prkp = clientSecret ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret |
| 4389 | : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret; |
| 4390 | spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys; |
| 4391 | break; |
| 4392 | case TrafficKeyApplicationData: |
| 4393 | prkp = clientSecret ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret |
| 4394 | : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret; |
| 4395 | spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys; |
| 4396 | break; |
| 4397 | default: |
| 4398 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4398); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 4399 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4399)); |
| 4400 | return SECFailure; |
| 4401 | } |
| 4402 | PORT_Assert(prkp != NULL)((prkp != ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert("prkp != NULL","tls13con.c" ,4402)); |
| 4403 | prk = *prkp; |
| 4404 | |
| 4405 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys epoch=%d (%s)",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys epoch=%d (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write"), spec->epoch, spec->phase) |
| 4406 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SPEC_DIR(spec),if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys epoch=%d (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write"), spec->epoch, spec->phase) |
| 4407 | spec->epoch, spec->phase))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys epoch=%d (%s)" , getpid(), ss->fd, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write"), spec->epoch, spec->phase); |
| 4408 | |
| 4409 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 4410 | NULL((void*)0), 0, |
| 4411 | kHkdfPurposeKey, strlen(kHkdfPurposeKey), |
| 4412 | bulkAlgorithm, keySize, |
| 4413 | ss->protocolVariant, |
| 4414 | &spec->keyMaterial.key); |
| 4415 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4416 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4416); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 4417 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4417)); |
| 4418 | goto loser; |
| 4419 | } |
| 4420 | |
| 4421 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && spec->epoch > 0) { |
| 4422 | rv = ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(spec->version, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, |
| 4423 | ss->protocolVariant, prk, kHkdfPurposeSn, |
| 4424 | strlen(kHkdfPurposeSn), &spec->maskContext); |
| 4425 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4426 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4426); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 4427 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4427)); |
| 4428 | goto loser; |
| 4429 | } |
| 4430 | } |
| 4431 | |
| 4432 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 4433 | NULL((void*)0), 0, |
| 4434 | kHkdfPurposeIv, strlen(kHkdfPurposeIv), |
| 4435 | ss->protocolVariant, |
| 4436 | spec->keyMaterial.iv, ivSize); |
| 4437 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4438 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4438); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 4439 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",4439)); |
| 4440 | goto loser; |
| 4441 | } |
| 4442 | |
| 4443 | if (deleteSecret) { |
| 4444 | PK11_FreeSymKey(prk); |
| 4445 | *prkp = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4446 | } |
| 4447 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4448 | |
| 4449 | loser: |
| 4450 | return SECFailure; |
| 4451 | } |
| 4452 | |
| 4453 | void |
| 4454 | tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
| 4455 | { |
| 4456 | /* Set the record version to pretend to be (D)TLS 1.2. */ |
| 4457 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 4458 | spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE((~0x0102) & 0xffff); |
| 4459 | } else { |
| 4460 | spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_20x0303; |
| 4461 | } |
| 4462 | SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: set spec=%d record version to 0x%04x",if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: set spec=%d record version to 0x%04x" , getpid(), ss->fd, spec, spec->recordVersion) |
| 4463 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->recordVersion))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: set spec=%d record version to 0x%04x" , getpid(), ss->fd, spec, spec->recordVersion); |
| 4464 | } |
| 4465 | |
| 4466 | static SECStatus |
| 4467 | tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
| 4468 | { |
| 4469 | ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; |
| 4470 | |
| 4471 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4471)); |
| 4472 | PORT_Assert(spec->epoch)((spec->epoch)?((void)0):PR_Assert("spec->epoch","tls13con.c" ,4472)); |
| 4473 | |
| 4474 | /* Version isn't set when we send 0-RTT data. */ |
| 4475 | spec->version = PR_MAX(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, ss->version)((0x0304)>(ss->version)?(0x0304):(ss->version)); |
| 4476 | |
| 4477 | ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); |
| 4478 | /* We want to keep read cipher specs around longer because |
| 4479 | * there are cases where we might get either epoch N or |
| 4480 | * epoch N+1. */ |
| 4481 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && spec->direction == ssl_secret_read) { |
| 4482 | ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(spec); |
| 4483 | } |
| 4484 | |
| 4485 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Set Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Set Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x" , getpid(), ss->fd, suite) |
| 4486 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Set Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x" , getpid(), ss->fd, suite); |
| 4487 | |
| 4488 | spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite)); |
| 4489 | |
| 4490 | if (spec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) { |
| 4491 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk && |
| 4492 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL0x0000) { |
| 4493 | spec->earlyDataRemaining = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->maxEarlyData; |
| 4494 | } |
| 4495 | } |
| 4496 | |
| 4497 | tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec); |
| 4498 | |
| 4499 | /* The record size limit is reduced by one so that the remainder of the |
| 4500 | * record handling code can use the same checks for all versions. */ |
| 4501 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) { |
| 4502 | spec->recordSizeLimit = ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read) |
| 4503 | ? ss->opt.recordSizeLimit |
| 4504 | : ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit) - |
| 4505 | 1; |
| 4506 | } else { |
| 4507 | spec->recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH16384; |
| 4508 | } |
| 4509 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4510 | } |
| 4511 | |
| 4512 | /* |
| 4513 | * Initialize the cipher context. All TLS 1.3 operations are AEAD, |
| 4514 | * so they are all message contexts. |
| 4515 | */ |
| 4516 | static SECStatus |
| 4517 | tls13_InitPendingContext(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
| 4518 | { |
| 4519 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism; |
| 4520 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode; |
| 4521 | SECItem iv; |
| 4522 | SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; |
| 4523 | |
| 4524 | calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; |
| 4525 | |
| 4526 | encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); |
| 4527 | encMode = CKA_NSS_MESSAGE0x82000000L | ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_write) ? CKA_ENCRYPT0x00000104UL : CKA_DECRYPT0x00000105UL); |
| 4528 | iv.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4529 | iv.len = 0; |
| 4530 | |
| 4531 | /* |
| 4532 | * build the context |
| 4533 | */ |
| 4534 | spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode, |
| 4535 | spec->keyMaterial.key, |
| 4536 | &iv); |
| 4537 | if (!spec->cipherContext) { |
| 4538 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); |
| 4539 | return SECFailure; |
| 4540 | } |
| 4541 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4542 | } |
| 4543 | |
| 4544 | /* |
| 4545 | * Called before sending alerts to set up the right key on the client. |
| 4546 | * We might encounter errors during the handshake where the current |
| 4547 | * key is ClearText or EarlyApplicationData. This |
| 4548 | * function switches to the Handshake key if possible. |
| 4549 | */ |
| 4550 | SECStatus |
| 4551 | tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) |
| 4552 | { |
| 4553 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4554 | |
| 4555 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 4556 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4557 | } |
| 4558 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 4559 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4560 | } |
| 4561 | if (TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_hello)tls13_InHsState(ss, wait_server_hello, wait_invalid)) { |
| 4562 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4563 | } |
| 4564 | if ((ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyClearText) && |
| 4565 | (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData)) { |
| 4566 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4567 | } |
| 4568 | |
| 4569 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 4570 | ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE0); |
| 4571 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4572 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 4573 | return SECFailure; |
| 4574 | } |
| 4575 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4576 | } |
| 4577 | |
| 4578 | /* Install a new cipher spec for this direction. |
| 4579 | * |
| 4580 | * During the handshake, the values for |epoch| take values from the |
| 4581 | * TrafficKeyType enum. Afterwards, key update increments them. |
| 4582 | */ |
| 4583 | static SECStatus |
| 4584 | tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch, |
| 4585 | SSLSecretDirection direction, PRBool deleteSecret) |
| 4586 | { |
| 4587 | TrafficKeyType type; |
| 4588 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4589 | ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4590 | ssl3CipherSpec **specp; |
| 4591 | |
| 4592 | /* Flush out old handshake data. */ |
| 4593 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 4594 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER0x40000000); |
| 4595 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 4596 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4597 | return SECFailure; |
| 4598 | } |
| 4599 | |
| 4600 | /* Create the new spec. */ |
| 4601 | spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction); |
| 4602 | if (!spec) { |
| 4603 | return SECFailure; |
| 4604 | } |
| 4605 | spec->epoch = epoch; |
| 4606 | spec->nextSeqNum = 0; |
| 4607 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 4608 | dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); |
| 4609 | } |
| 4610 | |
| 4611 | /* This depends on spec having a valid direction and epoch. */ |
| 4612 | rv = tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, spec); |
| 4613 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4614 | goto loser; |
| 4615 | } |
| 4616 | |
| 4617 | type = (TrafficKeyType)PR_MIN(TrafficKeyApplicationData, epoch)((TrafficKeyApplicationData)<(epoch)?(TrafficKeyApplicationData ):(epoch)); |
| 4618 | rv = tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(ss, spec, type, deleteSecret); |
| 4619 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4620 | goto loser; |
| 4621 | } |
| 4622 | |
| 4623 | rv = tls13_InitPendingContext(ss, spec); |
| 4624 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4625 | goto loser; |
| 4626 | } |
| 4627 | |
| 4628 | /* Now that we've set almost everything up, finally cut over. */ |
| 4629 | specp = (direction == ssl_secret_read) ? &ss->ssl3.crSpec : &ss->ssl3.cwSpec; |
| 4630 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 4631 | ssl_CipherSpecRelease(*specp); /* May delete old cipher. */ |
| 4632 | *specp = spec; /* Overwrite. */ |
| 4633 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 4634 | |
| 4635 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for epoch=%d (%s) dir=%s",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for epoch=%d (%s) dir=%s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), spec->epoch, spec->phase, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write")) |
| 4636 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), spec->epoch,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for epoch=%d (%s) dir=%s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), spec->epoch, spec->phase, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write")) |
| 4637 | spec->phase, SPEC_DIR(spec)))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for epoch=%d (%s) dir=%s" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), spec->epoch, spec->phase, ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read ) ? "read" : "write")); |
| 4638 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4639 | |
| 4640 | loser: |
| 4641 | ssl_CipherSpecRelease(spec); |
| 4642 | return SECFailure; |
| 4643 | } |
| 4644 | |
| 4645 | SECStatus |
| 4646 | tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes) |
| 4647 | { |
| 4648 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4649 | PK11Context *ctx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4650 | PRBool useEchInner; |
| 4651 | sslBuffer *transcript; |
| 4652 | |
| 4653 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4653)); |
| 4654 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { |
| 4655 | /* Backup: if we haven't done any hashing, then hash now. |
| 4656 | * This happens when we are doing 0-RTT on the client. */ |
| 4657 | ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss))); |
| 4658 | if (!ctx) { |
| 4659 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4660 | return SECFailure; |
| 4661 | } |
| 4662 | |
| 4663 | if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx) != SECSuccess) { |
| 4664 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4665 | goto loser; |
| 4666 | } |
| 4667 | |
| 4668 | /* One might expect this to use ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted, |
| 4669 | * but with 0-RTT we don't know that yet. */ |
| 4670 | useEchInner = ss->sec.isServer ? PR_FALSE0 : !!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx; |
| 4671 | transcript = useEchInner ? &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages : &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; |
| 4672 | |
| 4673 | PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages",if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages" , transcript->buf, transcript->len) |
| 4674 | transcript->buf,if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages" , transcript->buf, transcript->len) |
| 4675 | transcript->len))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages" , transcript->buf, transcript->len); |
| 4676 | |
| 4677 | if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx, |
| 4678 | transcript->buf, |
| 4679 | transcript->len) != SECSuccess) { |
| 4680 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4681 | goto loser; |
| 4682 | } |
| 4683 | } else { |
| 4684 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 4685 | ctx = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake); |
| 4686 | } else { |
| 4687 | ctx = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); |
| 4688 | } |
| 4689 | if (!ctx) { |
| 4690 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4691 | return SECFailure; |
| 4692 | } |
| 4693 | } |
| 4694 | |
| 4695 | rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, |
| 4696 | &hashes->len, |
| 4697 | sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); |
| 4698 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4699 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 4700 | goto loser; |
| 4701 | } |
| 4702 | |
| 4703 | PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 4704 | PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss))((hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)","tls13con.c",4704) ); |
| 4705 | PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 4706 | |
| 4707 | return SECSuccess; |
| 4708 | |
| 4709 | loser: |
| 4710 | PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 4711 | return SECFailure; |
| 4712 | } |
| 4713 | |
| 4714 | TLS13KeyShareEntry * |
| 4715 | tls13_CopyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *o) |
| 4716 | { |
| 4717 | TLS13KeyShareEntry *n; |
| 4718 | |
| 4719 | PORT_Assert(o)((o)?((void)0):PR_Assert("o","tls13con.c",4719)); |
| 4720 | n = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry)(TLS13KeyShareEntry *)PORT_ZAlloc_Util(sizeof(TLS13KeyShareEntry )); |
| 4721 | if (!n) { |
| 4722 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 4723 | } |
| 4724 | |
| 4725 | if (SECSuccess != SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &n->key_exchange, &o->key_exchange)) { |
| 4726 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(n); |
| 4727 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 4728 | } |
| 4729 | n->group = o->group; |
| 4730 | return n; |
| 4731 | } |
| 4732 | |
| 4733 | void |
| 4734 | tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer) |
| 4735 | { |
| 4736 | if (!offer) { |
| 4737 | return; |
| 4738 | } |
| 4739 | SECITEM_ZfreeItemSECITEM_ZfreeItem_Util(&offer->key_exchange, PR_FALSE0); |
| 4740 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(offer, sizeof(*offer)); |
| 4741 | } |
| 4742 | |
| 4743 | void |
| 4744 | tls13_DestroyKeyShares(PRCList *list) |
| 4745 | { |
| 4746 | PRCList *cur_p; |
| 4747 | |
| 4748 | /* The list must be initialized. */ |
| 4749 | PORT_Assert(PR_LIST_HEAD(list))(((list)->next)?((void)0):PR_Assert("PR_LIST_HEAD(list)","tls13con.c" ,4749)); |
| 4750 | |
| 4751 | while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)((list)->next == (list))) { |
| 4752 | cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list)(list)->prev; |
| 4753 | PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p)do { (cur_p)->prev->next = (cur_p)->next; (cur_p)-> next->prev = (cur_p)->prev; } while (0); |
| 4754 | tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry((TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p); |
| 4755 | } |
| 4756 | } |
| 4757 | |
| 4758 | void |
| 4759 | tls13_DestroyEarlyData(PRCList *list) |
| 4760 | { |
| 4761 | PRCList *cur_p; |
| 4762 | |
| 4763 | while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)((list)->next == (list))) { |
| 4764 | TLS13EarlyData *msg; |
| 4765 | |
| 4766 | cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list)(list)->prev; |
| 4767 | msg = (TLS13EarlyData *)cur_p; |
| 4768 | |
| 4769 | PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p)do { (cur_p)->prev->next = (cur_p)->next; (cur_p)-> next->prev = (cur_p)->prev; } while (0); |
| 4770 | SECITEM_ZfreeItemSECITEM_ZfreeItem_Util(&msg->data, PR_FALSE0); |
| 4771 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(msg, sizeof(*msg)); |
| 4772 | } |
| 4773 | } |
| 4774 | |
| 4775 | /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.2.2 specifies the following |
| 4776 | * nonce algorithm: |
| 4777 | * |
| 4778 | * The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes, |
| 4779 | * N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD |
| 4780 | * algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS. |
| 4781 | * The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows: |
| 4782 | * |
| 4783 | * 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with |
| 4784 | * zeroes to iv_length. |
| 4785 | * |
| 4786 | * 2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static |
| 4787 | * client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role. |
| 4788 | * |
| 4789 | * The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per- |
| 4790 | * record nonce. |
| 4791 | * |
| 4792 | * Existing suites have the same nonce size: N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 bytes |
| 4793 | * |
| 4794 | * See RFC 5288 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 |
| 4795 | */ |
| 4796 | static void |
| 4797 | tls13_WriteNonce(const unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned int ivInLen, |
| 4798 | const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned int nonceLen, |
| 4799 | unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned int ivOutLen) |
| 4800 | { |
| 4801 | size_t i; |
| 4802 | unsigned int offset = ivOutLen - nonceLen; |
| 4803 | |
| 4804 | PORT_Assert(ivInLen <= ivOutLen)((ivInLen <= ivOutLen)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ivInLen <= ivOutLen" ,"tls13con.c",4804)); |
| 4805 | PORT_Assert(nonceLen <= ivOutLen)((nonceLen <= ivOutLen)?((void)0):PR_Assert("nonceLen <= ivOutLen" ,"tls13con.c",4805)); |
| 4806 | PORT_Memsetmemset(ivOut, 0, ivOutLen); |
| 4807 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivInLen); |
| 4808 | |
| 4809 | /* XOR the last n bytes of the IV with the nonce (should be a counter). */ |
| 4810 | for (i = 0; i < nonceLen; ++i) { |
| 4811 | ivOut[offset + i] ^= nonce[i]; |
| 4812 | } |
| 4813 | PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Nonce", ivOut, ivOutLen))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Nonce", ivOut , ivOutLen); |
| 4814 | } |
| 4815 | |
| 4816 | /* Setup the IV for AEAD encrypt. The PKCS #11 module will add the |
| 4817 | * counter, but it doesn't know about the DTLS epic, so we add it here. |
| 4818 | */ |
| 4819 | unsigned int |
| 4820 | tls13_SetupAeadIv(PRBool isDTLS, SSL3ProtocolVersion v, unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned char *ivIn, |
| 4821 | unsigned int offset, unsigned int ivLen, DTLSEpoch epoch) |
| 4822 | { |
| 4823 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivLen); |
| 4824 | if (isDTLS && v < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 4825 | /* handle the tls 1.2 counter mode case, the epoc is copied |
| 4826 | * instead of xored. We accomplish this by clearing ivOut |
| 4827 | * before running xor. */ |
| 4828 | if (offset >= ivLen) { |
| 4829 | ivOut[offset] = ivOut[offset + 1] = 0; |
| 4830 | } |
| 4831 | ivOut[offset] ^= (unsigned char)(epoch >> BPB8) & 0xff; |
| 4832 | ivOut[offset + 1] ^= (unsigned char)(epoch)&0xff; |
| 4833 | offset += 2; |
| 4834 | } |
| 4835 | |
| 4836 | return offset; |
| 4837 | } |
| 4838 | |
| 4839 | /* |
| 4840 | * Do a single AEAD for TLS. This differs from PK11_AEADOp in the following |
| 4841 | * ways. |
| 4842 | * 1) If context is not supplied, it treats the operation as a single shot |
| 4843 | * and creates a context from symKey and mech. |
| 4844 | * 2) It always assumes the tag will be at the end of the buffer |
| 4845 | * (in on decrypt, out on encrypt) just like the old single shot. |
| 4846 | * 3) If we aren't generating an IV, it uses tls13_WriteNonce to create the |
| 4847 | * nonce. |
| 4848 | * NOTE is context is supplied, symKey and mech are ignored |
| 4849 | */ |
| 4850 | SECStatus |
| 4851 | tls13_AEAD(PK11Context *context, PRBool decrypt, |
| 4852 | CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivGen, unsigned int fixedbits, |
| 4853 | const unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned int ivLen, |
| 4854 | const unsigned char *nonceIn, unsigned int nonceLen, |
| 4855 | const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen, |
| 4856 | unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxout, |
| 4857 | unsigned int tagLen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inLen) |
| 4858 | { |
| 4859 | unsigned char *tag; |
| 4860 | unsigned char iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH24]; |
| 4861 | unsigned char tagbuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX64]; |
| 4862 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4863 | |
| 4864 | /* must have either context or the symKey set */ |
| 4865 | if (!context) { |
| 4866 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 4867 | return SECFailure; |
| 4868 | } |
| 4869 | |
| 4870 | PORT_Assert(ivLen <= MAX_IV_LENGTH)((ivLen <= 24)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ivLen <= MAX_IV_LENGTH" ,"tls13con.c",4870)); |
| 4871 | PORT_Assert(tagLen <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX)((tagLen <= 64)?((void)0):PR_Assert("tagLen <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX" ,"tls13con.c",4871)); |
| 4872 | if (!ivOut) { |
| 4873 | ivOut = iv; /* caller doesn't need a returned, iv */ |
| 4874 | } |
| 4875 | |
| 4876 | if (ivGen == CKG_NO_GENERATE0x00000000UL) { |
| 4877 | tls13_WriteNonce(ivIn, ivLen, nonceIn, nonceLen, ivOut, ivLen); |
| 4878 | } else if (ivIn != ivOut) { |
| 4879 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivLen); |
| 4880 | } |
| 4881 | if (decrypt) { |
| 4882 | inLen = inLen - tagLen; |
| 4883 | tag = (unsigned char *)in + inLen; |
| 4884 | /* tag is const on decrypt, but returned on encrypt */ |
| 4885 | } else { |
| 4886 | /* tag is written to a separate buffer, then added to the end |
| 4887 | * of the actual output buffer. This allows output buffer to be larger |
| 4888 | * than the input buffer and everything still work */ |
| 4889 | tag = tagbuf; |
| 4890 | } |
| 4891 | rv = PK11_AEADOp(context, ivGen, fixedbits, ivOut, ivLen, aad, aadLen, |
| 4892 | out, (int *)outLen, maxout, tag, tagLen, in, inLen); |
| 4893 | /* on encrypt SSL always puts the tag at the end of the buffer */ |
| 4894 | if ((rv == SECSuccess) && !(decrypt)) { |
| 4895 | unsigned int len = *outLen; |
| 4896 | /* make sure there is still space */ |
| 4897 | if (len + tagLen > maxout) { |
| 4898 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
| 4899 | return SECFailure; |
| 4900 | } |
| 4901 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(out + len, tag, tagLen); |
| 4902 | *outLen += tagLen; |
| 4903 | } |
| 4904 | return rv; |
| 4905 | } |
| 4906 | |
| 4907 | static SECStatus |
| 4908 | tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 4909 | { |
| 4910 | SECStatus rv; |
| 4911 | PRUint32 innerLength; |
| 4912 | SECItem oldAlpn = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 4913 | |
| 4914 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4914)); |
| 4915 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",4915)); |
| 4916 | |
| 4917 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 4918 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 4919 | |
| 4920 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4921, wait_encrypted_extensions, wait_invalid) |
| 4921 | wait_encrypted_extensions)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4921, wait_encrypted_extensions, wait_invalid); |
| 4922 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4923 | return SECFailure; |
| 4924 | } |
| 4925 | |
| 4926 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &innerLength, 2, &b, &length); |
| 4927 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4928 | return SECFailure; /* Alert already sent. */ |
| 4929 | } |
| 4930 | if (innerLength != length) { |
| 4931 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4932); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 4932 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4932); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4933 | return SECFailure; |
| 4934 | } |
| 4935 | |
| 4936 | /* If we are doing 0-RTT, then we already have an ALPN value. Stash |
| 4937 | * it for comparison. */ |
| 4938 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent && |
| 4939 | ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE) { |
| 4940 | oldAlpn = ss->xtnData.nextProto; |
| 4941 | ss->xtnData.nextProto.data = NULL((void*)0); |
| 4942 | ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT; |
| 4943 | } |
| 4944 | |
| 4945 | rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); |
| 4946 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4947 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ |
| 4948 | } |
| 4949 | |
| 4950 | /* Handle the rest of the extensions. */ |
| 4951 | rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions); |
| 4952 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 4953 | return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ |
| 4954 | } |
| 4955 | |
| 4956 | /* We can only get here if we offered 0-RTT. */ |
| 4957 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { |
| 4958 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent","tls13con.c", 4958)); |
| 4959 | if (!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
| 4960 | /* Illegal to accept 0-RTT without also accepting PSK. */ |
| 4961 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4962); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 4962 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4962); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4963 | } |
| 4964 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; |
| 4965 | |
| 4966 | /* Check that the server negotiated the same ALPN (if any). */ |
| 4967 | if (SECITEM_CompareItemSECITEM_CompareItem_Util(&oldAlpn, &ss->xtnData.nextProto)) { |
| 4968 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE0); |
| 4969 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4970); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 4970 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 4970); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4971 | return SECFailure; |
| 4972 | } |
| 4973 | /* Check that the server negotiated the same cipher suite. */ |
| 4974 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite) { |
| 4975 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4976); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0) |
| 4976 | illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , __func__, "tls13con.c", 4976); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 4977 | return SECFailure; |
| 4978 | } |
| 4979 | } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { |
| 4980 | /* Though we sent 0-RTT, the early_data extension wasn't present so the |
| 4981 | * state is unmodified; the server must have rejected 0-RTT. */ |
| 4982 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; |
| 4983 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; |
| 4984 | } else { |
| 4985 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none ||((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3 .hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)" ,"tls13con.c",4987)) |
| 4986 | (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry &&((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3 .hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)" ,"tls13con.c",4987)) |
| 4987 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored))((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3 .hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored ))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)" ,"tls13con.c",4987)); |
| 4988 | } |
| 4989 | |
| 4990 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE0); |
| 4991 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 4992 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_finished, __func__, "tls13con.c", 4992 ); |
| 4993 | } else { |
| 4994 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_cert_request, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 4994); |
| 4995 | } |
| 4996 | |
| 4997 | /* Client is done with any PSKs */ |
| 4998 | tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); |
| 4999 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5000 | |
| 5001 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5002 | } |
| 5003 | |
| 5004 | static SECStatus |
| 5005 | tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss) |
| 5006 | { |
| 5007 | sslBuffer extensions = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY{ ((void*)0), 0, 0, 0 }; |
| 5008 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5009 | |
| 5010 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5011 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5012 | |
| 5013 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5013)); |
| 5014 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5014)); |
| 5015 | |
| 5016 | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensions, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions); |
| 5017 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5018 | return SECFailure; |
| 5019 | } |
| 5020 | |
| 5021 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions, |
| 5022 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensions)((&extensions)->len) + 2); |
| 5023 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5024 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5024); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 5025 | goto loser; |
| 5026 | } |
| 5027 | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2); |
| 5028 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5029 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5029); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 5030 | goto loser; |
| 5031 | } |
| 5032 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensions); |
| 5033 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5034 | |
| 5035 | loser: |
| 5036 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensions); |
| 5037 | return SECFailure; |
| 5038 | } |
| 5039 | |
| 5040 | SECStatus |
| 5041 | tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) |
| 5042 | { |
| 5043 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 5044 | SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 5045 | unsigned int len; |
| 5046 | SSLHashType hashAlg; |
| 5047 | SSL3Hashes hash; |
| 5048 | SSL3Hashes tbsHash; /* The hash "to be signed". */ |
| 5049 | |
| 5050 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5050)); |
| 5051 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5051)); |
| 5052 | |
| 5053 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5054 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5055 | |
| 5056 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single)((ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single)?((void)0) :PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single" ,"tls13con.c",5056)); |
| 5057 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hash); |
| 5058 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5059 | return SECFailure; |
| 5060 | } |
| 5061 | |
| 5062 | /* We should have picked a signature scheme when we received a |
| 5063 | * CertificateRequest, or when we picked a server certificate. */ |
| 5064 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none)((ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none","tls13con.c" ,5064)); |
| 5065 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme == ssl_sig_none) { |
| 5066 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5067 | return SECFailure; |
| 5068 | } |
| 5069 | hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
| 5070 | rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, &hash, hashAlg, |
| 5071 | PR_TRUE1, &tbsHash); |
| 5072 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5073 | return SECFailure; |
| 5074 | } |
| 5075 | |
| 5076 | rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &tbsHash, privKey, &buf); |
| 5077 | if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 5078 | /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. |
| 5079 | * Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. |
| 5080 | * These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. |
| 5081 | */ |
| 5082 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
| 5083 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
| 5084 | |
| 5085 | slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); |
| 5086 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); |
| 5087 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); |
| 5088 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); |
| 5089 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE1; |
| 5090 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
| 5091 | } |
| 5092 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5093 | goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ |
| 5094 | } |
| 5095 | |
| 5096 | len = buf.len + 2 + 2; |
| 5097 | |
| 5098 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len); |
| 5099 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5100 | goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
| 5101 | } |
| 5102 | |
| 5103 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); |
| 5104 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5105 | goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshakeNumber */ |
| 5106 | } |
| 5107 | |
| 5108 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); |
| 5109 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5110 | goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
| 5111 | } |
| 5112 | |
| 5113 | done: |
| 5114 | /* For parity with the allocation functions, which don't use |
| 5115 | * SECITEM_AllocItem(). */ |
| 5116 | if (buf.data) |
| 5117 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(buf.data); |
| 5118 | return rv; |
| 5119 | } |
| 5120 | |
| 5121 | /* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete |
| 5122 | * tls13 CertificateVerify message |
| 5123 | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
| 5124 | */ |
| 5125 | SECStatus |
| 5126 | tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 5127 | { |
| 5128 | sslDelegatedCredential *dc = ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred; |
| 5129 | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; |
| 5130 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5131 | SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 5132 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5133 | SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; |
| 5134 | SSLHashType hashAlg; |
| 5135 | SSL3Hashes tbsHash; |
| 5136 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 5137 | |
| 5138 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5139 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5140 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5140)); |
| 5141 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5141)); |
| 5142 | |
| 5143 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 5144, wait_cert_verify, wait_invalid ) |
| 5144 | wait_cert_verify)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 5144, wait_cert_verify, wait_invalid ); |
| 5145 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5146 | return SECFailure; |
| 5147 | } |
| 5148 | |
| 5149 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); |
| 5150 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5151 | return SECFailure; |
| 5152 | } |
| 5153 | |
| 5154 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5155 | rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, b, length); |
| 5156 | } else { |
| 5157 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, b, length); |
| 5158 | } |
| 5159 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5160 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5161 | return SECFailure; |
| 5162 | } |
| 5163 | |
| 5164 | rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); |
| 5165 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5166 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 5166); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 5167 | return SECFailure; |
| 5168 | } |
| 5169 | |
| 5170 | /* Set the |spki| used to verify the handshake. When verifying with a |
| 5171 | * delegated credential (DC), this corresponds to the DC public key; |
| 5172 | * otherwise it correspond to the public key of the peer's end-entity |
| 5173 | * certificate. |
| 5174 | */ |
| 5175 | if (tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { |
| 5176 | /* DelegatedCredential.cred.expected_cert_verify_algorithm is expected |
| 5177 | * to match CertificateVerify.scheme. |
| 5178 | * DelegatedCredential.cred.expected_cert_verify_algorithm must also be |
| 5179 | * the same as was reported in ssl3_AuthCertificate. |
| 5180 | */ |
| 5181 | if (sigScheme != dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg || sigScheme != ss->sec.signatureScheme) { |
| 5182 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, __func__, "tls13con.c", 5182); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 5183 | return SECFailure; |
| 5184 | } |
| 5185 | |
| 5186 | /* Verify the DC has three steps: (1) use the peer's end-entity |
| 5187 | * certificate to verify DelegatedCredential.signature, (2) check that |
| 5188 | * the certificate has the correct key usage, and (3) check that the DC |
| 5189 | * hasn't expired. |
| 5190 | */ |
| 5191 | rv = tls13_VerifyDelegatedCredential(ss, dc); |
| 5192 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* Calls FATAL_ERROR() */ |
| 5193 | return SECFailure; |
| 5194 | } |
| 5195 | |
| 5196 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Verifying with delegated credential",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Verifying with delegated credential" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5197 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Verifying with delegated credential" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5198 | spki = dc->spki; |
| 5199 | } else { |
| 5200 | spki = &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; |
| 5201 | } |
| 5202 | |
| 5203 | rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, spki); |
| 5204 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5205 | /* Error set already */ |
| 5206 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5206); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), illegal_parameter ); } while (0); |
| 5207 | return SECFailure; |
| 5208 | } |
| 5209 | hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); |
| 5210 | |
| 5211 | rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, &hashes, hashAlg, PR_FALSE0, &tbsHash); |
| 5212 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5213 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5213); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5214 | return SECFailure; |
| 5215 | } |
| 5216 | |
| 5217 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); |
| 5218 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5219 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY); |
| 5220 | return SECFailure; |
| 5221 | } |
| 5222 | |
| 5223 | if (length != 0) { |
| 5224 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 5224); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 5225 | return SECFailure; |
| 5226 | } |
| 5227 | |
| 5228 | pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki); |
| 5229 | if (pubKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 5230 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); |
| 5231 | return SECFailure; |
| 5232 | } |
| 5233 | |
| 5234 | rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, sigScheme, |
| 5235 | &tbsHash, &signed_hash); |
| 5236 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5237 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), decrypt_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5237); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), decrypt_error); } while (0); |
| 5238 | goto loser; |
| 5239 | } |
| 5240 | |
| 5241 | /* Set the auth type and verify it is what we captured in ssl3_AuthCertificate */ |
| 5242 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 5243 | ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(sigScheme); |
| 5244 | |
| 5245 | uint32_t prelimAuthKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; |
| 5246 | rv = ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(ss, pubKey); |
| 5247 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5248 | goto loser; /* Alert sent and code set. */ |
| 5249 | } |
| 5250 | |
| 5251 | if (prelimAuthKeyBits != ss->sec.authKeyBits) { |
| 5252 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, __func__, "tls13con.c", 5252); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 5253 | goto loser; |
| 5254 | } |
| 5255 | } |
| 5256 | |
| 5257 | /* Request a client certificate now if one was requested. */ |
| 5258 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested) { |
| 5259 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer)((!ss->sec.isServer)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->sec.isServer" ,"tls13con.c",5259)); |
| 5260 | rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest( |
| 5261 | ss, ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, |
| 5262 | &ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities); |
| 5263 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5264 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5264); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5265 | goto loser; |
| 5266 | } |
| 5267 | } |
| 5268 | |
| 5269 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
| 5270 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_finished, __func__, "tls13con.c", 5270 ); |
| 5271 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5272 | |
| 5273 | loser: |
| 5274 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
| 5275 | return SECFailure; |
| 5276 | } |
| 5277 | |
| 5278 | /* Compute the PSK binder hash over: |
| 5279 | * Client HRR prefix, if present in ss->ssl3.hs.messages or ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages, |
| 5280 | * |len| bytes of |buf| */ |
| 5281 | static SECStatus |
| 5282 | tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, size_t length, |
| 5283 | SSL3Hashes *hashes, SSLHashType hashType) |
| 5284 | { |
| 5285 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5286 | PK11Context *ctx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5287 | sslBuffer *clientResidual = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5288 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 5289 | /* On the server, HRR residual is already buffered. */ |
| 5290 | clientResidual = ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx ? &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages : &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; |
| 5291 | } |
| 5292 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown)((ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown)?((void)0 ):PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown" ,"tls13con.c",5292)); |
| 5293 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5293)); |
| 5294 | |
| 5295 | PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "Binder computed over ClientHello",if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Binder computed over ClientHello" , b, length) |
| 5296 | b, length))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Binder computed over ClientHello" , b, length); |
| 5297 | |
| 5298 | ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType)); |
| 5299 | if (!ctx) { |
| 5300 | goto loser; |
| 5301 | } |
| 5302 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); |
| 5303 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5304 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 5305 | goto loser; |
| 5306 | } |
| 5307 | |
| 5308 | if (clientResidual && clientResidual->len) { |
| 5309 | PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, " with HRR prefix", clientResidual->buf,if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), " with HRR prefix" , clientResidual->buf, clientResidual->len) |
| 5310 | clientResidual->len))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), " with HRR prefix" , clientResidual->buf, clientResidual->len); |
| 5311 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, clientResidual->buf, clientResidual->len); |
| 5312 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5313 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 5314 | goto loser; |
| 5315 | } |
| 5316 | } |
| 5317 | |
| 5318 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 5319 | /* Removing the unnecessary header fields. |
| 5320 | * See ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader.*/ |
| 5321 | PORT_Assert(length >= 12)((length >= 12)?((void)0):PR_Assert("length >= 12","tls13con.c" ,5321)); |
| 5322 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, b, 4); |
| 5323 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5324 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 5325 | goto loser; |
| 5326 | } |
| 5327 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, b + 12, length - 12); |
| 5328 | } else { |
| 5329 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, b, length); |
| 5330 | } |
| 5331 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5332 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 5333 | goto loser; |
| 5334 | } |
| 5335 | rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); |
| 5336 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5337 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
| 5338 | goto loser; |
| 5339 | } |
| 5340 | |
| 5341 | PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 5342 | PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "PSK Binder hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "PSK Binder hash" , hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 5343 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5344 | |
| 5345 | loser: |
| 5346 | if (ctx) { |
| 5347 | PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 5348 | } |
| 5349 | return SECFailure; |
| 5350 | } |
| 5351 | |
| 5352 | /* Compute and inject the PSK Binder for sending. |
| 5353 | * |
| 5354 | * When sending a ClientHello, we construct all the extensions with a dummy |
| 5355 | * value for the binder. To construct the binder, we commit the entire message |
| 5356 | * up to the point where the binders start. Then we calculate the hash using |
| 5357 | * the saved message (in ss->ssl3.hs.messages). This is written over the dummy |
| 5358 | * binder, after which we write the remainder of the binder extension. */ |
| 5359 | SECStatus |
| 5360 | tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *chBuf) |
| 5361 | { |
| 5362 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 5363 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5364 | |
| 5365 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3. hs.psks)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)" ,"tls13con.c",5365)); |
| 5366 | sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next; |
| 5367 | unsigned int size = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(psk->hash); |
| 5368 | unsigned int prefixLen = extensions->len - size - 3; |
| 5369 | unsigned int finishedLen; |
| 5370 | |
| 5371 | PORT_Assert(extensions->len >= size + 3)((extensions->len >= size + 3)?((void)0):PR_Assert("extensions->len >= size + 3" ,"tls13con.c",5371)); |
| 5372 | |
| 5373 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chBuf, extensions->len, 2); |
| 5374 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5375 | return SECFailure; |
| 5376 | } |
| 5377 | |
| 5378 | /* Only write the extension up to the point before the binders. Assume that |
| 5379 | * the pre_shared_key extension is at the end of the buffer. Don't write |
| 5380 | * the binder, or the lengths that precede it (a 2 octet length for the list |
| 5381 | * of all binders, plus a 1 octet length for the binder length). */ |
| 5382 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(chBuf, extensions->buf, prefixLen); |
| 5383 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5384 | return SECFailure; |
| 5385 | } |
| 5386 | |
| 5387 | /* Calculate the binder based on what has been written out. */ |
| 5388 | rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(ss, chBuf->buf, chBuf->len, &hashes, psk->hash); |
| 5389 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5390 | return SECFailure; |
| 5391 | } |
| 5392 | |
| 5393 | /* Write the binder into the extensions buffer, over the zeros we reserved |
| 5394 | * previously. This avoids an allocation and means that we don't need a |
| 5395 | * separate write for the extra bits that precede the binder. */ |
| 5396 | PORT_Assert(psk->binderKey)((psk->binderKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("psk->binderKey", "tls13con.c",5396)); |
| 5397 | rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, psk->binderKey, |
| 5398 | psk->hash, &hashes, PR_TRUE1, |
| 5399 | extensions->buf + extensions->len - size, |
| 5400 | &finishedLen, size); |
| 5401 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5402 | return SECFailure; |
| 5403 | } |
| 5404 | PORT_Assert(finishedLen == size)((finishedLen == size)?((void)0):PR_Assert("finishedLen == size" ,"tls13con.c",5404)); |
| 5405 | |
| 5406 | /* Write out the remainder of the extension. */ |
| 5407 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(chBuf, extensions->buf + prefixLen, |
| 5408 | extensions->len - prefixLen); |
| 5409 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5410 | return SECFailure; |
| 5411 | } |
| 5412 | |
| 5413 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5414 | } |
| 5415 | |
| 5416 | static SECStatus |
| 5417 | tls13_ComputeFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, |
| 5418 | SSLHashType hashType, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
| 5419 | PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, |
| 5420 | unsigned int maxOutputLen) |
| 5421 | { |
| 5422 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5423 | PK11Context *hmacCtx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5424 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg = tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(hashType); |
| 5425 | SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 5426 | unsigned int outputLenUint; |
| 5427 | const char *label = kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret; |
| 5428 | PK11SymKey *secret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5429 | |
| 5430 | PORT_Assert(baseKey)((baseKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("baseKey","tls13con.c",5430)); |
| 5431 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s calculate finished",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s calculate finished" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )) |
| 5432 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s calculate finished" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" )); |
| 5433 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 5434 | |
| 5435 | /* Now derive the appropriate finished secret from the base secret. */ |
| 5436 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(baseKey, hashType, |
| 5437 | NULL((void*)0), 0, label, strlen(label), |
| 5438 | tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(hashType), |
| 5439 | tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType), |
| 5440 | ss->protocolVariant, &secret); |
| 5441 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5442 | goto abort; |
| 5443 | } |
| 5444 | |
| 5445 | PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType))((hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType))?((void )0):PR_Assert("hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType)" ,"tls13con.c",5445)); |
| 5446 | hmacCtx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macAlg, CKA_SIGN0x00000108UL, |
| 5447 | secret, ¶m); |
| 5448 | if (!hmacCtx) { |
| 5449 | goto abort; |
| 5450 | } |
| 5451 | |
| 5452 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmacCtx); |
| 5453 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 5454 | goto abort; |
| 5455 | |
| 5456 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmacCtx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
| 5457 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 5458 | goto abort; |
| 5459 | |
| 5460 | PORT_Assert(maxOutputLen >= tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType))((maxOutputLen >= tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType))?((void )0):PR_Assert("maxOutputLen >= tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType)" ,"tls13con.c",5460)); |
| 5461 | rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmacCtx, output, &outputLenUint, maxOutputLen); |
| 5462 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 5463 | goto abort; |
| 5464 | *outputLen = outputLenUint; |
| 5465 | |
| 5466 | PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); |
| 5467 | PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 5468 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "finished value", output, outputLenUint))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "finished value", output, outputLenUint); |
| 5469 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5470 | |
| 5471 | abort: |
| 5472 | if (secret) { |
| 5473 | PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); |
| 5474 | } |
| 5475 | |
| 5476 | if (hmacCtx) { |
| 5477 | PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE1); |
| 5478 | } |
| 5479 | |
| 5480 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5481 | return SECFailure; |
| 5482 | } |
| 5483 | |
| 5484 | static SECStatus |
| 5485 | tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey) |
| 5486 | { |
| 5487 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5488 | PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE64]; |
| 5489 | unsigned int finishedLen; |
| 5490 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 5491 | |
| 5492 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send finished handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5493 | |
| 5494 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5494)); |
| 5495 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5495)); |
| 5496 | |
| 5497 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); |
| 5498 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5499 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5499); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 5500 | return SECFailure; |
| 5501 | } |
| 5502 | |
| 5503 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockRead_Util((ss)->specLock ); }; |
| 5504 | rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, baseKey, tls13_GetHash(ss), &hashes, PR_TRUE1, |
| 5505 | finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); |
| 5506 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockRead_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 5507 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5508 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5508); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 5509 | return SECFailure; |
| 5510 | } |
| 5511 | |
| 5512 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, finishedLen); |
| 5513 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5514 | return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ |
| 5515 | } |
| 5516 | |
| 5517 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, finishedBuf, finishedLen); |
| 5518 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5519 | return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ |
| 5520 | } |
| 5521 | |
| 5522 | /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Record key log */ |
| 5523 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5524 | } |
| 5525 | |
| 5526 | static SECStatus |
| 5527 | tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType message, |
| 5528 | PK11SymKey *secret, |
| 5529 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, |
| 5530 | const SSL3Hashes *hashes) |
| 5531 | { |
| 5532 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5533 | PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE64]; |
| 5534 | unsigned int finishedLen; |
| 5535 | |
| 5536 | if (!hashes) { |
| 5537 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5537); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5538 | return SECFailure; |
| 5539 | } |
| 5540 | |
| 5541 | rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, secret, tls13_GetHash(ss), hashes, PR_FALSE0, |
| 5542 | finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); |
| 5543 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5544 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5544); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5545 | return SECFailure; |
| 5546 | } |
| 5547 | |
| 5548 | if (length != finishedLen) { |
| 5549 | #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
| 5550 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, message == ssl_hs_finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, message == ssl_hs_finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5550); PORT_SetError_Util(message == ssl_hs_finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); } while (0); tls13_FatalError (ss, message == ssl_hs_finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 5551 | return SECFailure; |
| 5552 | #endif |
| 5553 | } |
| 5554 | |
| 5555 | if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(b, finishedBuf, finishedLen) != 0) { |
| 5556 | #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
| 5557 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 5558); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE , decrypt_error); } while (0) |
| 5558 | decrypt_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 5558); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE , decrypt_error); } while (0); |
| 5559 | return SECFailure; |
| 5560 | #endif |
| 5561 | } |
| 5562 | |
| 5563 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5564 | } |
| 5565 | |
| 5566 | static SECStatus |
| 5567 | tls13_CommonHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, |
| 5568 | PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 5569 | { |
| 5570 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5571 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
| 5572 | |
| 5573 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 5574, wait_finished, wait_invalid) |
| 5574 | wait_finished)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED" , __func__, "tls13con.c", 5574, wait_finished, wait_invalid); |
| 5575 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5576 | return SECFailure; |
| 5577 | } |
| 5578 | ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight = PR_TRUE1; |
| 5579 | |
| 5580 | rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); |
| 5581 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5582 | LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5582); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); |
| 5583 | return SECFailure; |
| 5584 | } |
| 5585 | |
| 5586 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5587 | rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); |
| 5588 | } else { |
| 5589 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); |
| 5590 | } |
| 5591 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5592 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5593 | return SECFailure; |
| 5594 | } |
| 5595 | |
| 5596 | return tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, ssl_hs_finished, |
| 5597 | key, b, length, &hashes); |
| 5598 | } |
| 5599 | |
| 5600 | static SECStatus |
| 5601 | tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 5602 | { |
| 5603 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5604 | |
| 5605 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5605)); |
| 5606 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5606)); |
| 5607 | |
| 5608 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client handle finished handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client handle finished handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5609 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client handle finished handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5610 | |
| 5611 | rv = tls13_CommonHandleFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret, |
| 5612 | b, length); |
| 5613 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5614 | return SECFailure; |
| 5615 | } |
| 5616 | |
| 5617 | return tls13_SendClientSecondRound(ss); |
| 5618 | } |
| 5619 | |
| 5620 | static SECStatus |
| 5621 | tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 5622 | { |
| 5623 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5624 | |
| 5625 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5625)); |
| 5626 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5626)); |
| 5627 | |
| 5628 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server handle finished handshake",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server handle finished handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 5629 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server handle finished handshake" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 5630 | |
| 5631 | if (!tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { |
| 5632 | /* Receiving this message might be the first sign we have that |
| 5633 | * early data is over, so pretend we received EOED. */ |
| 5634 | rv = tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(ss); |
| 5635 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5636 | return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ |
| 5637 | } |
| 5638 | |
| 5639 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
| 5640 | /* Finalize the RTT estimate. */ |
| 5641 | ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss) - ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate; |
| 5642 | } |
| 5643 | } |
| 5644 | |
| 5645 | rv = tls13_CommonHandleFinished(ss, |
| 5646 | ss->firstHsDone ? ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret : ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret, |
| 5647 | b, length); |
| 5648 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5649 | return SECFailure; |
| 5650 | } |
| 5651 | |
| 5652 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5653 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake)tls13_SetHsState(ss, idle_handshake, __func__, "tls13con.c", 5653 ); |
| 5654 | |
| 5655 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL","tls13con.c",5655) ); |
| 5656 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE1); |
| 5657 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5658 | |
| 5659 | ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested = PR_FALSE0; |
| 5660 | |
| 5661 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.keyUpdateDeferred) { |
| 5662 | rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.deferredKeyUpdateRequest, |
| 5663 | PR_FALSE0); |
| 5664 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5665 | return SECFailure; /* error is set. */ |
| 5666 | } |
| 5667 | ss->ssl3.hs.keyUpdateDeferred = PR_FALSE0; |
| 5668 | } |
| 5669 | |
| 5670 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5671 | } |
| 5672 | |
| 5673 | if (!tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss) && |
| 5674 | (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_done)) { |
| 5675 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
| 5676 | } |
| 5677 | |
| 5678 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 5679 | ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5680 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5681 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5681); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5682 | return SECFailure; |
| 5683 | } |
| 5684 | |
| 5685 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 5686 | ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, TrafficKeyClearText); |
| 5687 | /* We need to keep the handshake cipher spec so we can |
| 5688 | * read re-transmitted client Finished. */ |
| 5689 | rv = dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.hdTimer, |
| 5690 | DTLS_RETRANSMIT_FINISHED_MS30000, |
| 5691 | dtls13_HolddownTimerCb); |
| 5692 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5693 | return SECFailure; |
| 5694 | } |
| 5695 | } |
| 5696 | |
| 5697 | rv = tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(ss); |
| 5698 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5699 | return SECFailure; |
| 5700 | } |
| 5701 | |
| 5702 | rv = tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); |
| 5703 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5704 | return SECFailure; |
| 5705 | } |
| 5706 | |
| 5707 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 5708 | /* If resumption, authType is the original value and not ssl_auth_psk. */ |
| 5709 | if (ss->opt.enableSessionTickets && ss->sec.authType != ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 5710 | rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss, NULL((void*)0), 0); |
| 5711 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5712 | goto loser; |
| 5713 | } |
| 5714 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 5715 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5716 | goto loser; |
| 5717 | } |
| 5718 | } |
| 5719 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 5720 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5721 | |
| 5722 | loser: |
| 5723 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 5724 | return SECFailure; |
| 5725 | } |
| 5726 | |
| 5727 | static SECStatus |
| 5728 | tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) |
| 5729 | { |
| 5730 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5730)); |
| 5731 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5731)); |
| 5732 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL)((ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL","tls13con.c",5732)); |
| 5733 | |
| 5734 | /* The first handshake is now completed. */ |
| 5735 | ss->handshake = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5736 | |
| 5737 | /* Don't need this. */ |
| 5738 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); |
| 5739 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5740 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); |
| 5741 | ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5742 | |
| 5743 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake)tls13_SetHsState(ss, idle_handshake, __func__, "tls13con.c", 5743 ); |
| 5744 | |
| 5745 | return ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); |
| 5746 | } |
| 5747 | |
| 5748 | /* Do the parts of sending the client's second round that require |
| 5749 | * the XmitBuf lock. */ |
| 5750 | static SECStatus |
| 5751 | tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(sslSocket *ss) |
| 5752 | { |
| 5753 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5754 | unsigned int offset = 0; |
| 5755 | |
| 5756 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5756)); |
| 5757 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending)((!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending","tls13con.c",5757 )); |
| 5758 | |
| 5759 | PRBool sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && |
| 5760 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL((void*)0) && |
| 5761 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL((void*)0); |
| 5762 | |
| 5763 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5764 | offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len); |
| 5765 | } |
| 5766 | |
| 5767 | if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { |
| 5768 | ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE0; |
| 5769 | rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); |
| 5770 | /* Don't send verify */ |
| 5771 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5772 | goto alert_error; /* error code is set. */ |
| 5773 | } |
| 5774 | } else if (sendClientCert) { |
| 5775 | rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); |
| 5776 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5777 | goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ |
| 5778 | } |
| 5779 | } |
| 5780 | |
| 5781 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5782 | rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, |
| 5783 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->buf) + offset, |
| 5784 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len) - offset); |
| 5785 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5786 | goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ |
| 5787 | } |
| 5788 | } |
| 5789 | |
| 5790 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested) { |
| 5791 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5792 | if (ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena) { |
| 5793 | PORT_FreeArenaPORT_FreeArena_Util(ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5794 | ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5795 | } |
| 5796 | PORT_Memsetmemset(&ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities, 0, |
| 5797 | sizeof(ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities)); |
| 5798 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested = PR_FALSE0; |
| 5799 | } |
| 5800 | |
| 5801 | if (sendClientCert) { |
| 5802 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5803 | offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len); |
| 5804 | } |
| 5805 | |
| 5806 | rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
| 5807 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
| 5808 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 5809 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5810 | goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ |
| 5811 | } |
| 5812 | |
| 5813 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
| 5814 | rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, |
| 5815 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->buf) + offset, |
| 5816 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)((&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf)->len) - offset); |
| 5817 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5818 | goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ |
| 5819 | } |
| 5820 | } |
| 5821 | } |
| 5822 | |
| 5823 | rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->firstHsDone ? ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret : ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); |
| 5824 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5825 | goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ |
| 5826 | } |
| 5827 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 5828 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5829 | /* No point in sending an alert here because we're not going to |
| 5830 | * be able to send it if we couldn't flush the handshake. */ |
| 5831 | goto error; |
| 5832 | } |
| 5833 | |
| 5834 | return SECSuccess; |
| 5835 | |
| 5836 | alert_error: |
| 5837 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5837); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); tls13_FatalError(ss, PORT_GetError_Util(), internal_error) ; } while (0); |
| 5838 | return SECFailure; |
| 5839 | error: |
| 5840 | LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError())do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError_Util(), __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5840); PORT_SetError_Util(PORT_GetError_Util()); } while (0 ); |
| 5841 | return SECFailure; |
| 5842 | } |
| 5843 | |
| 5844 | static SECStatus |
| 5845 | tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) |
| 5846 | { |
| 5847 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5848 | |
| 5849 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->recvBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5849)); |
| 5850 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",5850)); |
| 5851 | |
| 5852 | /* Defer client authentication sending if we are still waiting for server |
| 5853 | * authentication. This avoids unnecessary disclosure of client credentials |
| 5854 | * to an unauthenticated server. |
| 5855 | */ |
| 5856 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { |
| 5857 | PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget")PR_Assert("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget","tls13con.c" ,5857); |
| 5858 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5859 | return SECFailure; |
| 5860 | } |
| 5861 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending || ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) { |
| 5862 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondRound because"if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondRound because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd) |
| 5863 | " certificate authentication is still pending.",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondRound because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd) |
| 5864 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondRound because" " certificate authentication is still pending.", getpid(), ss ->fd); |
| 5865 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendClientSecondRound; |
| 5866 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR(-5998L)); |
| 5867 | return SECFailure; |
| 5868 | } |
| 5869 | |
| 5870 | rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); |
| 5871 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5872 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5872); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5873 | return SECFailure; |
| 5874 | } |
| 5875 | |
| 5876 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 5877 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5878 | rv = tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(ss); |
| 5879 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5880 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5881 | return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ |
| 5882 | } |
| 5883 | } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && |
| 5884 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none && |
| 5885 | !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 5886 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5887 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
| 5888 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5889 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5890 | return rv; |
| 5891 | } |
| 5892 | } |
| 5893 | |
| 5894 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 5895 | ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5896 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5897 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 5897); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE , internal_error); } while (0); |
| 5898 | return SECFailure; |
| 5899 | } |
| 5900 | |
| 5901 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 5902 | ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5903 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5904 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 5904); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 5905 | return SECFailure; |
| 5906 | } |
| 5907 | |
| 5908 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5909 | /* This call can't block, as clientAuthCertificatePending is checked above */ |
| 5910 | rv = tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(ss); |
| 5911 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; /*******************************/ |
| 5912 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5913 | return SECFailure; |
| 5914 | } |
| 5915 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, |
| 5916 | ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE0); |
| 5917 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5918 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 5919 | return SECFailure; |
| 5920 | } |
| 5921 | |
| 5922 | rv = tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(ss); |
| 5923 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5924 | return SECFailure; |
| 5925 | } |
| 5926 | |
| 5927 | /* The handshake is now finished */ |
| 5928 | return tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); |
| 5929 | } |
| 5930 | |
| 5931 | /* |
| 5932 | * enum { (65535) } TicketExtensionType; |
| 5933 | * |
| 5934 | * struct { |
| 5935 | * TicketExtensionType extension_type; |
| 5936 | * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; |
| 5937 | * } TicketExtension; |
| 5938 | * |
| 5939 | * struct { |
| 5940 | * uint32 ticket_lifetime; |
| 5941 | * uint32 ticket_age_add; |
| 5942 | * opaque ticket_nonce<1..255>; |
| 5943 | * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; |
| 5944 | * TicketExtension extensions<0..2^16-2>; |
| 5945 | * } NewSessionTicket; |
| 5946 | */ |
| 5947 | |
| 5948 | static SECStatus |
| 5949 | tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *appToken, |
| 5950 | unsigned int appTokenLen) |
| 5951 | { |
| 5952 | PRUint16 message_length; |
| 5953 | PK11SymKey *secret; |
| 5954 | SECItem ticket_data = { 0, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 5955 | SECStatus rv; |
| 5956 | NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; |
| 5957 | PRUint32 max_early_data_size_len = 0; |
| 5958 | PRUint32 greaseLen = 0; |
| 5959 | PRUint8 ticketNonce[sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce)]; |
| 5960 | sslBuffer ticketNonceBuf = SSL_BUFFER(ticketNonce){ ticketNonce, 0, sizeof(ticketNonce), 1 }; |
| 5961 | |
| 5962 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send new session ticket message %d",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send new session ticket message %d" , getpid(), ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce) |
| 5963 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send new session ticket message %d" , getpid(), ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce); |
| 5964 | |
| 5965 | ticket.flags = 0; |
| 5966 | if (ss->opt.enable0RttData) { |
| 5967 | ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; |
| 5968 | max_early_data_size_len = 8; /* type + len + value. */ |
| 5969 | } |
| 5970 | ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = ssl_ticket_lifetime; |
| 5971 | |
| 5972 | if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { |
| 5973 | greaseLen = 4; /* type + len + 0 (empty) */ |
| 5974 | } |
| 5975 | |
| 5976 | /* The ticket age obfuscator. */ |
| 5977 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom((PRUint8 *)&ticket.ticket_age_add, |
| 5978 | sizeof(ticket.ticket_age_add)); |
| 5979 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 5980 | goto loser; |
| 5981 | |
| 5982 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&ticketNonceBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce, |
| 5983 | sizeof(ticketNonce)); |
| 5984 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5985 | goto loser; |
| 5986 | } |
| 5987 | ++ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce; |
| 5988 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret, |
| 5989 | tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 5990 | ticketNonce, sizeof(ticketNonce), |
| 5991 | kHkdfLabelResumption, |
| 5992 | strlen(kHkdfLabelResumption), |
| 5993 | CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, |
| 5994 | tls13_GetHashSize(ss), |
| 5995 | ss->protocolVariant, &secret); |
| 5996 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 5997 | goto loser; |
| 5998 | } |
| 5999 | |
| 6000 | rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &ticket, appToken, appTokenLen, |
| 6001 | secret, &ticket_data); |
| 6002 | PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); |
| 6003 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6004 | goto loser; |
| 6005 | |
| 6006 | message_length = |
| 6007 | 4 + /* lifetime */ |
| 6008 | 4 + /* ticket_age_add */ |
| 6009 | 1 + sizeof(ticketNonce) + /* ticket_nonce */ |
| 6010 | 2 + /* extensions lentgh */ |
| 6011 | max_early_data_size_len + /* max_early_data_size extension length */ |
| 6012 | greaseLen + /* GREASE extension length */ |
| 6013 | 2 + /* ticket length */ |
| 6014 | ticket_data.len; |
| 6015 | |
| 6016 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket, |
| 6017 | message_length); |
| 6018 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6019 | goto loser; |
| 6020 | |
| 6021 | /* This is a fixed value. */ |
| 6022 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_ticket_lifetime, 4); |
| 6023 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6024 | goto loser; |
| 6025 | |
| 6026 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_age_add, 4); |
| 6027 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6028 | goto loser; |
| 6029 | |
| 6030 | /* The ticket nonce. */ |
| 6031 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticketNonce, sizeof(ticketNonce), 1); |
| 6032 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6033 | goto loser; |
| 6034 | |
| 6035 | /* Encode the ticket. */ |
| 6036 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( |
| 6037 | ss, ticket_data.data, ticket_data.len, 2); |
| 6038 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6039 | goto loser; |
| 6040 | |
| 6041 | /* Extensions */ |
| 6042 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, max_early_data_size_len + greaseLen, 2); |
| 6043 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6044 | goto loser; |
| 6045 | |
| 6046 | /* GREASE NewSessionTicket: |
| 6047 | * When sending a NewSessionTicket message in TLS 1.3, a server MAY select |
| 6048 | * one or more GREASE extension values and advertise them as extensions |
| 6049 | * with varying length and contents [RFC8701, SEction 4.1]. */ |
| 6050 | if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { |
| 6051 | PR_ASSERT(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->version >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",6051)); |
| 6052 | |
| 6053 | PRUint16 grease; |
| 6054 | rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(&grease); |
| 6055 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6056 | goto loser; |
| 6057 | /* Extension type */ |
| 6058 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, grease, 2); |
| 6059 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6060 | goto loser; |
| 6061 | /* Extension length */ |
| 6062 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); |
| 6063 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6064 | goto loser; |
| 6065 | } |
| 6066 | |
| 6067 | /* Max early data size extension. */ |
| 6068 | if (max_early_data_size_len) { |
| 6069 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber( |
| 6070 | ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, 2); |
| 6071 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6072 | goto loser; |
| 6073 | |
| 6074 | /* Length */ |
| 6075 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, 2); |
| 6076 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6077 | goto loser; |
| 6078 | |
| 6079 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->opt.maxEarlyDataSize, 4); |
| 6080 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 6081 | goto loser; |
| 6082 | } |
| 6083 | |
| 6084 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE0); |
| 6085 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6086 | |
| 6087 | loser: |
| 6088 | if (ticket_data.data) { |
| 6089 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE0); |
| 6090 | } |
| 6091 | return SECFailure; |
| 6092 | } |
| 6093 | |
| 6094 | SECStatus |
| 6095 | SSLExp_SendSessionTicket(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *token, |
| 6096 | unsigned int tokenLen) |
| 6097 | { |
| 6098 | sslSocket *ss; |
| 6099 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6100 | |
| 6101 | ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
| 6102 | if (!ss) { |
| 6103 | return SECFailure; |
| 6104 | } |
| 6105 | |
| 6106 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6107 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION); |
| 6108 | return SECFailure; |
| 6109 | } |
| 6110 | |
| 6111 | if (!ss->sec.isServer || !tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) || |
| 6112 | tokenLen > 0xffff) { |
| 6113 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 6114 | return SECFailure; |
| 6115 | } |
| 6116 | |
| 6117 | /* Disable tickets if we can trace this connection back to a PSK. |
| 6118 | * We aren't able to issue tickets (currently) without a certificate. |
| 6119 | * As PSK =~ resumption, there is no reason to do this. */ |
| 6120 | if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { |
| 6121 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED); |
| 6122 | return SECFailure; |
| 6123 | } |
| 6124 | |
| 6125 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { ((!((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss )->xmitBufLock)) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",6125)); PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); } }; |
| 6126 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 6127 | rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss, token, tokenLen); |
| 6128 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
| 6129 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
| 6130 | } |
| 6131 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 6132 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock )); }; |
| 6133 | |
| 6134 | return rv; |
| 6135 | } |
| 6136 | |
| 6137 | static SECStatus |
| 6138 | tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 6139 | { |
| 6140 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6141 | PRUint32 utmp; |
| 6142 | NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; |
| 6143 | SECItem data; |
| 6144 | SECItem ticket_nonce; |
| 6145 | SECItem ticket_data; |
| 6146 | |
| 6147 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle new session ticket message",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle new session ticket message" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6148 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle new session ticket message" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6149 | |
| 6150 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6151, idle_handshake, wait_invalid) |
| 6151 | idle_handshake)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6151, idle_handshake, wait_invalid); |
| 6152 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6153 | return SECFailure; |
| 6154 | } |
| 6155 | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { |
| 6156 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6157); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , unexpected_message); } while (0) |
| 6157 | unexpected_message)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6157); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , unexpected_message); } while (0); |
| 6158 | return SECFailure; |
| 6159 | } |
| 6160 | |
| 6161 | ticket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(ss); |
| 6162 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint, 4, &b, |
| 6163 | &length); |
| 6164 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6165 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6166); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 6166 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6166); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6167 | return SECFailure; |
| 6168 | } |
| 6169 | ticket.ticket.type = siBuffer; |
| 6170 | |
| 6171 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp), |
| 6172 | &b, &length); |
| 6173 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6174 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
| 6175 | return SECFailure; |
| 6176 | } |
| 6177 | ticket.ticket_age_add = PR_ntohl(utmp); |
| 6178 | |
| 6179 | /* The nonce. */ |
| 6180 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticket_nonce, 1, &b, &length); |
| 6181 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6182 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6183); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 6183 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6183); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6184 | return SECFailure; |
| 6185 | } |
| 6186 | |
| 6187 | /* Get the ticket value. */ |
| 6188 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticket_data, 2, &b, &length); |
| 6189 | if (rv != SECSuccess || !ticket_data.len) { |
| 6190 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6191); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 6191 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6191); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6192 | return SECFailure; |
| 6193 | } |
| 6194 | |
| 6195 | /* Parse extensions. */ |
| 6196 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &data, 2, &b, &length); |
| 6197 | if (rv != SECSuccess || length) { |
| 6198 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6199); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 6199 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6199); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6200 | return SECFailure; |
| 6201 | } |
| 6202 | |
| 6203 | rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &data.data, |
| 6204 | &data.len, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket); |
| 6205 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6206 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6207); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0) |
| 6207 | decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6207); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6208 | return SECFailure; |
| 6209 | } |
| 6210 | if (ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size) { |
| 6211 | ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; |
| 6212 | ticket.max_early_data_size = ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size; |
| 6213 | } |
| 6214 | |
| 6215 | if (!ss->opt.noCache) { |
| 6216 | PK11SymKey *secret; |
| 6217 | |
| 6218 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid)((ss->sec.ci.sid)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.ci.sid", "tls13con.c",6218)); |
| 6219 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &ticket.ticket, &ticket_data); |
| 6220 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6221 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6221); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 6222 | return SECFailure; |
| 6223 | } |
| 6224 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Caching session ticket",if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Caching session ticket" , ticket.ticket.data, ticket.ticket.len) |
| 6225 | ticket.ticket.data,if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Caching session ticket" , ticket.ticket.data, ticket.ticket.len) |
| 6226 | ticket.ticket.len))if (ssl_trace >= (50)) ssl_PrintBuf (ss, "Caching session ticket" , ticket.ticket.data, ticket.ticket.len); |
| 6227 | |
| 6228 | /* Replace a previous session ticket when |
| 6229 | * we receive a second NewSessionTicket message. */ |
| 6230 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_client_cache || |
| 6231 | ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) { |
| 6232 | /* Create a new session ID. */ |
| 6233 | sslSessionID *sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE0); |
| 6234 | if (!sid) { |
| 6235 | return SECFailure; |
| 6236 | } |
| 6237 | |
| 6238 | /* Copy over the peerCert. */ |
| 6239 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert)((ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert" ,"tls13con.c",6239)); |
| 6240 | sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); |
| 6241 | if (!sid->peerCert) { |
| 6242 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
| 6243 | return SECFailure; |
| 6244 | } |
| 6245 | |
| 6246 | /* Destroy the old SID. */ |
| 6247 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
| 6248 | ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
| 6249 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
| 6250 | } |
| 6251 | |
| 6252 | ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ticket); |
| 6253 | PORT_Assert(!ticket.ticket.data)((!ticket.ticket.data)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ticket.ticket.data" ,"tls13con.c",6253)); |
| 6254 | |
| 6255 | rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret, |
| 6256 | tls13_GetHash(ss), |
| 6257 | ticket_nonce.data, ticket_nonce.len, |
| 6258 | kHkdfLabelResumption, |
| 6259 | strlen(kHkdfLabelResumption), |
| 6260 | CKM_HKDF_DERIVE0x0000402aUL, |
| 6261 | tls13_GetHashSize(ss), |
| 6262 | ss->protocolVariant, &secret); |
| 6263 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6264 | return SECFailure; |
| 6265 | } |
| 6266 | |
| 6267 | rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret); |
| 6268 | PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); |
| 6269 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6270 | return SECFailure; |
| 6271 | } |
| 6272 | |
| 6273 | /* Cache the session. */ |
| 6274 | ssl_CacheSessionID(ss); |
| 6275 | } |
| 6276 | |
| 6277 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6278 | } |
| 6279 | |
| 6280 | #define _M_NONE0 0 |
| 6281 | #define _M(a) (1 << PR_MIN(a, 31)((a)<(31)?(a):(31))) |
| 6282 | #define _M1(a) (_M(ssl_hs_##a)) |
| 6283 | #define _M2(a, b) (_M1(a) | _M1(b)) |
| 6284 | #define _M3(a, b, c) (_M1(a) | _M2(b, c)) |
| 6285 | |
| 6286 | static const struct { |
| 6287 | PRUint16 ex_value; |
| 6288 | PRUint32 messages; |
| 6289 | } KnownExtensions[] = { |
| 6290 | { ssl_server_name_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, |
| 6291 | { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, |
| 6292 | { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate_request) }, |
| 6293 | { ssl_signature_algorithms_cert_xtn, _M2(client_hello, |
| 6294 | certificate_request) }, |
| 6295 | { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, |
| 6296 | { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, |
| 6297 | { ssl_padding_xtn, _M1(client_hello) }, |
| 6298 | { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, _M3(client_hello, server_hello, |
| 6299 | hello_retry_request) }, |
| 6300 | { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, _M2(client_hello, server_hello) }, |
| 6301 | { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, _M1(client_hello) }, |
| 6302 | { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, _M3(client_hello, encrypted_extensions, |
| 6303 | new_session_ticket) }, |
| 6304 | { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, _M3(client_hello, certificate_request, |
| 6305 | certificate) }, |
| 6306 | { ssl_cert_status_xtn, _M3(client_hello, certificate_request, |
| 6307 | certificate) }, |
| 6308 | { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate) }, |
| 6309 | { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, _M2(client_hello, hello_retry_request) }, |
| 6310 | { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate_request) }, |
| 6311 | { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, _M3(client_hello, server_hello, |
| 6312 | hello_retry_request) }, |
| 6313 | { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, |
| 6314 | { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, _M3(client_hello, encrypted_extensions, hello_retry_request) }, |
| 6315 | { ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn, _M_NONE0 /* Encoding/decoding only */ }, |
| 6316 | { ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn, _M1(client_hello) }, |
| 6317 | { ssl_certificate_compression_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate_request) } |
| 6318 | }; |
| 6319 | |
| 6320 | tls13ExtensionStatus |
| 6321 | tls13_ExtensionStatus(PRUint16 extension, SSLHandshakeType message) |
| 6322 | { |
| 6323 | unsigned int i; |
| 6324 | |
| 6325 | PORT_Assert((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6326 | (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6327 | (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6328 | (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6329 | (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6330 | (message == ssl_hs_certificate) ||(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)) |
| 6331 | (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))(((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello ) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions ) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate ) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request))?((void)0):PR_Assert ("(message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)" ,"tls13con.c",6331)); |
| 6332 | |
| 6333 | for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions)(sizeof(KnownExtensions)/sizeof((KnownExtensions)[0])); i++) { |
| 6334 | /* Hacky check for message numbers > 30. */ |
| 6335 | PORT_Assert(!(KnownExtensions[i].messages & (1U << 31)))((!(KnownExtensions[i].messages & (1U << 31)))?((void )0):PR_Assert("!(KnownExtensions[i].messages & (1U << 31))" ,"tls13con.c",6335)); |
| 6336 | if (KnownExtensions[i].ex_value == extension) { |
| 6337 | break; |
| 6338 | } |
| 6339 | } |
| 6340 | if (i >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions)(sizeof(KnownExtensions)/sizeof((KnownExtensions)[0]))) { |
| 6341 | return tls13_extension_unknown; |
| 6342 | } |
| 6343 | |
| 6344 | /* Return "disallowed" if the message mask bit isn't set. */ |
| 6345 | if (!(_M(message) & KnownExtensions[i].messages)) { |
| 6346 | return tls13_extension_disallowed; |
| 6347 | } |
| 6348 | |
| 6349 | return tls13_extension_allowed; |
| 6350 | } |
| 6351 | |
| 6352 | #undef _M |
| 6353 | #undef _M1 |
| 6354 | #undef _M2 |
| 6355 | #undef _M3 |
| 6356 | |
| 6357 | /* We cheat a bit on additional data because the AEAD interface |
| 6358 | * which doesn't have room for the record number. The AAD we |
| 6359 | * format is serialized record number followed by the true AD |
| 6360 | * (i.e., the record header) plus the serialized record number. */ |
| 6361 | static SECStatus |
| 6362 | tls13_FormatAdditionalData( |
| 6363 | sslSocket *ss, |
| 6364 | const PRUint8 *header, unsigned int headerLen, |
| 6365 | DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, |
| 6366 | PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int *aadLength, unsigned int maxLength) |
| 6367 | { |
| 6368 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6369 | sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(aad, maxLength){ aad, 0, maxLength, 1 }; |
| 6370 | |
| 6371 | if (IS_DTLS_1_OR_12(ss)((ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && ss ->version < 0x0304)) { |
| 6372 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, epoch, 2); |
| 6373 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6374 | return SECFailure; |
| 6375 | } |
| 6376 | } |
| 6377 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, seqNum, IS_DTLS_1_OR_12(ss)((ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && ss ->version < 0x0304) ? 6 : 8); |
| 6378 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6379 | return SECFailure; |
| 6380 | } |
| 6381 | |
| 6382 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, header, headerLen); |
| 6383 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6384 | return SECFailure; |
| 6385 | } |
| 6386 | |
| 6387 | *aadLength = buf.len; |
| 6388 | |
| 6389 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6390 | } |
| 6391 | |
| 6392 | PRInt32 |
| 6393 | tls13_LimitEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType type, PRInt32 toSend) |
| 6394 | { |
| 6395 | PRInt32 reduced; |
| 6396 | |
| 6397 | PORT_Assert(type == ssl_ct_application_data)((type == ssl_ct_application_data)?((void)0):PR_Assert("type == ssl_ct_application_data" ,"tls13con.c",6397)); |
| 6398 | PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->vrange.max >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",6398)); |
| 6399 | PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone)((!ss->firstHsDone)?((void)0):PR_Assert("!ss->firstHsDone" ,"tls13con.c",6399)); |
| 6400 | if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) { |
| 6401 | return toSend; |
| 6402 | } |
| 6403 | |
| 6404 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && toSend > ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining) { |
| 6405 | /* Don't split application data records in DTLS. */ |
| 6406 | return 0; |
| 6407 | } |
| 6408 | |
| 6409 | reduced = PR_MIN(toSend, ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining)((toSend)<(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining)?(toSend ):(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining)); |
| 6410 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining -= reduced; |
| 6411 | return reduced; |
| 6412 | } |
| 6413 | |
| 6414 | SECStatus |
| 6415 | tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, |
| 6416 | ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, |
| 6417 | SSLContentType type, |
| 6418 | const PRUint8 *pIn, |
| 6419 | PRUint32 contentLen, |
| 6420 | sslBuffer *wrBuf) |
| 6421 | { |
| 6422 | const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipherDef; |
| 6423 | const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; |
| 6424 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6425 | |
| 6426 | PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write)((cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write","tls13con.c",6426 )); |
| 6427 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase , cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen) |
| 6428 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase , cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen) |
| 6429 | cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase , cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen); |
| 6430 | |
| 6431 | if (contentLen + 1 + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->space - (wrBuf)->len)) { |
| 6432 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 6433 | return SECFailure; |
| 6434 | } |
| 6435 | |
| 6436 | /* Copy the data into the wrBuf. We're going to encrypt in-place |
| 6437 | * in the AEAD branch anyway */ |
| 6438 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->buf + (wrBuf)->len), pIn, contentLen); |
| 6439 | |
| 6440 | if (cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { |
| 6441 | /* Shortcut for plaintext */ |
| 6442 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, contentLen, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 6443 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess)((rv == SECSuccess)?((void)0):PR_Assert("rv == SECSuccess","tls13con.c" ,6443)); |
| 6444 | } else { |
| 6445 | PRUint8 hdr[13]; |
| 6446 | sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(hdr, sizeof(hdr)){ hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr), 1 }; |
| 6447 | PRBool needsLength; |
| 6448 | PRUint8 aad[21]; |
| 6449 | const int ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size + cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; |
| 6450 | unsigned int ivOffset = ivLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber); |
| 6451 | unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH24]; |
| 6452 | |
| 6453 | unsigned int aadLen; |
| 6454 | unsigned int len; |
| 6455 | |
| 6456 | PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead)((cipher_def->type == type_aead)?((void)0):PR_Assert("cipher_def->type == type_aead" ,"tls13con.c",6456)); |
| 6457 | |
| 6458 | /* If the following condition holds, we can skip the padding logic for |
| 6459 | * DTLS 1.3 (4.2.3). This will be the case until we support a cipher |
| 6460 | * with tag length < 15B. */ |
| 6461 | PORT_Assert(tagLen + 1 /* cType */ >= 16)((tagLen + 1 >= 16)?((void)0):PR_Assert("tagLen + 1 >= 16" ,"tls13con.c",6461)); |
| 6462 | |
| 6463 | /* Add the content type at the end. */ |
| 6464 | *(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->buf + (wrBuf)->len) + contentLen) = type; |
| 6465 | |
| 6466 | /* Create the header (ugly that we have to do it twice). */ |
| 6467 | rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, ssl_ct_application_data, |
| 6468 | &buf, &needsLength); |
| 6469 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6470 | return SECFailure; |
| 6471 | } |
| 6472 | if (needsLength) { |
| 6473 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, contentLen + 1 + tagLen, 2); |
| 6474 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6475 | return SECFailure; |
| 6476 | } |
| 6477 | } |
| 6478 | rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf)((&buf)->buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf)((&buf)->len), |
| 6479 | cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, |
| 6480 | aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad)); |
| 6481 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6482 | return SECFailure; |
| 6483 | } |
| 6484 | /* set up initial IV value */ |
| 6485 | ivOffset = tls13_SetupAeadIv(IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram), cwSpec->version, ivOut, cwSpec->keyMaterial.iv, |
| 6486 | ivOffset, ivLen, cwSpec->epoch); |
| 6487 | rv = tls13_AEAD(cwSpec->cipherContext, PR_FALSE0, |
| 6488 | CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR0x00000004UL, ivOffset * BPB8, |
| 6489 | ivOut, ivOut, ivLen, /* iv */ |
| 6490 | NULL((void*)0), 0, /* nonce */ |
| 6491 | aad + sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* aad */ |
| 6492 | aadLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), |
| 6493 | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->buf + (wrBuf)->len), /* output */ |
| 6494 | &len, /* out len */ |
| 6495 | SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->space - (wrBuf)->len), /* max out */ |
| 6496 | tagLen, |
| 6497 | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf)((wrBuf)->buf + (wrBuf)->len), /* input */ |
| 6498 | contentLen + 1); /* input len */ |
| 6499 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6500 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); |
| 6501 | return SECFailure; |
| 6502 | } |
| 6503 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 6504 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess)((rv == SECSuccess)?((void)0):PR_Assert("rv == SECSuccess","tls13con.c" ,6504)); |
| 6505 | } |
| 6506 | |
| 6507 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6508 | } |
| 6509 | |
| 6510 | /* Unprotect a TLS 1.3 record and leave the result in plaintext. |
| 6511 | * |
| 6512 | * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. |
| 6513 | * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). |
| 6514 | * |
| 6515 | * If SECFailure is returned, we: |
| 6516 | * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. |
| 6517 | * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. |
| 6518 | */ |
| 6519 | SECStatus |
| 6520 | tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, |
| 6521 | ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
| 6522 | SSL3Ciphertext *cText, |
| 6523 | sslBuffer *plaintext, |
| 6524 | SSLContentType *innerType, |
| 6525 | SSL3AlertDescription *alert) |
| 6526 | { |
| 6527 | const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef; |
| 6528 | const int ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size + cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; |
| 6529 | const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; |
| 6530 | const int innerTypeLen = 1; |
| 6531 | |
| 6532 | PRUint8 aad[21]; |
| 6533 | unsigned int aadLen; |
| 6534 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6535 | |
| 6536 | *alert = bad_record_mac; /* Default alert for most issues. */ |
| 6537 | |
| 6538 | PORT_Assert(spec->direction == ssl_secret_read)((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read)?((void)0):PR_Assert( "spec->direction == ssl_secret_read","tls13con.c",6538)); |
| 6539 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase, cText ->seqNum, cText->buf->len) |
| 6540 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase, cText ->seqNum, cText->buf->len) |
| 6541 | cText->seqNum, cText->buf->len))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u" , getpid(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase, cText ->seqNum, cText->buf->len); |
| 6542 | |
| 6543 | /* Verify that the outer content type is right. |
| 6544 | * |
| 6545 | * For the inner content type as well as lower TLS versions this is checked |
| 6546 | * in ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleNonApllicationData(). |
| 6547 | * |
| 6548 | * For DTLS 1.3 this is checked in ssl3gthr.c/dtls_GatherData(). DTLS drops |
| 6549 | * invalid records silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. |
| 6550 | * |
| 6551 | * Also allow the DTLS short header in TLS 1.3. */ |
| 6552 | if (!(cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data || |
| 6553 | (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && |
| 6554 | ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304 && |
| 6555 | (cText->hdr[0] & 0xe0) == 0x20))) { |
| 6556 | SSL_TRC(3,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x" , getpid(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0]) |
| 6557 | ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x" , getpid(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0]) |
| 6558 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0]))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x" , getpid(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0]); |
| 6559 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_RECORD_TYPE); |
| 6560 | *alert = unexpected_message; |
| 6561 | return SECFailure; |
| 6562 | } |
| 6563 | |
| 6564 | /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total |
| 6565 | * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ |
| 6566 | if (cText->buf->len < tagLen) { |
| 6567 | SSL_TRC(3,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6568 | ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6569 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6570 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); |
| 6571 | return SECFailure; |
| 6572 | } |
| 6573 | |
| 6574 | /* Check if the ciphertext can be valid if we assume maximum plaintext and |
| 6575 | * add the specific ciphersuite expansion. |
| 6576 | * This way we detect overlong plaintexts/padding before decryption. |
| 6577 | * This check enforces size limitations more strict than the RFC. |
| 6578 | * (see RFC8446, Section 5.2) */ |
| 6579 | if (cText->buf->len > (spec->recordSizeLimit + innerTypeLen + tagLen)) { |
| 6580 | *alert = record_overflow; |
| 6581 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
| 6582 | return SECFailure; |
| 6583 | } |
| 6584 | |
| 6585 | /* Check the version number in the record. Stream only. */ |
| 6586 | if (!IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6587 | SSL3ProtocolVersion version = |
| 6588 | ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) | |
| 6589 | (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2]; |
| 6590 | if (version != spec->recordVersion) { |
| 6591 | /* Do we need a better error here? */ |
| 6592 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6593 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6594 | return SECFailure; |
| 6595 | } |
| 6596 | } |
| 6597 | |
| 6598 | /* Decrypt */ |
| 6599 | PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead)((cipher_def->type == type_aead)?((void)0):PR_Assert("cipher_def->type == type_aead" ,"tls13con.c",6599)); |
| 6600 | rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, cText->hdr, cText->hdrLen, |
| 6601 | spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, |
| 6602 | aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad)); |
| 6603 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6604 | |
| 6605 | return SECFailure; |
| 6606 | } |
| 6607 | rv = tls13_AEAD(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE1, |
| 6608 | CKG_NO_GENERATE0x00000000UL, 0, /* ignored for decrypt */ |
| 6609 | spec->keyMaterial.iv, NULL((void*)0), ivLen, /* iv */ |
| 6610 | aad, sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* nonce */ |
| 6611 | aad + sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* aad */ |
| 6612 | aadLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), |
| 6613 | plaintext->buf, /* output */ |
| 6614 | &plaintext->len, /* outlen */ |
| 6615 | plaintext->space, /* maxout */ |
| 6616 | tagLen, |
| 6617 | cText->buf->buf, /* in */ |
| 6618 | cText->buf->len); /* inlen */ |
| 6619 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6620 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6621 | spec->deprotectionFailures++; |
| 6622 | } |
| 6623 | |
| 6624 | SSL_TRC(3,if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6625 | ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC" , getpid(), ss->fd) |
| 6626 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6627 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); |
| 6628 | return SECFailure; |
| 6629 | } |
| 6630 | |
| 6631 | /* There is a similar test in ssl3_HandleRecord, but this test is needed to |
| 6632 | * account for padding. */ |
| 6633 | if (plaintext->len > spec->recordSizeLimit + innerTypeLen) { |
| 6634 | *alert = record_overflow; |
| 6635 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
| 6636 | return SECFailure; |
| 6637 | } |
| 6638 | |
| 6639 | /* The record is right-padded with 0s, followed by the true |
| 6640 | * content type, so read from the right until we receive a |
| 6641 | * nonzero byte. */ |
| 6642 | while (plaintext->len > 0 && !(plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1])) { |
| 6643 | --plaintext->len; |
| 6644 | } |
| 6645 | |
| 6646 | /* Bogus padding. */ |
| 6647 | if (plaintext->len < 1) { |
| 6648 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6649 | /* It's safe to report this specifically because it happened |
| 6650 | * after the MAC has been verified. */ |
| 6651 | *alert = unexpected_message; |
| 6652 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); |
| 6653 | return SECFailure; |
| 6654 | } |
| 6655 | |
| 6656 | /* Record the type. */ |
| 6657 | *innerType = (SSLContentType)plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; |
| 6658 | --plaintext->len; |
| 6659 | |
| 6660 | /* Check for zero-length encrypted Alert and Handshake fragments |
| 6661 | * (zero-length + inner content type byte). |
| 6662 | * |
| 6663 | * Implementations MUST NOT send Handshake and Alert records that have a |
| 6664 | * zero-length TLSInnerPlaintext.content; if such a message is received, |
| 6665 | * the receiving implementation MUST terminate the connection with an |
| 6666 | * "unexpected_message" alert [RFC8446, Section 5.4]. */ |
| 6667 | if (!plaintext->len && ((!IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data) || |
| 6668 | (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) && dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(spec->version, cText->hdr[0])))) { |
| 6669 | switch (*innerType) { |
| 6670 | case ssl_ct_alert: |
| 6671 | *alert = unexpected_message; |
| 6672 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); |
| 6673 | return SECFailure; |
| 6674 | case ssl_ct_handshake: |
| 6675 | *alert = unexpected_message; |
| 6676 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); |
| 6677 | return SECFailure; |
| 6678 | default: |
| 6679 | break; |
| 6680 | } |
| 6681 | } |
| 6682 | |
| 6683 | /* Check that we haven't received too much 0-RTT data. */ |
| 6684 | if (spec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData && |
| 6685 | *innerType == ssl_ct_application_data) { |
| 6686 | if (plaintext->len > spec->earlyDataRemaining) { |
| 6687 | *alert = unexpected_message; |
| 6688 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); |
| 6689 | return SECFailure; |
| 6690 | } |
| 6691 | spec->earlyDataRemaining -= plaintext->len; |
| 6692 | } |
| 6693 | |
| 6694 | SSL_TRC(10,if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), plaintext->len, *innerType) |
| 6695 | ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d",if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), plaintext->len, *innerType) |
| 6696 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), plaintext->len, *innerType))if (ssl_trace >= (10)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d" , getpid(), ss->fd, (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client" ), plaintext->len, *innerType); |
| 6697 | |
| 6698 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6699 | } |
| 6700 | |
| 6701 | /* 0-RTT is only permitted if: |
| 6702 | * |
| 6703 | * 1. We are doing TLS 1.3 |
| 6704 | * 2. This isn't a second ClientHello (in response to HelloRetryRequest) |
| 6705 | * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. |
| 6706 | * 4. We have a valid ticket or an External PSK. |
| 6707 | * 5. If resuming: |
| 6708 | * 5a. The server is willing to accept 0-RTT. |
| 6709 | * 5b. We have not changed our ALPN settings to disallow the ALPN tag |
| 6710 | * in the ticket. |
| 6711 | * |
| 6712 | * Called from tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(). |
| 6713 | */ |
| 6714 | PRBool |
| 6715 | tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) |
| 6716 | { |
| 6717 | /* We checked that the cipher suite was still allowed back in |
| 6718 | * ssl3_SendClientHello. */ |
| 6719 | if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 6720 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6721 | } |
| 6722 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
| 6723 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6724 | } |
| 6725 | if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) { |
| 6726 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6727 | } |
| 6728 | if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3.hs. psks))) { |
| 6729 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6730 | } |
| 6731 | sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next; |
| 6732 | |
| 6733 | if (psk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL0x0000) { |
| 6734 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6735 | } |
| 6736 | if (!psk->maxEarlyData) { |
| 6737 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6738 | } |
| 6739 | |
| 6740 | if (psk->type == ssl_psk_external) { |
| 6741 | return psk->hash == tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(psk->zeroRttSuite); |
| 6742 | } |
| 6743 | if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { |
| 6744 | if (!ss->statelessResume) |
| 6745 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6746 | if ((sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) == 0) |
| 6747 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6748 | return ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(ss, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); |
| 6749 | } |
| 6750 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","tls13con.c",6750)); |
| 6751 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 6752 | } |
| 6753 | |
| 6754 | SECStatus |
| 6755 | tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(sslSocket *ss) |
| 6756 | { |
| 6757 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6758 | |
| 6759 | /* Don't do anything if there is no early_data xtn, which means we're |
| 6760 | * not doing early data. */ |
| 6761 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { |
| 6762 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6763 | } |
| 6764 | |
| 6765 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; |
| 6766 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; |
| 6767 | /* Note: Reset the preliminary info here rather than just add 0-RTT. We are |
| 6768 | * only guessing what might happen at this point.*/ |
| 6769 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite(1U << 2); |
| 6770 | |
| 6771 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: in 0-RTT mode", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: in 0-RTT mode" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6772 | |
| 6773 | /* Set the ALPN data as if it was negotiated. We check in the ServerHello |
| 6774 | * handler that the server negotiates the same value. */ |
| 6775 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len) { |
| 6776 | ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE; |
| 6777 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &ss->xtnData.nextProto, |
| 6778 | &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); |
| 6779 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6780 | return SECFailure; |
| 6781 | } |
| 6782 | } |
| 6783 | |
| 6784 | if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6785 | /* Pretend that this is a proper ChangeCipherSpec even though it is sent |
| 6786 | * before receiving the ServerHello. */ |
| 6787 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_LockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 6788 | tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
| 6789 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) NSSRWLock_UnlockWrite_Util((ss)-> specLock); }; |
| 6790 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_EnterMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 6791 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
| 6792 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss){ if (!ss->opt.noLocks) PR_ExitMonitor(((ss)->xmitBufLock )); }; |
| 6793 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6794 | return SECFailure; |
| 6795 | } |
| 6796 | } |
| 6797 | |
| 6798 | /* If we have any message that was saved for later hashing. |
| 6799 | * The updated hash is then used in tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets. */ |
| 6800 | rv = ssl3_MaybeUpdateHashWithSavedRecord(ss); |
| 6801 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6802 | return SECFailure; |
| 6803 | } |
| 6804 | |
| 6805 | /* If we're trying 0-RTT, derive from the first PSK */ |
| 6806 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) && !ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next == (&ss->ssl3. hs.psks)) && !ss->xtnData.selectedPsk)?((void)0):PR_Assert ("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) && !ss->xtnData.selectedPsk" ,"tls13con.c",6806)); |
| 6807 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)->next; |
| 6808 | rv = tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(ss); |
| 6809 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6810 | return SECFailure; |
| 6811 | } |
| 6812 | |
| 6813 | /* Save cwSpec in case we get a HelloRetryRequest and have to send another |
| 6814 | * ClientHello. */ |
| 6815 | ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
| 6816 | |
| 6817 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, |
| 6818 | ssl_secret_write, PR_TRUE1); |
| 6819 | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL((void*)0); |
| 6820 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6821 | return SECFailure; |
| 6822 | } |
| 6823 | |
| 6824 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6825 | } |
| 6826 | |
| 6827 | PRInt32 |
| 6828 | tls13_Read0RttData(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, PRInt32 len) |
| 6829 | { |
| 6830 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData))((!((&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)->next == (& ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)" ,"tls13con.c",6830)); |
| 6831 | PRInt32 offset = 0; |
| 6832 | while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)((&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)->next == (&ss ->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData))) { |
| 6833 | TLS13EarlyData *msg = |
| 6834 | (TLS13EarlyData *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)((&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)->next); |
| 6835 | unsigned int tocpy = msg->data.len - msg->consumed; |
| 6836 | |
| 6837 | if (tocpy > (len - offset)) { |
| 6838 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6839 | /* In DTLS, we only return entire records. |
| 6840 | * So offset and consumed are always zero. */ |
| 6841 | PORT_Assert(offset == 0)((offset == 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("offset == 0","tls13con.c" ,6841)); |
| 6842 | PORT_Assert(msg->consumed == 0)((msg->consumed == 0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("msg->consumed == 0" ,"tls13con.c",6842)); |
| 6843 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_SHORT_DTLS_READ); |
| 6844 | return -1; |
| 6845 | } |
| 6846 | |
| 6847 | tocpy = len - offset; |
| 6848 | } |
| 6849 | |
| 6850 | PORT_Memcpymemcpy(buf + offset, msg->data.data + msg->consumed, tocpy); |
| 6851 | offset += tocpy; |
| 6852 | msg->consumed += tocpy; |
| 6853 | |
| 6854 | if (msg->consumed == msg->data.len) { |
| 6855 | PR_REMOVE_LINK(&msg->link)do { (&msg->link)->prev->next = (&msg->link )->next; (&msg->link)->next->prev = (&msg ->link)->prev; } while (0); |
| 6856 | SECITEM_ZfreeItemSECITEM_ZfreeItem_Util(&msg->data, PR_FALSE0); |
| 6857 | PORT_ZFreePORT_ZFree_Util(msg, sizeof(*msg)); |
| 6858 | } |
| 6859 | |
| 6860 | /* We are done after one record for DTLS; otherwise, when the buffer fills up. */ |
| 6861 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) || offset == len) { |
| 6862 | break; |
| 6863 | } |
| 6864 | } |
| 6865 | |
| 6866 | return offset; |
| 6867 | } |
| 6868 | |
| 6869 | static SECStatus |
| 6870 | tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) |
| 6871 | { |
| 6872 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6873 | |
| 6874 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss))((ss->opt.noLocks || ((PR_GetMonitorEntryCount(((ss)->xmitBufLock )) > 0)))?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)" ,"tls13con.c",6874)); |
| 6875 | |
| 6876 | if (!ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData) { |
| 6877 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send EndOfEarlyData", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send EndOfEarlyData" , getpid(), ss->fd); |
| 6878 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_end_of_early_data, 0); |
| 6879 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6880 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
| 6881 | } |
| 6882 | } |
| 6883 | |
| 6884 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; |
| 6885 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6886 | } |
| 6887 | |
| 6888 | static SECStatus |
| 6889 | tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
| 6890 | { |
| 6891 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6892 | |
| 6893 | PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->version >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",6893)); |
| 6894 | |
| 6895 | rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6896, wait_end_of_early_data, wait_invalid) |
| 6896 | wait_end_of_early_data)tls13_CheckHsState(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA , "SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA", __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6896, wait_end_of_early_data, wait_invalid); |
| 6897 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6898 | return SECFailure; |
| 6899 | } |
| 6900 | |
| 6901 | /* We shouldn't be getting any more early data, and if we do, |
| 6902 | * it is because of reordering and we drop it. */ |
| 6903 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)(ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)) { |
| 6904 | ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, |
| 6905 | TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData); |
| 6906 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
| 6907 | } |
| 6908 | |
| 6909 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)?((void)0) :PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted" ,"tls13con.c",6909)); |
| 6910 | |
| 6911 | if (length) { |
| 6912 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, decode_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA , __func__, "tls13con.c", 6912); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA , decode_error); } while (0); |
| 6913 | return SECFailure; |
| 6914 | } |
| 6915 | |
| 6916 | rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, |
| 6917 | ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE0); |
| 6918 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 6919 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| 6920 | return SECFailure; |
| 6921 | } |
| 6922 | |
| 6923 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; |
| 6924 | if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { |
| 6925 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_client_cert)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_client_cert, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6925); |
| 6926 | } else { |
| 6927 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)tls13_SetHsState(ss, wait_finished, __func__, "tls13con.c", 6927 ); |
| 6928 | } |
| 6929 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6930 | } |
| 6931 | |
| 6932 | static SECStatus |
| 6933 | tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) |
| 6934 | { |
| 6935 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer)((ss->sec.isServer)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.isServer" ,"tls13con.c",6935)); |
| 6936 | if (!ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData || |
| 6937 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 6938 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6939 | } |
| 6940 | |
| 6941 | return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss, NULL((void*)0), 0); |
| 6942 | } |
| 6943 | |
| 6944 | SECStatus |
| 6945 | tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) |
| 6946 | { |
| 6947 | TLS13EarlyData *ed; |
| 6948 | SECItem it = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 6949 | |
| 6950 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer)((ss->sec.isServer)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->sec.isServer" ,"tls13con.c",6950)); |
| 6951 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)((ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)?((void)0) :PR_Assert("ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted" ,"tls13con.c",6951)); |
| 6952 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
| 6953 | /* Belt and suspenders. */ |
| 6954 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6954); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error ); } while (0); |
| 6955 | return SECFailure; |
| 6956 | } |
| 6957 | |
| 6958 | PRINT_BUF(3, (NULL, "Received early application data",if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Received early application data" , origBuf->buf, origBuf->len) |
| 6959 | origBuf->buf, origBuf->len))if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_PrintBuf (((void*)0), "Received early application data" , origBuf->buf, origBuf->len); |
| 6960 | ed = PORT_ZNew(TLS13EarlyData)(TLS13EarlyData *)PORT_ZAlloc_Util(sizeof(TLS13EarlyData)); |
| 6961 | if (!ed) { |
| 6962 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6962); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 6963 | return SECFailure; |
| 6964 | } |
| 6965 | it.data = origBuf->buf; |
| 6966 | it.len = origBuf->len; |
| 6967 | if (SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(NULL((void*)0), &ed->data, &it) != SECSuccess) { |
| 6968 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, __func__, "tls13con.c" , 6968); PORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); } while (0) ; tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); } while (0); |
| 6969 | return SECFailure; |
| 6970 | } |
| 6971 | PR_APPEND_LINK(&ed->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)do { (&ed->link)->next = (&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData ); (&ed->link)->prev = (&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData )->prev; (&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)->prev-> next = (&ed->link); (&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData )->prev = (&ed->link); } while (0); |
| 6972 | |
| 6973 | origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ |
| 6974 | |
| 6975 | return SECSuccess; |
| 6976 | } |
| 6977 | |
| 6978 | PRUint16 |
| 6979 | tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, SSLProtocolVariant variant) |
| 6980 | { |
| 6981 | if (variant == ssl_variant_datagram) { |
| 6982 | return dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); |
| 6983 | } |
| 6984 | /* Stream-variant encodings do not change. */ |
| 6985 | return (PRUint16)version; |
| 6986 | } |
| 6987 | |
| 6988 | SECStatus |
| 6989 | tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(sslSocket *ss) |
| 6990 | { |
| 6991 | PRUint32 temp; |
| 6992 | TLSExtension *versionExtension; |
| 6993 | SECItem it; |
| 6994 | SECStatus rv; |
| 6995 | |
| 6996 | /* Update the version based on the extension, as necessary. */ |
| 6997 | versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); |
| 6998 | if (!versionExtension) { |
| 6999 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7000 | } |
| 7001 | |
| 7002 | /* Struct copy so we don't damage the extension. */ |
| 7003 | it = versionExtension->data; |
| 7004 | |
| 7005 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &it.data, &it.len); |
| 7006 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 7007 | return SECFailure; |
| 7008 | } |
| 7009 | if (it.len) { |
| 7010 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7010); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 7011 | return SECFailure; |
| 7012 | } |
| 7013 | |
| 7014 | if (temp != tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304, |
| 7015 | ss->protocolVariant)) { |
| 7016 | /* You cannot negotiate < TLS 1.3 with supported_versions. */ |
| 7017 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7017); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 7018 | return SECFailure; |
| 7019 | } |
| 7020 | |
| 7021 | /* Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with...ServerHello.legacy_version |
| 7022 | * set to 0x0300 (SSL3) MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" |
| 7023 | * alert. [RFC8446, Section D.5] |
| 7024 | * |
| 7025 | * The ServerHello.legacy_version is read into the ss->version field by |
| 7026 | * ssl_ClientReadVersion(). */ |
| 7027 | if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_00x0300) { |
| 7028 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, protocol_version)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7028); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO , protocol_version); } while (0); |
| 7029 | return SECFailure; |
| 7030 | } |
| 7031 | |
| 7032 | ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304; |
| 7033 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7034 | } |
| 7035 | |
| 7036 | /* Pick the highest version we support that is also advertised. */ |
| 7037 | SECStatus |
| 7038 | tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, const TLSExtension *supportedVersions) |
| 7039 | { |
| 7040 | PRUint16 version; |
| 7041 | /* Make a copy so we're nondestructive. */ |
| 7042 | SECItem data = supportedVersions->data; |
| 7043 | SECItem versions; |
| 7044 | SECStatus rv; |
| 7045 | |
| 7046 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &versions, 1, |
| 7047 | &data.data, &data.len); |
| 7048 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 7049 | return SECFailure; |
| 7050 | } |
| 7051 | if (data.len || !versions.len || (versions.len & 1)) { |
| 7052 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7052); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO , illegal_parameter); } while (0); |
| 7053 | return SECFailure; |
| 7054 | } |
| 7055 | for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) { |
| 7056 | if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304 && |
| 7057 | (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted)) { |
| 7058 | /* Prevent negotiating to a lower version after 1.3 HRR or ECH |
| 7059 | * When accepting ECH, a different alert is generated. |
| 7060 | */ |
| 7061 | SSL3AlertDescription alert = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? illegal_parameter : protocol_version; |
| 7062 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
| 7063 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, alert)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7063); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION , alert); } while (0); |
| 7064 | return SECFailure; |
| 7065 | } |
| 7066 | |
| 7067 | PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeVersion(version, ss->protocolVariant); |
| 7068 | unsigned long offset; |
| 7069 | |
| 7070 | for (offset = 0; offset < versions.len; offset += 2) { |
| 7071 | PRUint16 supported = |
| 7072 | (versions.data[offset] << 8) | versions.data[offset + 1]; |
| 7073 | if (supported == wire) { |
| 7074 | ss->version = version; |
| 7075 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7076 | } |
| 7077 | } |
| 7078 | } |
| 7079 | |
| 7080 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version)do { do { if (ssl_trace >= (3)) ssl_Trace ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)" , getpid(), ss->fd, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, __func__ , "tls13con.c", 7080); PORT_SetError_Util(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION ); } while (0); tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION , protocol_version); } while (0); |
| 7081 | return SECFailure; |
| 7082 | } |
| 7083 | |
| 7084 | /* This is TLS 1.3 or might negotiate to it. */ |
| 7085 | PRBool |
| 7086 | tls13_MaybeTls13(sslSocket *ss) |
| 7087 | { |
| 7088 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 7089 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 7090 | } |
| 7091 | |
| 7092 | if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_30x0304) { |
| 7093 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 7094 | } |
| 7095 | |
| 7096 | if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_version(1U << 0))) { |
| 7097 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 7098 | } |
| 7099 | |
| 7100 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 7101 | } |
| 7102 | |
| 7103 | /* Setup random client GREASE values according to RFC8701. State must be kept |
| 7104 | * so an equal ClientHello might be send on HelloRetryRequest. */ |
| 7105 | SECStatus |
| 7106 | tls13_ClientGreaseSetup(sslSocket *ss) |
| 7107 | { |
| 7108 | if (!ss->opt.enableGrease) { |
| 7109 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7110 | } |
| 7111 | |
| 7112 | PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->vrange.max >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",7112)); |
| 7113 | |
| 7114 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { |
| 7115 | return SECFailure; |
| 7116 | } |
| 7117 | ss->ssl3.hs.grease = PORT_AllocPORT_Alloc_Util(sizeof(tls13ClientGrease)); |
| 7118 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { |
| 7119 | return SECFailure; |
| 7120 | } |
| 7121 | |
| 7122 | tls13ClientGrease *grease = ss->ssl3.hs.grease; |
| 7123 | /* We require eight GREASE values and randoms. */ |
| 7124 | PRUint8 random[8]; |
| 7125 | |
| 7126 | /* Generate random GREASE values. */ |
| 7127 | if (PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random)) != SECSuccess) { |
| 7128 | return SECFailure; |
| 7129 | } |
| 7130 | for (size_t i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(grease->idx)(sizeof(grease->idx)/sizeof((grease->idx)[0])); i++) { |
| 7131 | random[i] = ((random[i] & 0xf0) | 0x0a); |
| 7132 | grease->idx[i] = ((random[i] << 8) | random[i]); |
| 7133 | } |
| 7134 | /* Specific PskKeyExchangeMode GREASE value. */ |
| 7135 | grease->pskKem = 0x0b + ((random[8 - 1] >> 5) * 0x1f); |
| 7136 | |
| 7137 | /* Duplicate extensions are not allowed. */ |
| 7138 | if (grease->idx[grease_extension1] == grease->idx[grease_extension2]) { |
| 7139 | grease->idx[grease_extension2] ^= 0x1010; |
| 7140 | } |
| 7141 | |
| 7142 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7143 | } |
| 7144 | |
| 7145 | /* Destroy client GREASE state. */ |
| 7146 | void |
| 7147 | tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(sslSocket *ss) |
| 7148 | { |
| 7149 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { |
| 7150 | PORT_FreePORT_Free_Util(ss->ssl3.hs.grease); |
| 7151 | ss->ssl3.hs.grease = NULL((void*)0); |
| 7152 | } |
| 7153 | } |
| 7154 | |
| 7155 | /* Generate a random GREASE value according to RFC8701. |
| 7156 | * This function does not provide valid PskKeyExchangeMode GREASE values! */ |
| 7157 | SECStatus |
| 7158 | tls13_RandomGreaseValue(PRUint16 *out) |
| 7159 | { |
| 7160 | PRUint8 random; |
| 7161 | |
| 7162 | if (PK11_GenerateRandom(&random, sizeof(random)) != SECSuccess) { |
| 7163 | return SECFailure; |
| 7164 | } |
| 7165 | |
| 7166 | random = ((random & 0xf0) | 0x0a); |
| 7167 | *out = ((random << 8) | random); |
| 7168 | |
| 7169 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7170 | } |
| 7171 | |
| 7172 | /* Set TLS 1.3 GREASE Extension random GREASE type. */ |
| 7173 | SECStatus |
| 7174 | tls13_MaybeGreaseExtensionType(const sslSocket *ss, |
| 7175 | const SSLHandshakeType message, |
| 7176 | PRUint16 *exType) |
| 7177 | { |
| 7178 | if (*exType != ssl_tls13_grease_xtn) { |
| 7179 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7180 | } |
| 7181 | |
| 7182 | PR_ASSERT(ss->opt.enableGrease)((ss->opt.enableGrease)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->opt.enableGrease" ,"tls13con.c",7182)); |
| 7183 | PR_ASSERT(message == ssl_hs_client_hello ||((message == ssl_hs_client_hello || message == ssl_hs_certificate_request )?((void)0):PR_Assert("message == ssl_hs_client_hello || message == ssl_hs_certificate_request" ,"tls13con.c",7184)) |
| 7184 | message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)((message == ssl_hs_client_hello || message == ssl_hs_certificate_request )?((void)0):PR_Assert("message == ssl_hs_client_hello || message == ssl_hs_certificate_request" ,"tls13con.c",7184)); |
| 7185 | |
| 7186 | /* GREASE ClientHello: |
| 7187 | * A client MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and |
| 7188 | * advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents |
| 7189 | * [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ |
| 7190 | if (message == ssl_hs_client_hello) { |
| 7191 | PR_ASSERT(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->vrange.max >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",7191)); |
| 7192 | /* Check if the first GREASE extension was already added. */ |
| 7193 | if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension1])) { |
| 7194 | *exType = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension1]; |
| 7195 | } else { |
| 7196 | *exType = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension2]; |
| 7197 | } |
| 7198 | } |
| 7199 | /* GREASE CertificateRequest: |
| 7200 | * When sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as |
| 7201 | * follows: A server MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and |
| 7202 | * advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents |
| 7203 | * [RFC8701, Section 4.1]. */ |
| 7204 | else if (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request) { |
| 7205 | PR_ASSERT(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)((ss->version >= 0x0304)?((void)0):PR_Assert("ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3" ,"tls13con.c",7205)); |
| 7206 | /* Get random grease extension type. */ |
| 7207 | SECStatus rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(exType); |
| 7208 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 7209 | return SECFailure; |
| 7210 | } |
| 7211 | } |
| 7212 | |
| 7213 | return SECSuccess; |
| 7214 | } |