| File: | s/lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c |
| Warning: | line 634, column 13 Value stored to 'encalgtag' is never read |
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| 1 | /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| 2 | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| 3 | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
| 4 | |
| 5 | /* |
| 6 | * CMS recipientInfo methods. |
| 7 | */ |
| 8 | |
| 9 | #include "cmslocal.h" |
| 10 | |
| 11 | #include "cert.h" |
| 12 | #include "keyhi.h" |
| 13 | #include "secasn1.h" |
| 14 | #include "secitem.h" |
| 15 | #include "secoid.h" |
| 16 | #include "pk11func.h" |
| 17 | #include "secerr.h" |
| 18 | |
| 19 | PRBool |
| 20 | nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri) |
| 21 | { |
| 22 | if (ri->recipientInfoType == NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans) { |
| 23 | NSSCMSRecipientIdentifier *rid; |
| 24 | rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier; |
| 25 | if (rid->identifierType == NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID) { |
| 26 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 27 | } |
| 28 | } |
| 29 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 30 | } |
| 31 | |
| 32 | /* |
| 33 | * NOTE: fakeContent marks CMSMessage structure which is only used as a carrier |
| 34 | * of pwfn_arg and arena pools. In an ideal world, NSSCMSMessage would not have |
| 35 | * been exported, and we would have added an ordinary enum to handle this |
| 36 | * check. Unfortunatly wo don't have that luxury so we are overloading the |
| 37 | * contentTypeTag field. NO code should every try to interpret this content tag |
| 38 | * as a real OID tag, or use any fields other than pwfn_arg or poolp of this |
| 39 | * CMSMessage for that matter */ |
| 40 | static const SECOidData fakeContent; |
| 41 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 42 | nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, |
| 43 | NSSCMSRecipientIDSelector type, |
| 44 | CERTCertificate *cert, |
| 45 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
| 46 | SECItem *subjKeyID, |
| 47 | void *pwfn_arg, |
| 48 | SECItem *DERinput) |
| 49 | { |
| 50 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri; |
| 51 | void *mark; |
| 52 | SECOidTag certalgtag; |
| 53 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 54 | NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey *rek; |
| 55 | NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok; |
| 56 | unsigned long version; |
| 57 | SECItem *dummy; |
| 58 | PLArenaPool *poolp; |
| 59 | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, *freeSpki = NULL((void*)0); |
| 60 | NSSCMSRecipientIdentifier *rid; |
| 61 | extern const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate[]; |
| 62 | |
| 63 | if (!cmsg) { |
| 64 | /* a CMSMessage wasn't supplied, create a fake one to hold the pwfunc |
| 65 | * and a private arena pool */ |
| 66 | cmsg = NSS_CMSMessage_Create(NULL((void*)0)); |
| 67 | cmsg->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg; |
| 68 | /* mark it as a special cms message */ |
| 69 | cmsg->contentInfo.contentTypeTag = (SECOidData *)&fakeContent; |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | |
| 72 | poolp = cmsg->poolp; |
| 73 | |
| 74 | mark = PORT_ArenaMarkPORT_ArenaMark_Util(poolp); |
| 75 | |
| 76 | ri = (NSSCMSRecipientInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAllocPORT_ArenaZAlloc_Util(poolp, sizeof(NSSCMSRecipientInfo)); |
| 77 | if (ri == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 78 | goto loser; |
| 79 | |
| 80 | ri->cmsg = cmsg; |
| 81 | |
| 82 | if (DERinput) { |
| 83 | /* decode everything from DER */ |
| 84 | SECItem newinput; |
| 85 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(poolp, &newinput, DERinput); |
| 86 | if (SECSuccess != rv) |
| 87 | goto loser; |
| 88 | rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItemSEC_QuickDERDecodeItem_Util(poolp, ri, NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate, &newinput); |
| 89 | if (SECSuccess != rv) |
| 90 | goto loser; |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | switch (type) { |
| 94 | case NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN: { |
| 95 | ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert); |
| 96 | if (NULL((void*)0) == ri->cert) |
| 97 | goto loser; |
| 98 | spki = &(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); |
| 99 | break; |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | |
| 102 | case NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID: { |
| 103 | PORT_Assert(pubKey)((pubKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("pubKey","cmsrecinfo.c",103)); |
| 104 | spki = freeSpki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubKey); |
| 105 | break; |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | |
| 108 | case NSSCMSRecipientID_BrandNew: |
| 109 | goto done; |
| 110 | break; |
| 111 | |
| 112 | default: |
| 113 | /* unkown type */ |
| 114 | goto loser; |
| 115 | break; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(spki->algorithm)); |
| 119 | |
| 120 | rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier; |
| 121 | |
| 122 | // This switch must match the switch in NSS_CMSRecipient_IsSupported. |
| 123 | switch (certalgtag) { |
| 124 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 125 | ri->recipientInfoType = NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans; |
| 126 | rid->identifierType = type; |
| 127 | if (type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN) { |
| 128 | rid->id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert); |
| 129 | if (rid->id.issuerAndSN == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 130 | break; |
| 131 | } |
| 132 | } else if (type == NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID) { |
| 133 | NSSCMSKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *riExtra; |
| 134 | |
| 135 | rid->id.subjectKeyID = PORT_ArenaNew(poolp, SECItem)(SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc_Util(poolp, sizeof(SECItem)); |
| 136 | if (rid->id.subjectKeyID == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 137 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 138 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 139 | break; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItemSECITEM_CopyItem_Util(poolp, rid->id.subjectKeyID, subjKeyID); |
| 142 | if (rv != SECSuccess || rid->id.subjectKeyID->data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 143 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 144 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 145 | break; |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | riExtra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx; |
| 148 | riExtra->version = 0; |
| 149 | riExtra->pubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey); |
| 150 | if (riExtra->pubKey == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 151 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 152 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
| 153 | break; |
| 154 | } |
| 155 | } else { |
| 156 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 157 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | break; |
| 160 | case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */ |
| 161 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| 162 | PORT_Assert(type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN)((type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN)?((void)0):PR_Assert("type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN" ,"cmsrecinfo.c",162)); |
| 163 | if (type != NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN) { |
| 164 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 165 | break; |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | /* a key agreement op */ |
| 168 | ri->recipientInfoType = NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree; |
| 169 | |
| 170 | /* we do not support the case where multiple recipients |
| 171 | * share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys |
| 172 | * in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the |
| 173 | * ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm |
| 174 | * Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */ |
| 175 | |
| 176 | /* only epheremal-static Diffie-Hellman is supported for now |
| 177 | * this is the only form of key agreement that provides potential anonymity |
| 178 | * of the sender, plus we do not have to include certs in the message */ |
| 179 | |
| 180 | /* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */ |
| 181 | if ((rek = NSS_CMSRecipientEncryptedKey_Create(poolp)) == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 182 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 183 | break; |
| 184 | } |
| 185 | |
| 186 | /* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */ |
| 187 | rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientID_IssuerSN; |
| 188 | if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 189 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 190 | break; |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | |
| 193 | oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey); |
| 194 | |
| 195 | /* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */ |
| 196 | oiok->identifierType = NSSCMSOriginatorIDOrKey_OriginatorPublicKey; |
| 197 | |
| 198 | rv = NSS_CMSArray_Add(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys, |
| 199 | (void *)rek); |
| 200 | |
| 201 | break; |
| 202 | default: |
| 203 | /* other algorithms not supported yet */ |
| 204 | /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */ |
| 205 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 206 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 207 | break; |
| 208 | } |
| 209 | |
| 210 | if (rv == SECFailure) |
| 211 | goto loser; |
| 212 | |
| 213 | /* set version */ |
| 214 | switch (ri->recipientInfoType) { |
| 215 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans: |
| 216 | if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN) |
| 217 | version = NSS_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_ISSUERSN0; |
| 218 | else |
| 219 | version = NSS_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_SUBJKEY2; |
| 220 | dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeIntegerSEC_ASN1EncodeInteger_Util(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version), version); |
| 221 | if (dummy == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 222 | goto loser; |
| 223 | break; |
| 224 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree: |
| 225 | dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeIntegerSEC_ASN1EncodeInteger_Util(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version), |
| 226 | NSS_CMS_KEYAGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION3); |
| 227 | if (dummy == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 228 | goto loser; |
| 229 | break; |
| 230 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK: |
| 231 | /* NOTE: this cannot happen as long as we do not support any KEK algorithm */ |
| 232 | dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeIntegerSEC_ASN1EncodeInteger_Util(poolp, &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version), |
| 233 | NSS_CMS_KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION4); |
| 234 | if (dummy == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 235 | goto loser; |
| 236 | break; |
| 237 | } |
| 238 | |
| 239 | done: |
| 240 | PORT_ArenaUnmarkPORT_ArenaUnmark_Util(poolp, mark); |
| 241 | if (freeSpki) |
| 242 | SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki); |
| 243 | return ri; |
| 244 | |
| 245 | loser: |
| 246 | if (ri && ri->cert) { |
| 247 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert); |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | if (freeSpki) { |
| 250 | SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki); |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | PORT_ArenaReleasePORT_ArenaRelease_Util(poolp, mark); |
| 253 | if (cmsg->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == &fakeContent) { |
| 254 | NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy(cmsg); |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | |
| 259 | /* |
| 260 | * NSS_CMSRecipient_IsSupported - checks for a support certificate |
| 261 | * |
| 262 | * Use this function to confirm that the given certificate will be |
| 263 | * accepted by NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_Create, which means that the |
| 264 | * certificate can be used with a supported encryption algorithm. |
| 265 | */ |
| 266 | PRBool |
| 267 | NSS_CMSRecipient_IsSupported(CERTCertificate *cert) |
| 268 | { |
| 269 | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki = &(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); |
| 270 | SECOidTag certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(spki->algorithm)); |
| 271 | |
| 272 | switch (certalgtag) { |
| 273 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 274 | case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */ |
| 275 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| 276 | return PR_TRUE1; |
| 277 | default: |
| 278 | return PR_FALSE0; |
| 279 | } |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | |
| 282 | /* |
| 283 | * NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_Create - create a recipientinfo |
| 284 | * |
| 285 | * we currently do not create KeyAgreement recipientinfos with multiple |
| 286 | * recipientEncryptedKeys the certificate is supposed to have been |
| 287 | * verified by the caller |
| 288 | */ |
| 289 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 290 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_Create(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, CERTCertificate *cert) |
| 291 | { |
| 292 | return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(cmsg, NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN, cert, |
| 293 | NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0)); |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 297 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_CreateNew(void *pwfn_arg) |
| 298 | { |
| 299 | return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(NULL((void*)0), NSSCMSRecipientID_BrandNew, NULL((void*)0), |
| 300 | NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), pwfn_arg, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | |
| 303 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 304 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_CreateFromDER(SECItem *input, void *pwfn_arg) |
| 305 | { |
| 306 | return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(NULL((void*)0), NSSCMSRecipientID_BrandNew, NULL((void*)0), |
| 307 | NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0), pwfn_arg, input); |
| 308 | } |
| 309 | |
| 310 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 311 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_CreateWithSubjKeyID(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, |
| 312 | SECItem *subjKeyID, |
| 313 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
| 314 | { |
| 315 | return nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(cmsg, NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID, |
| 316 | NULL((void*)0), pubKey, subjKeyID, NULL((void*)0), NULL((void*)0)); |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | |
| 319 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo * |
| 320 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_CreateWithSubjKeyIDFromCert(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, |
| 321 | CERTCertificate *cert) |
| 322 | { |
| 323 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 324 | SECItem subjKeyID = { siBuffer, NULL((void*)0), 0 }; |
| 325 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo *retVal = NULL((void*)0); |
| 326 | |
| 327 | if (!cmsg || !cert) { |
| 328 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 329 | } |
| 330 | pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); |
| 331 | if (!pubKey) { |
| 332 | goto done; |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | if (CERT_FindSubjectKeyIDExtension(cert, &subjKeyID) != SECSuccess || |
| 335 | subjKeyID.data == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 336 | goto done; |
| 337 | } |
| 338 | retVal = NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_CreateWithSubjKeyID(cmsg, &subjKeyID, pubKey); |
| 339 | done: |
| 340 | if (pubKey) |
| 341 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
| 342 | |
| 343 | if (subjKeyID.data) |
| 344 | SECITEM_FreeItemSECITEM_FreeItem_Util(&subjKeyID, PR_FALSE0); |
| 345 | |
| 346 | return retVal; |
| 347 | } |
| 348 | |
| 349 | void |
| 350 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_Destroy(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri) |
| 351 | { |
| 352 | if (!ri) { |
| 353 | return; |
| 354 | } |
| 355 | /* version was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */ |
| 356 | /* issuerAndSN was allocated on the pool, so no need to destroy it */ |
| 357 | if (ri->cert != NULL((void*)0)) |
| 358 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert); |
| 359 | |
| 360 | if (nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri)) { |
| 361 | NSSCMSKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra; |
| 362 | extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx; |
| 363 | if (extra->pubKey) |
| 364 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(extra->pubKey); |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | if (ri->cmsg && ri->cmsg->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == &fakeContent) { |
| 367 | NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy(ri->cmsg); |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | |
| 370 | /* we're done. */ |
| 371 | } |
| 372 | |
| 373 | int |
| 374 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_GetVersion(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri) |
| 375 | { |
| 376 | unsigned long version; |
| 377 | SECItem *versionitem = NULL((void*)0); |
| 378 | |
| 379 | switch (ri->recipientInfoType) { |
| 380 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans: |
| 381 | /* ignore subIndex */ |
| 382 | versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version); |
| 383 | break; |
| 384 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK: |
| 385 | /* ignore subIndex */ |
| 386 | versionitem = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version); |
| 387 | break; |
| 388 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree: |
| 389 | versionitem = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version); |
| 390 | break; |
| 391 | } |
| 392 | |
| 393 | PORT_Assert(versionitem)((versionitem)?((void)0):PR_Assert("versionitem","cmsrecinfo.c" ,393)); |
| 394 | if (versionitem == NULL((void*)0)) |
| 395 | return 0; |
| 396 | |
| 397 | /* always take apart the SECItem */ |
| 398 | if (SEC_ASN1DecodeIntegerSEC_ASN1DecodeInteger_Util(versionitem, &version) != SECSuccess) |
| 399 | return 0; |
| 400 | else |
| 401 | return (int)version; |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | |
| 404 | SECItem * |
| 405 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_GetEncryptedKey(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri, int subIndex) |
| 406 | { |
| 407 | SECItem *enckey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 408 | |
| 409 | switch (ri->recipientInfoType) { |
| 410 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans: |
| 411 | /* ignore subIndex */ |
| 412 | enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); |
| 413 | break; |
| 414 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK: |
| 415 | /* ignore subIndex */ |
| 416 | enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey); |
| 417 | break; |
| 418 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree: |
| 419 | enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey); |
| 420 | break; |
| 421 | } |
| 422 | return enckey; |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | |
| 425 | SECOidTag |
| 426 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_GetKeyEncryptionAlgorithmTag(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri) |
| 427 | { |
| 428 | SECOidTag encalgtag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; /* an invalid encryption alg */ |
| 429 | |
| 430 | switch (ri->recipientInfoType) { |
| 431 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans: |
| 432 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
| 433 | break; |
| 434 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree: |
| 435 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
| 436 | break; |
| 437 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK: |
| 438 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
| 439 | break; |
| 440 | } |
| 441 | return encalgtag; |
| 442 | } |
| 443 | |
| 444 | SECStatus |
| 445 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_WrapBulkKey(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri, PK11SymKey *bulkkey, |
| 446 | SECOidTag bulkalgtag) |
| 447 | { |
| 448 | CERTCertificate *cert; |
| 449 | SECOidTag certalgtag; |
| 450 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 451 | NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey *rek; |
| 452 | NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok; |
| 453 | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, *freeSpki = NULL((void*)0); |
| 454 | PLArenaPool *poolp; |
| 455 | NSSCMSKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *extra = NULL((void*)0); |
| 456 | PRBool usesSubjKeyID; |
| 457 | void *wincx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 458 | |
| 459 | poolp = ri->cmsg->poolp; |
| 460 | cert = ri->cert; |
| 461 | usesSubjKeyID = nss_cmsrecipientinfo_usessubjectkeyid(ri); |
| 462 | if (cert) { |
| 463 | spki = &cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; |
| 464 | } else if (usesSubjKeyID) { |
| 465 | extra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx; |
| 466 | /* sanity check */ |
| 467 | PORT_Assert(extra->pubKey)((extra->pubKey)?((void)0):PR_Assert("extra->pubKey","cmsrecinfo.c" ,467)); |
| 468 | if (!extra->pubKey) { |
| 469 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 470 | return SECFailure; |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | spki = freeSpki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(extra->pubKey); |
| 473 | } else { |
| 474 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 475 | return SECFailure; |
| 476 | } |
| 477 | |
| 478 | /* XXX set ri->recipientInfoType to the proper value here */ |
| 479 | /* or should we look if it's been set already ? */ |
| 480 | |
| 481 | certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&spki->algorithm); |
| 482 | switch (certalgtag) { |
| 483 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 484 | /* wrap the symkey */ |
| 485 | if (cert) { |
| 486 | rv = NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSA(poolp, cert, bulkkey, |
| 487 | &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); |
| 488 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 489 | break; |
| 490 | } else if (usesSubjKeyID) { |
| 491 | PORT_Assert(extra != NULL)((extra != ((void*)0))?((void)0):PR_Assert("extra != NULL","cmsrecinfo.c" ,491)); |
| 492 | rv = NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSAPubKey(poolp, extra->pubKey, |
| 493 | bulkkey, &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); |
| 494 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 495 | break; |
| 496 | } |
| 497 | |
| 498 | rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmIDSECOID_SetAlgorithmID_Util(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), certalgtag, NULL((void*)0)); |
| 499 | break; |
| 500 | case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */ |
| 501 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| 502 | rek = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[0]; |
| 503 | if (rek == NULL((void*)0)) { |
| 504 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 505 | break; |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | |
| 508 | oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey); |
| 509 | PORT_Assert(oiok->identifierType == NSSCMSOriginatorIDOrKey_OriginatorPublicKey)((oiok->identifierType == NSSCMSOriginatorIDOrKey_OriginatorPublicKey )?((void)0):PR_Assert("oiok->identifierType == NSSCMSOriginatorIDOrKey_OriginatorPublicKey" ,"cmsrecinfo.c",509)); |
| 510 | |
| 511 | /* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */ |
| 512 | if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmIDSECOID_SetAlgorithmID_Util(poolp, &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.algorithmIdentifier, |
| 513 | certalgtag, NULL((void*)0)) != SECSuccess) { |
| 514 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 515 | break; |
| 516 | } |
| 517 | |
| 518 | /* this will generate a key pair, compute the shared secret, */ |
| 519 | /* derive a key and ukm for the keyEncAlg out of it, encrypt the bulk key with */ |
| 520 | /* the keyEncAlg, set encKey, keyEncAlg, publicKey etc. */ |
| 521 | switch (certalgtag) { |
| 522 | case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: |
| 523 | rv = NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey, |
| 524 | &rek->encKey, |
| 525 | &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm, |
| 526 | &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg, |
| 527 | &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey); |
| 528 | break; |
| 529 | |
| 530 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| 531 | if (ri->cmsg) { |
| 532 | wincx = ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg; |
| 533 | } else { |
| 534 | wincx = PK11_GetWindow(bulkkey); |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | rv = NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(poolp, cert, bulkkey, |
| 537 | &rek->encKey, |
| 538 | PR_TRUE1, |
| 539 | &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm, |
| 540 | &ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg, |
| 541 | &oiok->id.originatorPublicKey.publicKey, |
| 542 | wincx); |
| 543 | break; |
| 544 | |
| 545 | default: |
| 546 | /* Not reached. Added to silence enum warnings. */ |
| 547 | PORT_Assert(0)((0)?((void)0):PR_Assert("0","cmsrecinfo.c",547)); |
| 548 | break; |
| 549 | } |
| 550 | break; |
| 551 | default: |
| 552 | /* other algorithms not supported yet */ |
| 553 | /* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */ |
| 554 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); |
| 555 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | if (freeSpki) |
| 558 | SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki); |
| 559 | |
| 560 | return rv; |
| 561 | } |
| 562 | |
| 563 | PK11SymKey * |
| 564 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_UnwrapBulkKey(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri, int subIndex, |
| 565 | CERTCertificate *cert, SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey, SECOidTag bulkalgtag) |
| 566 | { |
| 567 | PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 568 | SECOidTag encalgtag; |
| 569 | SECItem *enckey, *ukm; |
| 570 | NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok; |
| 571 | int error; |
| 572 | void *wincx = NULL((void*)0); |
| 573 | |
| 574 | ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert); |
| 575 | /* mark the recipientInfo so we can find it later */ |
| 576 | |
| 577 | switch (ri->recipientInfoType) { |
| 578 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans: |
| 579 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
| 580 | enckey = &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.encKey); /* ignore subIndex */ |
| 581 | switch (encalgtag) { |
| 582 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 583 | /* RSA encryption algorithm: */ |
| 584 | /* get the symmetric (bulk) key by unwrapping it using our private key */ |
| 585 | bulkkey = NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA(privkey, enckey, bulkalgtag); |
| 586 | break; |
| 587 | default: |
| 588 | error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
| 589 | goto loser; |
| 590 | } |
| 591 | break; |
| 592 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree: |
| 593 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
| 594 | enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey); |
| 595 | oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey); |
| 596 | ukm = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm); |
| 597 | switch (encalgtag) { |
| 598 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_STDDH_SHA1KDF_SCHEME: |
| 599 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_STDDH_SHA224KDF_SCHEME: |
| 600 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_STDDH_SHA256KDF_SCHEME: |
| 601 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_STDDH_SHA384KDF_SCHEME: |
| 602 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_STDDH_SHA512KDF_SCHEME: |
| 603 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_COFACTORDH_SHA1KDF_SCHEME: |
| 604 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_COFACTORDH_SHA224KDF_SCHEME: |
| 605 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_COFACTORDH_SHA256KDF_SCHEME: |
| 606 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_COFACTORDH_SHA384KDF_SCHEME: |
| 607 | case SEC_OID_DHSINGLEPASS_COFACTORDH_SHA512KDF_SCHEME: |
| 608 | if (ri->cmsg) { |
| 609 | wincx = ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg; |
| 610 | } |
| 611 | bulkkey = NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_ECDH(privkey, enckey, |
| 612 | &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg), |
| 613 | bulkalgtag, ukm, oiok, wincx); |
| 614 | break; |
| 615 | |
| 616 | case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: |
| 617 | /* Diffie-Helman key exchange */ |
| 618 | /* XXX not yet implemented */ |
| 619 | /* XXX problem: SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY points to a PKCS3 mechanism! */ |
| 620 | /* we support ephemeral-static DH only, so if the recipientinfo */ |
| 621 | /* has originator stuff in it, we punt (or do we? shouldn't be that hard...) */ |
| 622 | /* first, we derive the KEK (a symkey!) using a Derive operation, then we get the */ |
| 623 | /* content encryption key using a Unwrap op */ |
| 624 | /* the derive operation has to generate the key using the algorithm in RFC2631 */ |
| 625 | error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
| 626 | goto loser; |
| 627 | break; |
| 628 | default: |
| 629 | error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
| 630 | goto loser; |
| 631 | } |
| 632 | break; |
| 633 | case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK: |
| 634 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTagSECOID_GetAlgorithmTag_Util(&(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg)); |
Value stored to 'encalgtag' is never read | |
| 635 | enckey = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.encKey); |
| 636 | /* not supported yet */ |
| 637 | error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
| 638 | goto loser; |
| 639 | break; |
| 640 | } |
| 641 | /* XXXX continue here */ |
| 642 | return bulkkey; |
| 643 | |
| 644 | loser: |
| 645 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(error); |
| 646 | return NULL((void*)0); |
| 647 | } |
| 648 | |
| 649 | SECStatus |
| 650 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_GetCertAndKey(NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri, |
| 651 | CERTCertificate **retcert, |
| 652 | SECKEYPrivateKey **retkey) |
| 653 | { |
| 654 | CERTCertificate *cert = NULL((void*)0); |
| 655 | NSSCMSRecipient **recipients = NULL((void*)0); |
| 656 | NSSCMSRecipientInfo *recipientInfos[2]; |
| 657 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
| 658 | SECKEYPrivateKey *key = NULL((void*)0); |
| 659 | |
| 660 | if (!ri) |
| 661 | return SECFailure; |
| 662 | |
| 663 | if (!retcert && !retkey) { |
| 664 | /* nothing requested, nothing found, success */ |
| 665 | return SECSuccess; |
| 666 | } |
| 667 | |
| 668 | if (retcert) { |
| 669 | *retcert = NULL((void*)0); |
| 670 | } |
| 671 | if (retkey) { |
| 672 | *retkey = NULL((void*)0); |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | |
| 675 | if (ri->cert) { |
| 676 | cert = CERT_DupCertificate(ri->cert); |
| 677 | if (!cert) { |
| 678 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 679 | } |
| 680 | } |
| 681 | if (SECSuccess == rv && !cert) { |
| 682 | /* we don't have the cert, we have to look for it */ |
| 683 | /* first build an NSS_CMSRecipient */ |
| 684 | recipientInfos[0] = ri; |
| 685 | recipientInfos[1] = NULL((void*)0); |
| 686 | |
| 687 | recipients = nss_cms_recipient_list_create(recipientInfos); |
| 688 | if (recipients) { |
| 689 | /* now look for the cert and key */ |
| 690 | if (0 == PK11_FindCertAndKeyByRecipientListNew(recipients, |
| 691 | ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg)) { |
| 692 | cert = CERT_DupCertificate(recipients[0]->cert); |
| 693 | key = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(recipients[0]->privkey); |
| 694 | } else { |
| 695 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 696 | } |
| 697 | |
| 698 | nss_cms_recipient_list_destroy(recipients); |
| 699 | } else { |
| 700 | rv = SECFailure; |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | } else if (SECSuccess == rv && cert && retkey) { |
| 703 | /* we have the cert, we just need the key now */ |
| 704 | key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(cert->slot, cert, ri->cmsg->pwfn_arg); |
| 705 | } |
| 706 | if (retcert) { |
| 707 | *retcert = cert; |
| 708 | } else { |
| 709 | if (cert) { |
| 710 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); |
| 711 | } |
| 712 | } |
| 713 | if (retkey) { |
| 714 | *retkey = key; |
| 715 | } else { |
| 716 | if (key) { |
| 717 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(key); |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | } |
| 720 | |
| 721 | return rv; |
| 722 | } |
| 723 | |
| 724 | SECStatus |
| 725 | NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_Encode(PLArenaPool *poolp, |
| 726 | const NSSCMSRecipientInfo *src, |
| 727 | SECItem *returned) |
| 728 | { |
| 729 | extern const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate[]; |
| 730 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 731 | if (!src || !returned) { |
| 732 | PORT_SetErrorPORT_SetError_Util(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
| 733 | } else if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItemSEC_ASN1EncodeItem_Util(poolp, returned, src, |
| 734 | NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate)) { |
| 735 | rv = SECSuccess; |
| 736 | } |
| 737 | return rv; |
| 738 | } |